This compilation brings together the most important judgments and decisions on prison issues handed down by the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union.
By reporting on the main trends in European prison case law, it aims to support legal practitioners in the prison field in their research and litigation, as well as to identify blind spots in European case law and to build strategic litigation avenues.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
VAINIK AND OTHERS v. ESTONIA ■ Applications nos. 17982/21 and 3 others
Introduction of a total ban on smoking in prisons; no consensus among member States on the need to ban smoking in prison settings; ban not subject to parliamentary review and debate; no assessment of the impact of the ban from the perspective of smoking prisoners’ personal autonomy, understood as encompassing the possibility to make choices about one’s own life and health: violation of Article 8 (Joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Roosma and Ní Raifeartaigh, partly dissenting opinion of Justice Pavli).
M.A. v. LATVIA ■ Application no. 55234/21
Detention of a mentally ill person in ordinary prison facilities despite a court order for her placement in a general psychiatric hospital: violation of Article 5 § 1 (e).
SANCHEZ I PICANYOL AND OTHERS v. SPAIN ■ Applications nos. 25608/20 and 2 others
Political figure imprisoned for his participation in events linked to the Catalan independence referendum; refusal to grant him temporary prison leave to enable his participation in political processes (electoral campaign, parliamentary sittings): no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.
A.V. v. SWITZERLAND ■ Application no. 37639/19
Systematic monitoring of the applicant’s correspondence in prison, with the exception of correspondence with her lawyer and several public institutions: no violation of Article 8.
VĂSCĂUŢANU v. ROMANIA (dec.) ■ Application no. 10120/23
Prisoner held in inadequate detention conditions failed to use a domestic preventive remedy rendered effective by recent case-law developments and general measures taken by the authorities to address the structural problems of prison overcrowding and poor detention conditions: inadmissible (non-exhaustion of domestic remedies).
RASMUSSEN AND OTHERS v. DENMARK ■ Application no. 2390/24
Death of a prisoner caused by a drug overdose (opioids); prison authorities had not had sufficient facts at their disposal to suggest that there was a real and immediate risk to the prisoner’s life: no violation of Article 2.
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
Ukraine | Deterioration of the state of health of a prisoner suffering from a congenital disease for which there is no commonly available cure – retinitis pigmentosa (Nikolayev v. Ukraine, no. 54309/20, 6 November 2025): inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
VAINIK AND OTHERS v. ESTONIA ■ Applications nos. 17982/21 and 3 others ■ Third Section ■ 4 November 2025
This legal summary was prepared by the Court’s Registry.
Art 8 ■ Introduction of total ban on smoking in prisons affecting the applicants, serving prisoners who were long-term smokers ■ Choice to smoke and the provision of treatment to counter withdrawal effects of quitting fell within the material scope of the right to respect for private life ■ Legitimate aims of protecting health and preventing disorder or crime ■ Domestic authorities enjoyed considerable but not unlimited margin of appreciation to regulate smoking in prison ■ Impugned ban not adopted by Parliament and did not benefit from direct parliamentary review and debate ■ Lack of consensus among member States on the need to ban smoking in prison settings • No assessment of importance and impact of ban from the perspective of the personal autonomy of prisoners who smoke ■ Failure to provide relevant and sufficient reasons for far-reaching and absolute prohibition ■ Margin of appreciation exceeded.
Facts ■ In October 2016 the Minister of Justice amended the provisions of Regulation no. 72 on the Internal Prison Rules resulting in prison detainees being prohibited from having smokable tobacco products and items that can be used to assemble or smoke smokable tobacco products. In April 2017 the governor of Viru Prison amended Viru Prison’s house rules to completely ban smoking on its premises. Both bans entered into force on 1 October 2017.
The applicants were all detained in Viru Prison at the time the smoking ban entered into force and were long-term smokers. They all unsuccessfully brought complaints before the administrative courts challenging the introduced measures. The complaints brought by two of the applicants resulted in constitutional review proceedings before the Supreme Court in which that court declared the ban constitutional.
Law ■ Articles 3 and 8
(1) Admissibility – Compatibility ratione materiae
(a) Article 3 – The applicants had all been long-term smokers before the ban on smoking entered into force. The Court was prepared to accept that the forced and abrupt break from a long-term smoking habit, together with the ensuing withdrawal symptoms, might cause mental and physical distress. Whilst acknowledging that it might not always be easy or even possible to supply medical evidence of the occurrence and extent of (mental) distress, the Court considered that, even if quitting smoking had caused the applicants some level of stress and anguish, it could not be concluded that the possible suffering had attained the minimum level of severity. There was, therefore, no sufficient basis for concluding that the applicants had been treated in such a way as to reach the threshold of Article 3.
Conclusion: inadmissible (incompatible ratione materiae).
(b) Article 8 – Given the broad notion of “private life” and the manner in which it had been applied in its case-law, the Court was prepared to accept that the choice to smoke – an activity not generally banned in the respondent State – and the question of providing treatment to counter the withdrawal effects of quitting smoking could be seen as falling within the material scope of the right to respect for private life. Accordingly, Article 8 was applicable.
Conclusion: admissible.
(2) Merits
The present case was the first time that the Court had been called upon to assess the impact of a total ban on smoking in prison on prisoners with a long-term smoking habit. It considered the ban had been an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private life but held it had been “in accordance with the law” and had served the legitimate aim of protecting the health of others as it had intended to protect the health of non-smoking prisoners and prison staff from the harmful effects of passive smoking. In addition, the Court accepted that prison security and more efficient use of prison resources could be linked to the legitimate aim of preventing disorder or crime.
