This compilation gathers the most important judgments and decisions on prison issues handed down by the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union.
By reporting on the main trends in European prison case law, it aims to support legal practitioners in the prison field in their research and litigation, as well as to identify blind spots in European case law to build strategic litigation avenues.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
MAGYAR AND OTHERS v. HUNGARY (dec.) ■ Applications nos. 21083/23 and 7 others
Rejection by domestic court of prisoners’ request to review their life sentences, recognised by the Court as ‘irreducible’ in previous judgments: inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
TAŞ v. TÜRKİYE (dec.) ■ Application no. 40924/19
Two-month delay in providing a prisoner with medical equipment prescribed by a doctor (back pain); applicant failed to demonstrate that he had filed a petition with the prison administration requesting these items: inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
HAYES AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM ■ Applications nos. 56532/22 and 2 others
No risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole which would be irreducible de facto and de jure in the event of the applicants’ extradition to, and conviction in, the USA; compassionate release considered a satisfactory review mechanism; mandatory sentence of life imprisonment not considered grossly disproportionate in the circumstances of the case: no violation of Article 3.
ZEYNALOV AND SADIGOV v. AZERBAIJAN ■ Application no. 29041/14
Prisoner subjected to personal search before and after meetings with his lawyer, lawyer’s documents inspected following meetings with his client in prison, and seizure by prison staff of a letter addressed to a third person entrusted by the prisoner to his lawyer for posting; interference with lawyer-client communications without any suspicion of wrongdoing; the fact that the letter was not addressed to the prisoner’s lawyer is incapable of justifying the interference: violation of Article 8.
UKRAINE AND THE NETHERLANDS v. RUSSIA [GC] ■ Applications nos. 8019/16 and 3 others
Administrative practices in occupied territory of Ukraine resulting in grave human rights violations perpetrated by Russian or Russian-controlled forces.
Extrajudicial killings, including during detention, of civilians and prisoners of war: violation of Article 2.
Torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and appalling conditions of detention of civilians and prisoners of war: violation of Article 3.
Forced labour of civilians and prisoners of war: violation of Article 4 § 2.
Unlawful and arbitrary detention of civilians: violation of Article 5.
Unjustified displacement and transfer of civilians in detention and application of filtration measures: violation of Article 8.
Respondent Government failed to provide information requested by the Court: violation of Article 38.
Article 46: Respondent State to release or safely return all persons who were deprived of liberty on Ukrainian territory under occupation by the Russian and Russian-controlled forces in breach of Article 5 before 16 September 2022 and who were still in the custody of the Russian authorities.
GULLOTTI v. ITALY ■ Application no. 64753/14
Unjustified additional limitation of applicant’s right to correspondence during special regime detention (“41 bis”): violation of Article 8.
ZLOBIN AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA ■ Applications nos. 9096/13 and 9 others
Prisoners’ rights organisation and its director ordered to delete and refute online publications made on the conditions of detention, as well ill-treatment and torture in a correctional colony for women following a defamation dispute: violation of Article 10.
GÜNGÖRAY v. TÜRKİYE ■ Application no. 33975/21
Prisoner with allergic asthma exposed to passive smoking for one year and seven months despite medical reports recommending his transfer to a non-smoking cell; transfer not effected after COVID-19 risks had decreased: violation of Article 3.
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
Russia | Inadequate conditions of detention during prisoners’ transport – inadequate temperature, lack of fresh air, lack of or insufficient electric or natural light, no or restricted access to toilet, overcrowding, absence of windows, passive smoking, transportation at night (Sokolov and Medvedkova v. Russia, nos. 42076/20 and 43729/20, 10 July 2025): violation of Article 3.
Russia | Permanent video surveillance of prisoners in pre-trial or post-conviction detention facilities, including lavatory and/or shower room and by opposite-sex operators; restrictions on family visits in pre-trial detention facilities; inability to take part in parliamentary elections (Tingayev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42870/16 and 12 others, 10 July 2025): violation of Article 8; violation of Article 3 of Protocol no. 1.