(a) Margin of appreciation – The loss of the ability to smoke could not be regarded as an inevitable consequence of a custodial sentence in terms of the right to respect for private life. Moreover, given that all the applicants had been convicted and were serving their prison sentences, the ban on smoking could not be seen as an inherent part of the punitive element of the custodial sentence. Indeed, in all but one of the member States that had been surveyed, prisoners continued to be able to smoke, subject to limitations of varying scope and intensity. Although member States had an obligation to take positive measures to protect prisoners against the harmful effects of passive smoking in certain circumstances, the Court had previously acknowledged that there was no uniform approach or solution among the Contracting States with regard to such protection. Despite the lack of a uniform approach, the Court noted the general international trend towards stricter tobacco control with the aim of protecting people from exposure to tobacco smoke. That trend, in broad terms, was also evident in the prison context. According to the comparative-law information available to the Court, almost all of the member States surveyed had taken steps to restrict smoking in prisons, and normally allowed it only in specifically designated areas. At the same time, in the overwhelming majority of member States the protection of individuals from exposure to tobacco smoke in prison had not been considered to require a total smoking ban.
Although smoking was a habit likely to lead to addiction, making it difficult to quit, the activity itself could not be considered an indispensable or inextricable facet of an individual’s identity or existence. At the same time, the decision to smoke – or not – could be seen as part of the freedom to make choices about one’s own body and health, and, as such, an exercise of personal autonomy. The aims of tobacco control in prison must be balanced against the standards enshrined in the “Nelson Mandela Rules” and the European Prison Rules, which emphasise that prison regimes should seek to minimise differences between prison life and life at liberty. In that connection, the Court reiterated that restrictions on Convention rights specific to prisoners had to be justified by reference to considerations of security or other necessary and inevitable consequences of imprisonment, or flow from an adequate link between the restriction and the circumstances of the prisoner in question.
In view of the above, and noting that the ban had been implemented not only with the aim of protecting health but also in the overall interests of preventing disorder and crime, the Estonian authorities had enjoyed a considerable margin of appreciation when addressing the issue of smoking in prison.
(b) Necessary in a democratic society – Prisoners in general continued to enjoy all the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention save for the right to liberty. It was thus inconceivable that a prisoner forfeited those rights merely because of his status as a person detained following conviction. The applicants’ right to respect for their private life was a right underpinned by the notion of personal autonomy which entailed, as a matter of principle, the possibility to make choices about one’s own life and health. While prisoners did not forfeit their right to private life and autonomy simply owing to detention, the manner in which they could choose to exercise their private life in prison was nonetheless constrained to a considerable degree. It could be argued that, in that context of already limited personal autonomy, the freedom of choice over matters that prisoners could still decide for themselves – such as whether to smoke – becomes all the more precious to those individuals. In that connection, from the prisoners’ perspective, smoking might be viewed not only as a mere unhealthy habit but also as a means of relieving anxiety and tension.
The ban on smoking had been introduced through amendments to the Internal Prison Rules, followed by changes to Viru Prison’s house rules. The prohibition had been adopted through general measures and not specifically addressed to the applicants. The ban had not been adopted by Parliament, but rather had resulted from the combined effect of a ministerial regulation and Viru Prison’s house rules. While the Court did not doubt the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the ban contained in the Internal Prison Rules had been in keeping with the relevant provisions of the Imprisonment Act on which it had been based, it nonetheless noted that the ban did not benefit from direct parliamentary review and debate. The social and economic impacts of the smoking ban, as well as its constitutionality, had been analysed in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft amendments to the Internal Prison Rules and Viru Prison’s house rules and subsequently by the Supreme Court in the context of constitutional review proceedings. In that connection, the domestic authorities’ proportionality assessment appeared to have been focused on how the complete ban on smoking – while interfering with the right to property and right to free self-realisation – contributed to the aims of health protection and prison security. In addition, it had been found that no less restrictive means had been feasible or that they would not be as effective in achieving the stated aim as the complete ban. However, from the smokers’ perspective, the domestic analysis seemed to have focused on the ban’s limited (physical) impact in terms of withdrawal effects and the possibility of counselling and treatment. In that regard, the understanding of personal autonomy, together with the importance of prisoners’ freedom of choice to decide on matters concerning their own body and health, seemed to have been completely absent from the domestic discussion. Indeed, as appeared from the explanatory memorandum to the draft regulation amending the Internal Prison Rules, smoking among prisoners had been seen as an expression of prison subculture rather than an exercise of choice.
While acknowledging that the member States’ margin of appreciation in regulating smoking in prisons was considerable, the Court took the view that it was not all-embracing or unlimited. While there was an overall international trend towards limiting smoking in society at large, as well as a trend towards restricting smoking in member States’ prisons, smoking tobacco remained legal for persons at liberty, and, on the basis of the limited examples in the prison context, it could not be concluded that there was a consensus among the member States on the need to ban smoking in prison settings. The Court welcomed the efforts to protect health and security in prisons by limiting the exposure of non-smokers to second-hand smoke and other risks associated with smoking. It acknowledged that, in terms of regulating smoking in prisons through the adoption of general measures, the authorities could not be expected to assess the proportionality of smoking restrictions in each individual case. However, it found that the national authorities, by imposing a complete ban on smoking in prisons without assessing its importance and impact from the perspective of personal autonomy of prisoners who smoke, had failed to provide relevant and sufficient reasons for that far-reaching and absolute prohibition and thus had exceeded the margin of appreciation afforded by the Convention.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 8.
Article 41 ■ EUR 1,500 in respect of costs and expenses; claim for just satisfaction dismissed.
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
M.A. v. LATVIA ■ Application no. 55234/21 ■ First Section ■ 6 November 2025
Art 5 § 1 ■ Persons of unsound mind ■ Detention of a mentally ill person in ordinary prison facilities despite a court order for her placement in a general psychiatric hospital not in conformity with Art 5 § 1 (e) ■ Six-month delay between the order to place her in a psychiatric hospital and her placement ■ Lack of coordination between domestic courts.
Facts ■ In 2016, the applicant was assessed as having a second-degree disability on account of her mental illness (organic personality disorder, epilepsy with generalised seizure disorder). In March 2018, the applicant was convicted to four years’ imprisonment for fraud, tax evasion and forgery and was incarcerated in Iļģuciema Prison.
In 2021 the framework of unrelated criminal proceedings on suspicion of fraud, a forensic psychiatric examination found that the applicant’s mental condition had deteriorated to the point that it did not allow her to participate in court proceedings or to serve a sentence in prison. The expertise recommended the application of compulsory medical measures (medical treatment in a general psychiatric hospital) instead of imprisonment.
In May 2021, the applicant was transferred to the Latvian Prison Hospital in Olaine Prison for further medical treatment. Upon request of the applicant’s lawyer, the applicant was examined by the prison’s doctor council, who concluded that there was no indication that the applicant should be released from further serving her sentence.
In July 2021, in the frame of the second set of proceedings, a District court ordered the applicant’s placement in a general psychiatric hospital for six months pending the proceedings for application of compulsory medical measures. In August 2021, the Olaine prison asked a Regional court whether the applicant could continue to serve the sentence imposed on her in the first set of criminal proceedings. While the proceedings were pending, the applicant was transferred back to Iļģuciema Prison.
In September 2021, the competent court requested an outpatient forensic psychiatric examination of the applicant. This expertise could not take place before December 2021, due to COVID-19 quarantine measures. In the meantime, the application for conditional release of the applicant, filed by Iļģuciema Prison, was rejected by the competent court.
In December 2021, the outpatient psychiatric examination concluded that, in view of her mental illness, the applicant could not be placed in a prison, and recommended to apply compulsory medical treatment in a general psychiatric hospital.
In January 2022, in the frame of the second criminal proceedings, the District court ordered the placement of the applicant in a general psychiatric hospital for another six months. On the next day, the Iļģuciema Prison informed the competent courts that in the absence of a ruling precluding the applicant from serving a prison sentence in the first set of proceedings, it would continue to execute that sentence.
In February 2022, on the basis of the expert’s conclusions it had recently received, a district court decided to release the applicant from the obligation to serve the sentence and applied compulsory medical measures by ordering her placement in a general psychiatric hospital. The applicant was immediately placed in the Riga Psychiatric and Narcology Centre.
Law ■ Articles 3 and 13
The applicant complained that her continued detention in an ordinary prison amounted to a violation of Article 3. She further argued that she did not have an effective remedy in this respect.
The Court considered this part of the complaint to be inadmissible, due to non-exhaustion of available domestic remedies. It noted that, in relation to poor detention conditions, it had considered that complaints before administrative courts were effective remedies (§ 68, referring to D v. Latvia, no. 76680/17, § 33, 11 January 2024).
The Court rejected the applicant’s argument that, due to her mental health condition, she “could not have understood her actions or lodged complaints regarding the adequacy of medical assistance provided to her in the ordinary prison facilities or procured a power of attorney for these purposes” (§ 61). The Court also rejected the applicant’s argument that “domestic law did not provide for the possibility of a convicted person applying for legal aid in proceedings before the administrative courts” (ibid.). It noted in particular that during the period under consideration, “a number of other complaints were lodged on her behalf with various domestic authorities by her counsel […] in addition to the present application before the Court” (§ 69). Consequently, the Court “conclude that the practical realities of the applicant’s position amounted to special circumstances dispensing her from the obligation to avail herself of the remedy provided for in domestic law” (ibid.).
As regards the applicant’s argument that due to their length, domestic proceedings could not be considered as effective, the Court observed that the applicant could have requested an interim measure.
Conclusion ■ Inadmissible (non-exhaustion of domestic remedies).
Law ■ Article 5 § 1 (e)
General principles: Pankiewicz v. Poland, no. 34151/04, § 38, 12 February 2008, and Brand v. the Netherlands, no. 49902/99, § 58, 11 May 2004, Rooman v. Belgium [GC], no. 18052/11, § 190, 31 January 2019, W.A. v. Switzerland, no. 38958/16, § 32, 2 November 2021, O.H. v. Germany, no. 4646/08, § 78, 24 November 2011)
The Court analysed that important milestones in the case are the July 2021 and January 2022 court orders to place the applicant in a general psychiatric hospital pending the proceedings for application of compulsory medical measures (the compulsory medical measure was eventually ordered in February 2022). The Court should therefore analyse the conformity of the applicant’s detention between July 2021 and February 2022 with the purpose of Article 5 § 1.
The Court considered that “as from 13 July 2021, when the District Court found the applicant to be a person ‘of unsound mind’ and ordered her treatment in a general psychiatric hospital, albeit in separate unrelated criminal proceedings [then those for which she was initially imprisoned], the purpose of her ensuing detention became incompatible with the aims of her conviction in the first set of proceedings” (§ 89).
The Court observed that despite the July 2021 order to place the applicant in a general psychiatric hospital (which entered into force in August 2021), she was maintained in an ordinary prison for another six months until February 2022. The Court also noted that during her detention in prison, the applicant was only provided basic care that “no individualised treatment programme was put in place with a view to cure or alleviate her condition” (§ 90).