Ukraine | Life-sentenced prisoners deprived of clear and realistic prospects of early release until 3 March 2023 reform (Kovalenko and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 22971/19 and 24 others, 28 August 2025): violation of Article 3 for the period between the date of the applicants’ final sentencing to life imprisonment until 3 March 2023; no violation of Article 3 after that date.
Armenia| Prisoner with health conditions (severe diabetes, heart condition, serious mobility problems) not provided with adequate medical treatment; restricted use of sanitary facilities owing to their lack of accessibility for persons with limited mobility; no daily assistance provided for the administration of medication and the maintenance of personal hygiene, which was instead carried out by other prisoners (Grigoryan v. Armenia, no. 14875/23, 28 August 2025): violation of Article 3.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
MAGYAR AND OTHERS v. HUNGARY (dec.) ■ Applications nos. 21083/23 and 7 others ■ Second Section Committee ■ 1 July 2025
Art 3 ■ Life sentence without a possibility of parole or with a possibility of parole after serving a very long time ■ Applications before domestic courts following ECtHR judgment dismissed ■ No “relevant new information possibly entailing a fresh violation” of Article 6 the Convention.
Facts ■ The eight applicants are serving life sentences which were recognised by the Court in previous judgments as being de facto irreducible. The applicants have asked the Hungarian Kúria to implement these judgments and address the irreducibility of their sentence by reviewing the judgments sentencing them to irreducible life sentences. The Kúria rejected the applications presented before it. In one case, it held that the impugned sentence had been established in review proceedings and is therefore insusceptible of further review. In the other cases, it held that “the question of reducibility was one of execution of criminal judgments, rather than one of sentencing” and therefore argued that the impugned sentences could not be considered contrary to the Convention (§ 7).
The applicants argued that their sentences remained irreducible despite the Court’s judgments, and that the rejection of their applications by the Kúria “represented reluctance to abide by the Court’s judgments” (§ 9).
Law ■ Admissibility
First, the Court recalled that “complaints of a failure either to execute the Court’s judgment or to redress a violation already found by the Court fall outside the Court’s competence ratione materiae” (§ 16), as the supervision of the execution of its judgments fall within the remit of the Committee of Ministers, which can initiate an infringement procedure if it considers that a State refuses to abide by a final judgment (Article 46 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention).
Second, the Court stressed that the applicant did not complain about unfairness of proceedings before the Kúria, but only about the outcomes of these decisions – which indicates that the issue “is entirely rooted in the original criminal judgments imposing the impugned irreducible life sentences on the applicants” (§ 22). The Court therefore considered that the applications did not contain “relevant new information possibly entailing a fresh violation” of Article 6 the Convention (§ 19, mentioning Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no. 22251/08, § 35, 5 February 2015 as a reference), and were therefore incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention.
Conclusion ■ Inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
TAŞ v. TÜRKİYE (dec.) ■ Application no. 40924/19 ■ Second Section Committee ■ 1 July 2025
Art 3 ■ Delay in providing a prisoner with medical equipment prescribed by a doctor ■ Items provided following legal action ■ Applicant failed to demonstrate he had filed a petition to the prison administration
Facts ■ The applicant was detained in İzmir F-Type Prison. On 4 December 2017, he underwent a medical examination at a public hospital. The medical report drawn up following the examination recommended the use of several medical items (a heater for the applicant’s knees, a corset to relieve his sciatica and herniated lumbar disc, and an orthopaedic pillow).
The applicant alleges that on 7 December 2017 he had submitted a petition to the prison administration, asking to be provided with those items. On 12 December 2017, one of these items (a heater) was delivered to the applicant upon his request.
On 2 February 2018, the applicant submitted a petition to the prison administration, stating that despite his petition dated 7 December 2017, he had not received the items requested. In this petition he also requested the authorities to allow his family to bring the necessary equipment, which were not provided to him by the prison authorities.
On 6 February 2018 he lodged a complaint with the İzmir enforcement judge, stating that the prison authorities had disregarded his petitions.
On 14 February 2018 the applicant submitted a new petition to the prison administration, requesting them to provide him with the medical equipment prescribed by the doctor.
On 16 February 2018 the prison administration procured an orthopaedic pillow and a corset and delivered them to the applicant.
On 19 February 2018 the İzmir enforcement judge rejected the applicant’s request, stating that his request to allow his family to provide him with the relevant medical equipment cannot be satisfied since medical equipment prescribed by a doctor should be requested from the prison administration, and not brought by family members. The judge did not address the applicant’s claim that he had initially lodged a petition to the prison administration on 7 December 2017. The İzmir Assize Court upheld that decision and the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s individual application as being manifestly ill-founded.
Law ■ Admissibility
The Court considered that, although the applicant “provided the Court with a number of petitions in which he had asked the prison administration about the outcome of his petition of 7 December 2017, he did not submit that petition itself or any corroborating evidence to establish that it had been submitted to the prison administration”. In the Court’s view, the applicant therefore failed to demontrated that he submitted this petition.
The Court added that, even assuming that this petition had been submitted, the prescribed medical equipment was provided “within a period of two months and ten days, which cannot be considered excessively lengthy in view of the nature of the material in question” (§ 18). The Court concluded that the applicant did not substantiate (eg by the provision of medical reports) that “he experienced physical or psychological suffering attaining the threshold so as to fall within the scope of Article 3 due to that delay” (ibid).
Conclusion ■ Inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
HAYES AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM ■ Applications nos. 56532/22 and 2 others ■ Second Section ■ 1 July 2025
This legal summary was prepared by the Court’s Registry.
Art 3 ■ Overcrowding ■ Lack of personal space ■ Other elements of detention conditions (inadequate ventilation, insufficient sanitary facilities and hygiene, passive smoking) not reaching the severity threshold.
Art 3 ■ No risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole which would be irreducible de facto and de jure in event of applicants’ extradition to, and conviction in, the USA ■ Domestic courts’ failure to engage in first stage of Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC] test ■ Government’s failure to rebut the presumption, in event of applicants’ conviction on one charge, that the mandatory life sentence would be imposed ■ Compassionate release review mechanism satisfied second stage of Sanchez-Sanchez test ■ Review mechanism allowed US authorities “to consider a prisoner’s progress towards rehabilitation or any other ground for release based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances” ■ Imposition of a mandatory life sentence would not be grossly disproportionate in view of the gravity of the offences charged.
Facts ■ The applicants are nationals of the United States of America (“the USA”) currently being detained in the United Kingdom (Scotland). The US government requested their extradition as they are wanted on federal charges concerning an alleged conspiracy to kidnap children and kill witnesses, and an alleged attempt to effect that conspiracy involving the brandishing of a firearm. Conspiracy to kill witnesses – count (2) – carries a minimum sentence of life imprisonment without parole. The applicants unsuccessfully challenged their extradition at first instance and on appeal.
Under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the Court has indicated to the United Kingdom Government that the applicant should not be extradited for the duration of the proceedings before it.
Law ■ Article 3
(1) Is there a real risk that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole would be imposed on the applicants?
The national courts had focused on the question of reducibility, the second stage of the test laid out in Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC], having apparently assumed that the first stage, whether there was a real risk that the applicants would be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, had been satisfied. While it was in principle for the applicants to demonstrate that a whole life sentence would be imposed, they appeared to rely solely on the fact that they faced, in respect of count (2), a mandatory life sentence without parole.
In Sanchez-Sanchez the Court had held that a real risk would “more readily be established” where an applicant faced a mandatory life sentence, although such a risk would not be established automatically. However, in view of the restrictions on judicial discretion in such cases, it was not entirely clear what further evidence an applicant could be expected to adduce in order to demonstrate the existence of a real risk.
Evidence of the kind considered by the Court in Sanchez-Sanchez (sentencing practice and the treatment of co-conspirators or other defendants with similar records to the applicant) was of considerably greater significance where a criminal charge carried a discretionary, as opposed to a mandatory, life sentence. Therefore, as the applicants faced a mandatory life sentence in the event of their conviction on count (2), there existed a rebuttable presumption that the first stage of the Sanchez-Sanchez test had been met. Accordingly, it was for the Government to demonstrate on the facts that the mandatory minimum sentence would not be imposed.