Although the Court acknowledged that the applicant was imprisoned in the frame of criminal proceedings, and then ordered to be placed in a psychiatric hospital in the frame of separate proceedings, and that “recourse to a special procedure under domestic law was required to secure her release from further serving her sentence and subsequent transfer to the psychiatric hospital” (§ 91).
However, it noted a lack of coordination between courts in the frame of those two parallel proceedings. In particular, although a first expertise on the applicant’s condition had been conducted (in April-May 2021) in the frame of the second set of proceedings, having led to the July 2021 order to place her in a general psychiatric hospital, another expertise was conducted in September 2021 in the framework of the proceedings for the applicant’s release from further serving her sentence imposed in the first set of criminal proceedings. The Court considered that no reason was given to explain the necessity of this second forensic psychiatric examination, which had delayed her admission in a specialised psychiatric facility.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 5 § 1 (e).
Article 41 ■ EUR 9,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, no claim in respect of costs and expenses.
SANCHEZ I PICANYOL AND OTHERS v. SPAIN ■ Applications no. 25608/20 and 2 others ■ Fifth Section ■ 6 November 2025
This summary focuses on the parts of complaints under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. It is adapted from the press release prepared by the Court’s Registry.
Art 3 P1 ■ Prisoner denied prison leave to take part in electoral campaign and sitting in Parliament ■ Seriousness of the offences committed, temporal proximity to the commission of these offences ■ Balancing by the national authorities of the various interests at stake cannot be described as arbitrary, and does not undermine the free expression of the opinion of the people.
Facts ■ At the relevant time, the first applicant (“the applicant”) was Chair of a civil association for the promotion of Catalan independence (Assemblea Nacional Catalana, ANC). In October 2017, the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention in connection with the events surrounding the organisation of a referendum on Catalonia’s independence, specifically the demonstrations co-organised by the ANC in September 2017 to prevent the search of Catalan public institutions, which resulted in altercations with law enforcement officers and significant material damage. In 2019, he was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment, as well as being banned from public office and disqualified from standing for election for an equal period. He was released in 2021 after being granted a pardon.
During his pre-trial detention, the applicant made several requests for measures enabling him to participate in political processes. In December 2017, in the frame of the Catalan general elections, he applied for prison leave to take part in the political campaign. On 14 December 2017, the investigating judge rejected his request, arguing that his ability to take part in the campaign was not eliminated by his imprisonment, and that limitations to his right to participate in the electoral process were justified by the fact his pre-trial detention aimed to mitigate the risk of his absconding, destroying evidence or committing new offences related to those for which he had been sentenced.
In 2018, having been elected member of the Catalan Parliament, the applicant also applied for prison leave to attend sittings of parliament and the investiture session for the Presidency of the Catalan Autonomous Government (Generalitat), to which he was a candidate (the President of the Generalitat is elected among members of Parliaments by members of the Parliament). Both requests were rejected by the competent authorities, up to the Constitutional Tribunal in January and February 2020.
On 21 March 2018, the first applicant submitted an application to the United Nations Human Rights Committee. He complained that the authorities decisions had deprived him of his right to political participation guaranteed by Article 25 of the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and requested that the Committee instruct the authorities to enable him to assume the presidency of the Generalitat, either by releasing him to attend the investiture, or by allowing him to attend via video link. On 23 March, the Committee called on the Spanish authorities to take all necessary measures to ensure the applicant could exercise his political rights. In May 2020, the applicant requested the withdrawal of his entire communication. His request was granted in March 2021.
The applicant also filed a complaint with the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, arguing that the authorities’ decisions prevented him from standing as candidate, as well as assuming the mandate in the event of his election. On 25 April 2019, the WGAD issued an opinion focusing on the detention measure, focusing on the detention measure only.
Law ■ Admissibility
General principles: Vojnovič v. Croatia (dec.), no. 4819/10, § 31, 26 June 2012 ; Celniku v. Greece, no. 21449/04, § 39, 5 July 2007 ; Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2), [GC], no. 14305/17, § 182 ; Gürdeniz v. Turkey (dec.), no. 59715/10, 18 March 2014
The Court specifically addressed the Government’s objection that, given the applicant’s application to the CCPR and the WGAD, his application before the Court should be declared inadmissible under Article 35 § 2 b), as it “has already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement and contains no relevant new information”. The Court recalled that the mere fact that a complaint has been lodged before an international body does not render it inadmissible, as the key criteria is the existence of a decision on the merits of the case.
Regarding the application to the CCPR, the Court noted that the applicant had withdrawn it. Regarding the application to the WGAD, the Court noted that the WGAD’s opinion focused on the legality of the applicant’s pre-trial detention rather than on the applicant’s political rights.
Law ■ Article 3 of Protocol No. 1
General principles: Etxeberria and Others v. Spain, nos 35579/03 and 3 others, § 48, 30 June 2009 ; Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 52 ; Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, § 115, CEDH 2006‑IV ; Selahattin Demirtas v. Turkey [GC], no. 14305/17, § 389
Regarding the rejection of the applicant’s applications for temporary release to participate in political processes, the Court based its assessment of the authorities’ decisions on the seriousness of the offences of which the applicant was accused, his rolee as Chair of an association advocating for the independence of Catalonia, and the social and political context at the material time, as well as the brief interval between the alleged offences and the rejection of the applicant’s applications.
Regarding the refusal to grant the applicant prison leave to participate in the electoral campaign, the Court noted that the authorities based their decision on their assessment of the risk of the applicant absconding or becoming involved in similar events to those for which he had been detained. The authorities provided a detailed assessment of this risk. Regarding the applicant’s access to the internet, the Court noted that he had access to communication means in line with the applicable prison regime applicable to him, and that his political party had been able to convey his political messages. The Court also noted that the applicant had been elected to the Catalan Parliament while being in prison.
Regarding the refusal to grant him prison leave to participate in the Catalan Parliament’s sittings, the Court noted that the authorities based their decision on the persisting risk of reoffending. The Court also noted that the authorities had afforded him the opportunity to vote by proxy during parliamentary sittings so as to preserve the essential content of the right to sit in Parliament. The Court noted that, despite being in remand detention and with criminal proceedings still pending, the applicant was permitted to participate in a sitting in May 2019. According to the Court, this “confirms the argument based on the proximity in time between the disputed facts and the applicant’s requests, as the impact of the aforementioned facts, as well as the risk of reoffending, diminishes over time” (§234).
Regarding the rejection of the applicant’s request for leave to attend the investiture session (as a candidate for the office of President of the Generalitat), the Court first confirmed that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 applies as relating to legislative processes (since the President of the Generalitat is selected by members of Parliaments among members of Parliament, taking part in the selection process is an extension of the exerice of the mandate of member of Parliament, §239). The Court then considered that, given the applicant’s involvement in the events of September 2017, it was not unreasonable for the domestic courts to conclude that “his presence at the Parliamentary session could have sparked further incidents of a certain intensity” (§241).
In conclusion, the court considered that the national authorities had not weighed the various interests at stake in an arbitrary manner or in a way that restricted the free expression of the people’s opinion (§ 253).
Conclusion ■ No violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.
A.V. v. SWITZERLAND ■ Application no. 37639/19 ■ Fifth Section ■ 6 November 2025
Art 8 ■ Correspondence ■ Monitoring by a prison of the applicant’s unprotected incoming and outgoing correspondence, with the exception of correspondence exchanged with her lawyer and a number of public institutions ■ Measure in accordance with the relevant legislation ■ Measure not considered in itself to be unreasonable or arbitrary in the light of the normal requirements of imprisonment.
Facts ■ In June 2017, the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention on charges of murder attempt on her daughter. In June 2018, the competent prosecutor’s office authorised the applicant to serve her prison sentence, in lieu of her remand detention, with special restrictions. These restrictions involved first monitoring the applicant’s correspondence and telephone conversations (order of 11 June), and then only monitoring her correspondence with her daughter, which was considered relevant for the ongoing investigation (order of 27 June 2018). On 14 August 2018, the competent court annulled the prosecutor’s office orders for lack of proper motivation. On 29 August 2018, the applicant started serving her sentence, without specific restrictions being indicated – which meant that the only usual restrictions on correspondence monitoring applied, including a general possibility for the prison administration to open prisoners’ mails on security grounds.
In September 2018, the applicant requested that the monitoring of her correspondence was lifted. In November 2018 and December 2018, the prison administration informed the applicant that the opening of her correspondence was carried out in application of the relevant legal provisions allowing the prison administration, on security grounds, to systematically open prisoners’ correspondence, with the exception of correspondence with lawyers and public authorities.
The applicant challenged this decision, arguing in particular that the said legal provisions failed to comply with the principle of the foreseeability, as it did not regulate either the grounds that might justify such monitoring or the scope of the authorities’ discretionary power in this area.
In January 2019, the competent court rejected the applicant’s appeal. It noted that the general control of the applicant’s correspondence resulted from generic legal provisions, not from a specific decision of the prison administration imposing a stricter monitoring leading to restriction on the distribution of the applicant’s correspondence. Only such decision would require to be based on an assessment of the impact of the measure on the applicant’s private and family life. Furthermore, the court noted that, since the measure did not apply to correspondence with lawyers or public authorities (licensed business agents, supervisory authorities, criminal authorities or consulates and embassies), it was proportionate.
In May 2019, the federal tribunal rejected the appeal formed by the applicant against the January 2019 judgment. The federal tribunal declared that the systematic opening of prisoners’ correspondence was aimed in particular at preventing the introduction of illicit items (drugs, blades, etc.) into the prison, but also at preventing the commission of new offences from within the prison (such as drug trafficking).
The applicant complained that the systematic opening of her correspondence, with the exception of her correspondence with her lawyer and public authorities, breached Article 8 of the Convention.
Law ■ Article 8
General principles: on the restriction of prisoners’ correspondence, see Kwiek v. Poland, § 39; on prisoners’ correspondence with specific authorities, see Campbell v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1992, Serie A no 233; Niedbała v. Poland, no. 27915/95, 4 July 2000; Szuluk v. United Kongdom, no. 36936/05, CEDH 2009 ; on the lack of precision on the authorities’ discretionary power in matters of automatic control of prisoners’ correspondence, see Labita v. Italy [GC], no.26772/95, §§ 175-185, CEDH 2000-IV; Onoufriou v. Cyprus, no. 24407/04, § 109, 7 January 2010; Vintman v. Ukraine, no. 28403/05, § 130, 23 October 2014; on the lack of information provided to a prisoner or lack of participation in the application of the measure see Sałapa v. Poland, no. 35489/97, § 97, 19 December 2002; on the protection against abuse in the control of prisoners’ correspondence, see Erdem v. Germany, no. 38321/97, § 65, CEDH 2001‑VII ; Fazıl Ahmet Tamer v. Turkey, no. 6289/02, § 51, 5 December 2006.
The Court noted that, since the applicant’s correspondence was systematically opened (with the exception of privileged correspondence, i.e. with lawyers and specific public authorities), it was undisputed that there had been an interference with her rights under Article 8.