In that regard, firstly, the Government contended that in view of the US prosecutor’s assurance that the applicants would be offered a plea bargain, if they pled guilty they could avoid the imposition of a mandatory life sentence. Secondly, the Government submitted that the sentencing judge would have discretion to reduce even a mandatory life sentence were the applicants to provide “substantial assistance” to the prosecuting authorities.
The Court could not base its assessment of risk on the likely sentence an applicant would receive if they pled guilty. Consequently, the availability of a plea bargain in the event of a guilty plea could not be a relevant consideration in its assessment of risk. The Court also recognised that the length of a prison sentence might be affected by pre-trial factors, such as the defendant agreeing to cooperate with the US Government. However, no indication had been given as to the assistance the US authorities considered that the applicants could provide; and there had been no obvious scope for them to provide such assistance since the fourth member of the alleged conspiracy had been arrested and had pled guilty. It had been understood that he had offered substantial assistance to the authorities and it had been anticipated that he would give incriminating evidence against the applicants at trial.
The Government had not sought to challenge either submission and had not, therefore, rebutted the presumption that in the event of the applicants’ conviction on the second charge, the mandatory minimum life sentence would be imposed. Accordingly, in view of the domestic courts’ decision not to engage with the first stage of the Sanchez-Sanchez test, the applicants’ extradition to the US would expose them to a real risk of being sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.
(2) Do the review mechanisms in the US satisfy the second stage of the Sanchez‑Sanchez test?
Two review mechanisms had been available to the applicants if they had been convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole: compassionate release and executive clemency.
The First Step Act 2018 had significantly expanded access to compassionate release and empowered courts to reduce sentences where the relevant criteria were satisfied. Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code (“U.S.C.”), § 3582(c)(1)(A), compassionate release might be granted either where the prisoner was at least 70 years of age, had served at least 30 years in prison, and was not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community; or where extraordinary and compelling reasons warranted a reduction of their sentence. Eligibility for compassionate release under both heads would be considered by reference to the factors set out in § 3553(a) of the U.S.C. According to the US Supreme Court, evidence of post‑sentencing rehabilitation might be “highly relevant” to several of the § 3553(a) factors.
The first head was clearly linked to the prisoner’s age but did not require that they be experiencing any deterioration in physical or mental health. Each of the applicants, if convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment, would, after thirty years, be at least seventy years old and therefore potentially eligible to apply for compassionate release under that head.
For the second head, according to the federal sentencing guidelines, “extraordinary and compelling reasons” existed under various circumstances or a combination thereof. Compassionate release might also be available if a prisoner had received an unusually long sentence and had served at least ten years of imprisonment. Full consideration would also have to be given to the prisoner’s individualised circumstances, and it was clear from the case-law that evidence of post-sentencing rehabilitation would be relevant to that assessment. While rehabilitation alone was not considered an extraordinary and compelling reason, the courts appeared to give due consideration to a prisoner’s progress towards rehabilitation in deciding whether or not to grant a motion for compassionate release. Indeed, there was clear evidence of sentences (including life sentences) being reduced by the US courts with progress towards rehabilitation weighing heavily in their reasoning. Moreover, if a prisoner could produce “significant and extensive evidence of post-sentencing rehabilitation”, the court would have to provide a “more robust” and “individualized” explanation when it ruled on a compassionate release motion. A failure to obtain release on such a motion did not prevent a prisoner from requesting release again.
Therefore, notwithstanding that a motion could not be granted on the basis of rehabilitation alone, compassionate release undoubtedly constituted a review mechanism that allowed the domestic authorities “to consider a prisoner’s progress towards rehabilitation or any other ground for release based on his or her behaviour or other relevant personal circumstances”. As such, it satisfied the second stage of the Sanchez‑Sanchez test.
In light of that conclusion, it was not necessary to consider whether executive clemency would also satisfy the second stage of the test.
(3) Would a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment on count (2) be grossly disproportionate?
The Court agreed with the domestic courts that a mandatory life sentence would not be grossly disproportionate in view of the gravity of the offences charged. Although the applicants had not been charged with homicide, that fact alone could not render their cases sufficiently “rare and unique” as to meet the high threshold of exceptionality required to establish gross disproportionality.