The Court further noted that the measure was provided by law and was pursuing a legitimate aim – i.e. the “security and good functioning” of the prison facility, public security outside prison, and the prevention of future offences.
As regards the necessity of the measure, the Court noted that the applicant did not claim that her correspondence had been subject to additional measures, neither that the impugned measure had led to delays in the distribution of her correspondence. Referring to a judgment of a domestic court, the Court accepted that the systematic opening and reading of the applicant’s correspondence could be qualified as an “elementary surveillance” (“surveillance élémentaire”, § 37) as it concerned only the applicant’s non-privileged correspondence. The Court considered that for such a control, “there is no need to require the authorities to justify the necessity of such monitoring in each individual case” (ibid.) and accepted the Government’s view that “it would be difficult to distinguish between different detainees in the same institution for the purposes of such monitoring” (ibid.). The Court was also satisfied with the fact that a specific decision should be adopted by the authorities in the case where stricter monitoring conditions should be implemented. Lastly, the Court observed that the applicant had the possibility to challenge the impugned measure before domestic courts.
The Court concluded that the monitoring of the applicant’s unprotected correspondence was in accordance with the relevant legislation and cannot, in itself, be regarded as unreasonable or arbitrary in the light of the normal requirements of imprisonment.
Conclusion ■ No violation of Article 8.
VĂSCĂUŢANU v. ROMANIA (dec.) ■ Application no. 10120/23 ■ Fourth Section ■ 18 November 2025
This legal summary was prepared by the Court’s Registry.
Art 3 + 13 ■ Effective preventive remedy in matters of poor detention conditions ■ Recent evolution of practice of domestic court documented by nearly 200 cases ■ Complaint examined by a judge offering guarantees of independence and impartiality ■ Speediness of proceedings (15 days) ■ Adversarial proceedings ■ Binding decisions ■ General measures taken by the Government to address structural problems of prison overcrowding and poor detention conditions.
Art 35 § 1 ■ Non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
Facts ■ Imprisoned since 2019 and sentenced to life imprisonment, the applicant served his sentence in several prisons and in March 2024 he was once again transferred to Craiova Prison, where he is currently being held.
Between 2023 and 2024, on the basis of Article 56 of Law No. 254/2013 on the enforcement of sentences and measures involving deprivation of liberty imposed by the judicial authorities during criminal proceedings (“Law No. 254/2013”), the applicant lodged three complaints with the sentence enforcement judge concerning the alleged misuse of handcuffs by prison staff, the impossibility of having a dental X-ray and the alleged inadequacy of dental care. The second complaint was upheld in April 2024 by the sentence enforcement judge, who ordered the prison to facilitate access to the requested X-ray, while the other two complaints were dismissed in November 2023 and October 2024.
Invoking Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant alleges that the conditions in which he has been detained in Craiova prison since March 2024 amount to continuous inhuman and degrading treatment.
Law ■ Article 35 § 1
General principles: Rezmiveș and Others v. Romania, no. 61467/12, 25 April 2017; Polgar v. Romania, no. 39412/19, 20 July 2021; Vlad v. Romania (dec.), no. 122/17, 15 November 2022.
Since 13 January 2021, the compensatory remedy has been an effective remedy for persons who consider that they have been detained in poor conditions and who, at the time of bringing their action, are no longer detained in conditions that they allege to be contrary to the Convention (Polgar v. Romania; Vlad v. Romania (dec.)).
As the applicant has been detained in Craiova Prison since March 2024 in conditions allegedly contrary to Article 3, it must be examined whether he had a preventive remedy available to him that could have prevented the continuation of the alleged violation.
Law No. 254/2013 provides for the possibility for detainees to lodge a complaint with the judge responsible for the enforcement of sentences in the jurisdiction of which the prison is located, in order to report any measure relating to the exercise of their rights under that law.
It is necessary to examine whether this remedy – about which the Court had expressed doubts as to its effectiveness in Rezmiveș and Others v. Romania and Polgar, cited above – constitutes an effective remedy.
(a) The practice of domestic courts in applying Article 56 of Law No. 254/2013
The 194 relevant examples of case law provided by the Government show that most of the detainees who brought proceedings before the sentencing judges on the basis of Article 56 of Law No. 254/2013 to complain about their poor conditions of detention obtained favourable court decisions ordering the authorities to put an end to the situations described. More specifically, in 190 cases, the actions of the individuals concerned were upheld (in whole or in part), and 152 final court decisions resulting from these proceedings were enforced by the national authorities. This shows that, in the majority of cases, the use of this remedy by detainees has been effective in preventing the continuation of the alleged violations under Article 3.
This remedy is heard before a judge who offers guarantees of independence and impartiality. The judge’s decisions, which are adopted within 15 days of the complaint being lodged – thereby satisfying the criterion of speed of proceedings – are taken in accordance with the adversarial principle and are binding on prisons.
The examples in question cover the vast majority of prisons in the national prison system (a total of 21 out of 27 prisons) and a breakthrough in case law was achieved in 2023. In quantitative terms, there are three times as many relevant examples of case law as in the previous year and, in qualitative terms, it must be noted that the national courts seized of the matter generally conducted an examination in accordance with the requirements of the Convention, putting an end to the situations contrary to Article 3 denounced by the complainants. More specifically, in a judgment of 6 April 2023, the judge responsible for the enforcement of sentences at Iaşi prison ordered the prison to bring the cell in which the complainant was detained into line with standards for the accommodation of prisoners. Following this judgment, which was upheld by the court of first instance, the complainant was no longer imprisoned in the cell in question. In another case, in May 2023, the Piteşti Court of First Instance overturned the sentence enforcement judge’s ruling and ordered the prison in question to comply with domestic and international standards for the accommodation of prisoners, thereby putting an end to the overcrowding denounced by the complainant.
Other domestic decisions, which followed the judgment of 6 April 2023, also demonstrated that the preventive remedy enabled the complainants (including those incarcerated, like the applicant, in Craiova Prison) to put an end to the situations they had denounced as contrary to Article 3.
(b) On the general improvement of detention conditions
On the basis of the action plan launched in 2020, following the adoption of the pilot judgment in Rezmiveș and Others, cited above, the respondent State implemented a series of measures aimed at resolving the structural problem of poor detention conditions in Romanian prisons. Between 2020 and 2024, the accommodation capacity of detention centres has been increased, modernisation and renovation work has been undertaken on some of the existing cells and, in order to balance the prison population, prisoners have been transferred between prisons. Two new prisons are currently under construction. When reviewing the implementation of the pilot judgment, the progress made by the national authorities received a positive signal from the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which at the same time encouraged them to continue their efforts to implement their action plan in these areas, in particular to put in place measures to reduce the prison population.
The Council of Europe’s annual penal statistics (SPACE) confirm that over the last eleven years, the density rate in Romanian prisons has shown a general downward trend (from 165.4% in 2013 to 120.09% in 2022, to 116% in 2024), although prison overcrowding still persists.
In view of this overall downward trend, which is expected to continue, and the material conditions in Romanian prisons, as well as the likelihood that this situation will remain manageable, thanks in particular to renovation and construction work, the decisions of the sentence enforcement judge and the courts do not appear difficult or impossible to comply with in cases where they aim to remedy overcrowding or improve existing material conditions.
Given the nature of the preventive remedy, the way in which the domestic courts apply it and the improvement in the material conditions of detention in Romanian prisons, the remedy introduced by Article 56 of Law No. 254/2013 has, since 6 April 2023, an accessible remedy that is likely to offer reasonable prospects of success to persons who allege that they are being detained in poor conditions.
c) On the effectiveness of the preventive remedy in the applicant’s case
The applicant made use of the remedy established by Law No 254/2013 on three occasions to allege ill-treatment and obtain adequate medical care during his detention in Craiova prison, but never to complain about what he considered to be poor conditions of detention in that prison.
However, the remedy established by Law No. 254/2013 could be considered, as of 6 April 2023, to be effective for challenging poor conditions of detention in Romanian prisons.
The applicant should have made use of the preventive remedy in question in order to obtain an immediate improvement in his living conditions in prison.
The Court reserves the right to examine the consistency of subsequent domestic case law with its own case law, as well as the effectiveness of remedies in theory and in practice with regard to improving the situation of overcrowding and material conditions in Romanian prisons.
Conclusion ■ Inadmissible (failure to exhaust domestic remedies).
RASMUSSEN AND OTHERS v. DENMARK ■ Application no. 2390/24 ■ Fourth Section ■ 25 November 2025
Art 2 (substantive) ■ Accidental death of a prisoner caused by a drug overdose ■ Domestic courts thoroughly examined the case in the light of the Court’s case‑law ■ In case-circumstances not established that the prison authorities knew or ought to have known there was a real and immediate risk to his life ■ Prison authorities took basic precautions to minimise any potential risk to protect the prisoner’s health and well-being.
Facts ■ The applicants are the mother, wife and child of J.F., who died in Kragskovhede prison on 17 November 2017 following an opioids overdose.
J.F. was incarcerated on 22 September 2017. He was considered to be addicted to benzodiazepines and other substances. On 16 November 2017 in the morning, he was conducted to the prison nurse and started an antibiotics treatment for a dental abscess. In the evening (7.40 p.m.) a prison officer observed that he appeared intoxicated. Furthermore, another prisoner alleged that stolen a bottle of methadone tablets when he had seen the prison nurse and “had taken too many of those tablets” (§ 7).
Upon instruction of the nurse, J.F. was transferred to the prison’s medical unit for observation. The nurse also instructed to call a doctor or emergency services should J.F. deteriorate. At the medical unit, prison officers talked to J.F., who denied taking anything other than antibiotics. He was placed in a provisional observation cell. When J.F.’s cell was searched, “a piece of cardboard […] with two lines of powder arranged on it” (ibid.) was found, suggesting that he had taken additional substance. J.F. was checked on every hour visually by prison officers, who however did not enter the cell.
On 17 November 2017 at 12.15 a.m. a prison officer noticed that J.F. was no longer moving. He was declared dead less than hour after, at 1.10 a.m. The autopsy report established that the cause of the death was “poisoning caused by methadone, oxycodone, fentanyl and benzodiazepines” (§ 12).
The criminal investigations into the case were discontinued since it could not be determined that a criminal offence had be committed. A report by the Danish Patient Safety Authority found that the prison had “major problems of significance to patient safety” concerning the storage of medicines and the safe administration of medication (§ 14). The Ombudsman noted that the prison administration “had not meticulously followed [… the instructions] on dealing with an intoxicated client” and that several errors had been made (see below). However, having noted that the Prison and Probation Service had raised several criticisms, it found no reason to take further action.
In September 2020, the applicants initiated civil proceedings against the authorities. In a judgment handed down in May 2022, the District Court considered that “it ought to have been clear to the prison staff that there had been a significant risk that J.F. had taken an overdose of methadone” (§ 22) and therefore considered that “because a doctor had not been called to attend to J.F., the prison staff had not acted as could reasonably be expected in the given situation, and thus had not met the obligation incumbent on the Prison and Probation Service to protect J.F.’s life” (ibid.). However, in March 2023, following appeal proceedings, the High Court found that “with the information available at the time, the actions of the Prison and Probation Service did not act contrary to the obligations following from Article 2” ECHR (§ 29).