According to the allegations, the applicants’ plan had involved obtaining firearms, achieving armed entry to two private homes, kidnapping five children (all under the age of eight) and murdering their four parents with a view to eliminating them as witnesses. The plan had proceeded to the extent of one of the parents being held at gunpoint ready to be executed when law enforcement had intervened. Although the victims had not died, the fact that the applicants had been carrying out the agreed plan when the police had arrived meant that although the full intended harm had been prevented, the level of culpability involved in the alleged offending had not been greatly reduced. The decision of the US Congress to punish such acts with the most severe punishment available – being a mandatory life sentence – therefore fell well within the boundaries of “legitimate and reasonable differences between States”.
(4) Conclusion
The foregoing considerations were sufficient to conclude that the applicants’ extradition to the US would not be in breach of Article 3 on account either of the risk that if convicted they would receive a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, which would be irreducible de facto and de jure; or because a mandatory life sentence on count (2) would be grossly disproportionate.
Conclusion ■ No violation of Article 3.
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
ZEYNALOV AND SADIGOV v. AZERBAIJAN ■ Application no. 29041/14 ■ Third Section Committee ■ 8 July 2025
Art 8 ■ Lawyer-client communication ■ Client subjected to search before and after meetings with his lawyer ■ Lawyer’s documents inspected after meetings with his client ■ Seizure of a letter, addressed to a third person, given to the first applicant’s lawyer for him to send it ■ Absence of suspicion of wrongdoing ■ Nature of the letter not justifying the interference suffered.
Facts ■ The first applicant (Mr Zeynalov) is a journalist who was held in Baku pre-trial detention facility at the material time. The second applicant (Mr Sadigov) was his lawyer.
They argued that Mr Zeynalov was subjected to a search before and after each of his meetings with Mr Sadigov, and that Mr Sadigov’s documents were inspected by prison staff after each meeting and before leaving the detention facility. They further argue that their meetings were supervised through the window of the meeting rooms, and through audio and video surveillance inside the meeting room.
They also complained about one specific incident that occured in November 2011. Following threats made to the applicant through a newspaper article, Mr Zeynalov wrote a letter to the Minister of Internal Affairs, and gave it to the prison director to send on his behalf. Since he received no document confirming the ministers’ receipt, he gave a copy to Mr Sadigov during one of their meetings and asked him to send it. When Mr Sadigov was about to leave the facility, he was asked by a prison staff to present documents in his possession. After the prison offcer allegedly tried to search him by force, Mr Sadigov show the letter, which was seized and not returned to him despite his request to that effect. No record was drawn up about the seizure of the letter in question.
The applicants complained about the surveillance of their meetings and about this specific indicident before the domestic courts, who dismissed their complaints.
Law ■ Article 8
General principles: Michaud v. France no. 12323/11, §§ 117-19, 6 December 2012; Altay v. Turkey no. 11236/09, §§ 47-52, 9 April 2019; Namazli v. Azerbaijan no. 8826/20, §§ 34-37, 20 June 2024; Laurent v. France, no. 28798/13, § 47, 24 May 2018, Klaus Müller v. Germany, no. 24173/18, § 37, 19 November 2020, R.E. v. the United Kingdom, no. 62498/11, § 131, 27 October 2015; Vasil Vasilev v. Bulgaria, no. 7610/15, § 90, 16 November 2021; Eylem Kaya v. Turkey, no. 26623/07, § 48, 13 December 2016.
The Court did not discuss the lawfulness of the interference (which was a point of dispute between the parties), as it considered it in any event to be not “necessary in a democratic society”. The Court noted that nothing suggests that when they decided to conduct searches and inspections before and after the applicants’ meetings and to seize the letter confiscated in November 2011, the prison staff “had been acting on any suspicion – let alone any concrete evidence of wrongdoing by the applicants” (§ 15). Similarly, nothing suggest that the letter in question “ contained any unlawful element necessitating its seizure” (ibid).
The Court also rejected the Government’s argument that the letter seize was not addressed by Mr Zeynalov to his lawyer, Mr Sadigov. The Court recalled that not only does Article 8 protect the confidentiality of private communication, but also that the exchanges of between lawyers and their clients was afforded “strengthened protection” since “lawyers would be unable to defend their clients if they were unable to guarantee that their exchanges would remain confidential” (§ 16). The Court stressed that there was no reason to distinguish in lawyer-client communications between matters concerning litigation and those having little or nothing to do with it.