The Appeals Permission Board refused to grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Law ■ Article 2
General principles: Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 97, ECHR 2000‑VII; Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no. 23458/02, §§ 174 and 177, ECHR 2011 and T.V. v. Croatia, no. 47909/19, § 46, 11 June 2024, Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], no. 50385/99, §§ 57-59, ECHR 2004‑XI; Tekin and Arslan v. Belgium, no. 37795/13, § 84, 5 September 2017; Machalikashvili and Others v. Georgia, no. 32245/19, § 99, 19 January 2023, Ainis and Others v. Italy no. 2264/12, 14 September 2023, § 54, Patsaki and Others v. Greece, no. 20444/14, § 87, 7 February 2019, Daraibou v. Croatia, no. 84523/17, § 84, 17 January 2023, Fernandes de Oliveira v. Portugal [GC], no. 78103/14, § 132, 31 January 2019, and Hasani v. Sweden, no. 35950/20, § 76, 6 March 2025
As regards the procedural aspect, the Court noted that investigations were initiated and that an autopsy was conducted shortly after J.F.’s death, and that “domestic courts thoroughly examined the case in the light of the Court’s case‑law” (§ 76).
As regards the substantive aspect, the Court clarified that its task was to determine whether “whether the prison authorities knew or ought to have known that J.F. was at real and immediate risk of losing his life, and in the affirmative, whether they failed to take, within the scope of their powers, measures which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk, including providing prompt medical care” (§ 71).
In this respect, the Court observed that some crucial facts could not be fully clarified (e.g. whether a bottle of 100 tablets of methadone had gone missing on the day of the events, how many tables J.F. ingested, and how he obtained the remaining opioids found in his blood).
It also noted that the Prison and Probation Service and the Parliamentary Ombudsman had identified various errors – namely that the instruction on dealing with an intoxicated client where not followed since the nurse had not contacted a doctor and she had not arranged for J.F. to be observed at set times, that there was no stock management or monitoring of the stock of medicines in the prison, that J.F. had not been formally searched when he had arrived at the medical unit, that the substance discovered in J.F.’s cell had been destroyed and therefore could not be analysed and that J.F. had not been asked to provide a urine sample.
However, while acknowledging that “various actions might have mitigated the risk of J.F. dying from an overdose” (§ 80), the Court considered that since the authorities could not have known that there was a real and immediate risk to J.F.’s life, it cannot be considered that they failed to take these measures to avoid that risk.
Concerning the fact that no doctor had been called, while noting that “it would certainly have been prudent to call a doctor” (§ 81), it noted that J.F. “displayed no behaviour conducive to self-harm, or other alarming signs […] and often appeared to be under the influence of medicine or drugs” (§ 81). Consequently, when he was taken to the medical unit to be observed by prison officers, these officers did not consider J. F.’s intoxication to be unusual. Furthermore, the Court considered that the prison officers took sufficient basic precaution to minimise J.F.’s health risks – they contacted a nurse who instructed them to keep J.F. under observation and to call a doctor in case his state would deteriorate; J.F. was also kept under close observation until he went to bed, and was then checked on every hour.
Concerning the lack of monitoring of the stock of methadone, the Court noted that “a better monitoring of the stock of methadone could have helped clarify rather quickly whether a bottle of methadone tablets had gone missing, which could have supported the suspicion that J.F. had taken it” (§ 84). However, noting that the prison’s dispensary was equipped with locked cabinets for dangerous medicines and considered “that a better monitoring system could not have prevented human error such as the nurse being briefly distracted and thus allowing an inmate to steal medicine” (ibid.).
Concerning the fact that J.F. had not been searched upon his arrival at the medical unit (prison officers just checked his clothes and patted his pockets), the Court considered that it is not its role “to assess whether such coercive measures, which would have infringed on J.F.’s personal autonomy, would have been justified” (§ 86) and noted that there was no indication that J.F. had taken and ingested substances. As regards the urine testing, the Court considered that although it could have confirmed the ingestion of substances, the effect of such ingestion “would nevertheless have depended on the tolerance level of the individual concerned” (ibid.).
Similarly, concerning the destruction of the substances discovered in J.F.’s cell, the court considered unclear whether the analysis of such substance “could have cast light on the nature and amount of drugs and substances that J.F. had already ingested” (§ 85).
Concerning the lack of availability of naloxone (which can work as an antidote is case of opioid overdose), also underlined by the CPT in its 2024 report (§ 47, quoting the CPT report mentioning this absence as a source of “serious concern”), the Court noted that this had not been raised before domestic courts and, in any event, considered that
“no evidence has been provided to indicate whether naloxone was available at the relevant time, and whether it could possibly have made a difference in the treatment of J.F.” (§ 87).
Lastly, the Court considered the overdose had been accidental (since there was no indication of intentional self-harm) and that J.F. “significantly contributed to the perception of the prison officers that he was not facing a real and immediate threat to his life” (§ 88) since he denied having taken drugs (despite him having ingested various opioids on that day) and refused medical attention multiple times.
Consequently, the Court accepted the domestic High Court findings that the prison authorities “did not know or could not have known that J.F. […] was so intoxicated that there was a real and immediate risk that he would lose his life” (§ 89). Despite this, observed the Court, they “took certain basic precautions in order to minimise any potential risk to protect the health and well-being of J.F.” (ibid.). Consequently, the Court considered that it does not need to examine whether the prison authorities had taken measures which could reasonably have been expected of them.
Conclusion ■ No violation of Article 2.
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