Lastly, while domestic courts argued that the personal search of the first applicant before and after meeting with his lawyers answered a “pressing social need” (§ 17), the Court noted that the Government failed to demonstrate the existence of such a need.
The Court considered it had dealt with the main legal questions raised by the case and did not find it necessary to examine the issues of audio and video surveillance inside meeting room, and of visual surveillance of their meetings through a window.
Conclusion ■ Violation of article 8.
Article 41 ■ EUR 1,200 in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 500 in respect of costs and expenses.
UKRAINE AND THE NETHERLANDS v. RUSSIA [GC] ■ Applications nos. 8019/16 and 3 others ■ Grand Chamber ■ 9 July 2025
The analysis below focuses on parts of the judgment pertaining to prisoners’ rights. It is based on the legal summary prepared by the Court’s registry. Read de registry’s summary for a detailed analysis of all aspects of the case.
Art 33 ■ ■ Inter-State application ■ Multiple, flagrant and unprecedented Convention violations by the respondent State in Ukraine.
Art 32 ■ Importance of historical context of the Council of Europe ■ Nature and scale of violence and statements concerning Ukraine’s very right to exist representing a threat to peaceful co-existence within Europe ■ Relationship between Convention and IHL.
Art 2 (substantive) ■ Administrative practice of extrajudicial killing of civilians and Ukrainian military personnel hors de combat in occupied territory in Ukraine.
Art 3 (substantive) ■ Administrative practice of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment in occupied territory in Ukraine ■ Torture constituting a coordinated State policy of the Russian Federation in respect of Ukrainian civilians and POWs ■ Inadequate conditions of detention ■ Suffering of family members of those abducted or disappeared after 24 February 2022 in a context of mass arbitrary detentions and systematic abuse of detainees amounting to inhuman treatment.
Art 4 § 2 ■ Administrative practice of forced labour in occupied territory in Ukraine.
Art 5 ■ Administrative practice of unlawful and arbitrary detention of civilians, without any legal basis and without basic procedural safeguards, in occupied territory in Ukraine.
Art 8 ■ Administrative practice of unjustified transfer and displacement of civilians in occupied territory in Ukraine and unjustified application of filtration measures ■ Displacement of civilians by Russian occupying authorities did not qualify as lawful evacuation under IHL ■ Displacement of such civilians amounted to forced displacement.
Art 38 ■ Non-compliance with obligation to furnish all necessary facilities for examination of case ■ Deplorable failure of respondent State to abide by fundamental duty of cooperation with Court inevitably affected Court’s examination of case.
Art 46 ■ Respondent State to release or safely return all persons deprived of their liberty on Ukrainian territory under occupation by the Russian and Russian-controlled forces in breach of Art 5 before 16 September 2022 and still in the Russian authorities’ custody
Facts ■ The case pertains to events which began in the spring of 2014 with the occupation and annexation by Russia of Crimea, part of Ukrainian sovereign territory, and the appearance of pro-Russian separatist armed groups in eastern Ukraine who subsequently took control of territory in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and declared independence from Ukraine. The violence rapidly escalated, with separatist armed groups seizing public buildings and towns. The government of Ukraine launched an “Anti-Terrorist Operation” to re-establish control. The separatists held “referendums” in territory under separatist control and subsequently declared the independence of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”) and the “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”).
On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian armed forces entered Ukrainian sovereign territory at various border points and launched attacks by land, air and sea. Ukrainian towns and cities in the north, south and east were subjected to heavy airstrikes and artillery fire, causing large-scale death, injury and destruction. Over the subsequent years, control over territory in Ukraine has shifted in the face of Russian advances and Ukrainian counter-offensives. Heavy fighting continues on multiple fronts. Russian aerial strikes continue across Ukraine.
The case encompasses four interstate applications. The first three applications (nos. 8019/16, 43800/14 and 28525/20) concern complaints related to the conflict in eastern Ukraine involving the separatists from spring 2014. In its two applications, the Ukrainian Government pleaded an administrative practice by Russia of numerous Convention violations. The application lodged by the Dutch Government concerned alleged violations of Articles 2, 3 and 13 resulting from the downing of flight MH17 (see the Registry’s legal summary on this aspect of the complaint).
By a decision of 25 January 2023, the Grand Chamber declared the three applications partially admissible. On 17 February 2023 the Grand Chamber decided to join the fourth application (no. 11055/22) to the pending case. The application concerns the Ukrainian Government’s complaints of further administrative practices committed by the Russian Federation following its full-scale invasion beginning on 24 February 2022.
Law ■ Preliminary observations and general findings
(a) Participation of the respondent State
The respondent State had not participated in the proceedings on the merits in respect of the first three applications or in the proceedings on the admissibility and merits of the fourth application. Respecting the adversarial nature of and the need for equality of arms between the parties in the proceedings, the Court continued to engage in correspondence with the respondent Government in the normal manner. A respondent State’s failure or refusal to participate effectively in the proceedings was not in itself a reason for the Court to discontinue the examination of an application. The Court found that there was insufficient cause for the respondent Government’s failure to submit a memorial or to participate in the hearing. It thus decided to proceed with its examination of the case, finding that that was consistent with the proper administration of justice
(b) The present conflict
The transformation from covert to openly acknowledged operations in Ukraine had brought transparency to the Russian Federation’s objectives in Ukraine, which appeared to be no less than the destruction of Ukraine as an independent sovereign State, through the forcible acquisition of Ukrainian territory and the subjugation of any remaining Ukrainian nation to Russian influence and control. The Russian Federation had, moreover, not identified any clear limitations to its territorial ambitions, either in Ukraine or beyond, and the potential for further escalation had frequently been invoked by senior Russian political figures.
Although the Court had already examined applications arising out of situations of conflict in Europe, the events in Ukraine were unprecedented in the history of the Council of Europe. The nature and scale of the violence, as well as the ominous statements of the Respondent State’s President and other senior Government figures concerning Ukraine’s statehood, its independence and its very right to exist, represented a threat to the peaceful co-existence that Europe had long taken for granted. The dangerous rhetoric had also on occasion been extended to encompass other Council of Europe member States, including Poland, Moldova and the Baltic countries. Those actions sought to undermine the very fabric of the democracy on which the Council of Europe and its member States were founded by their destruction of individual freedoms, their suppression of political liberties and their blatant disregard for the rule of law. In none of the conflicts previously before the Court had there been such near universal condemnation of the “flagrant” disregard by the respondent State for the foundations of the international legal order established after the Second World War and such clear measures taken by the Council of Europe to sanction the respondent State’s disrespect for the Council of Europe’s fundamental values: peace, human life, human dignity and the individual rights guaranteed by the Convention.
The Court was not called upon to decide on the legality of Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukraine in the abstract or the individual criminal responsibility of those implicated in the events, but rather to decide on the conformity of the respondent State’s actions with the fundamental guarantees contained in the Convention and its Protocols.
(c) Temporal jurisdiction
The Court’s temporal jurisdiction did not extend further than 16 September 2022, when the Russian Federation ceased to be a Party to the Convention. The Court could, however, have regard to facts which had occurred following the termination date, far as it considered appropriate in its assessment of whether there had been a violation of the Convention in respect of acts which occurred prior to 16 September 2022.
(d) Approach to the evidence
The Court applied the approach to the evidence, to the burden and standard of proof and to the drawing of inferences outlined in its admissibility decision with one exception: since the Court was examining the merits of the alleged violations, the applicable standard of proof to be satisfied was that of “beyond reasonable doubt”.
(e) Relationship between the Convention and international humanitarian law
The Court confirmed its duty to interpret the Convention in the light of the rules set out in Article 31 § 3 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and so far as possible in harmony with other rules of international law of which it formed part, including IHL. In particular, in the context of international armed conflict the specific IHL provisions did not displace Convention human rights guarantees but were used as an interpretative tool when determining the scope of those guarantees; the safeguards under the Convention continued to apply.
In examining the alleged violations of specific Convention Articles against the backdrop of international armed conflict, the Court observed that it would have regard to the relevant IHL provisions, interpret IHL and where necessary for it to carry out its role, assess the respondent State’s compliance with IHL provisions. In its admissibility decision, the Court had acknowledged that a harmonious interpretation of Convention provisions with relevant IHL provisions might not be possible in the absence of a derogation under Article 15, since the provisions might be in conflict with one another, as regards the Article 2 complaints advanced by the applicant Governments. It would address whether such conflict arose on the facts of the present case in the context of those complaints.
Law ■ Jurisdiction and attribution
(a) Continuing jurisdiction in the “DPR” and the “LPR” on the basis of effective control
Given the absence of any information to suggest a decrease in the level of control exercised by the respondent State over the “DPR” and the “LPR” since the hearing on admissibility on 26 January 2022, and the formalisation of the control already exercised by it through the purported “accession” of those two territories to the Russian Federation and the retroactive application of Russian criminal law to the territories and assimilation of “DPR” and “LPR” interests to those of the Russian Federation itself, the Court found that those areas continued to be under the respondent State’s effective control throughout the period falling within the Court’s temporal jurisdiction (i.e., until 16 September 2022).
(b) Jurisdiction in respect of the complaints in application no. 11055/22
The complaints concerning the Russian authorities’ actions on Russian sovereign territory, in respect of filtration processes and the transfer and adoption of children, clearly fell within Russia’s jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1.
Insofar as the complaints concerned the respondent State’s actions in areas in the hands of the Russian armed forces after the 2022 invasion, it was clear from the evidence and the speed and scale of the Russian advance that the respondent State’s military presence in Ukraine was substantial. As a result, the Russian armed forces had taken control of areas of Ukraine. The fact that some of the territory in question had been later recovered by Ukraine during successful counter-offensives did not undermine that conclusion. By virtue of the control exercised over the territory concerned by the Russian armed forces, the Court held that Russia exercised effective control over such territory and thus had jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 for any period during which such areas had remained under the control of its armed forces, up until 16 September 2022.
(c) Jurisdiction in respect of military attacks between 2014 and 2022
In its admissibility decision the Court had joined to the merits the respondent Government’s objection as to whether the applicant Ukrainian Government’s complaints of administrative practices of bombing and shelling in violation of Article 2 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, together with associated Article 14 complaints, fell within the respondent State’s Article 1 jurisdiction. With the joining of application no. 11055/22, the Court also had to examine the military attacks referred to in that application.
The reality of the extensive, strategically planned military attacks perpetrated by Russian forces across Ukrainian sovereign territory between 2014 and 2022, carried out with the deliberate intention and indisputable effect of assuming authority and control, falling short of effective control, over areas, infrastructure and people in Ukraine, was wholly at odds with any notion of chaos. In planning and in executing, directly or via the armed forces of the “DPR” and “LPR”, its military attacks across Ukrainian territory with a view to acquiring and retaining effective control over areas of sovereign Ukrainian territory and thereby removing those areas from the effective control of Ukraine, the Russian Federation had assumed a degree of responsibility over those individuals affected by its attack. In those circumstances, the Russian Federation exercised, through its de jure and de facto armed forces, authority and control over individuals affected by its military attacks up until 16 September 2022. Such individuals, therefore, fell within its jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1. It followed that the Russian Federation was under an obligation pursuant to that provision to secure to individuals affected by its military attacks the Convention rights and freedoms relevant to their situation.
(d) Attribution
Acts and omissions of the Russian military were acts of Russian State organs and were plainly attributable to the respondent State. In its admissibility decision, the Court had already explained that the acts and omissions of separatists in the areas under the effective control of the Russian Federation had been attributable to that State. It was right to equate the separatists with de facto organs of the Russian Federation, within the meaning of Article 4 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. Any other solution would allow States to avoid their Convention obligations by choosing to act through entities whose supposed independence was purely fictitious.
Conclusion ■ Jurisdiction established (unanimously); preliminary objection concerning military attacks dismissed (unanimously).
Law ■ Administrative practices
The Court acknowledged that, given the overall context and the alleged pattern of violations, direct evidence of the alleged events might be difficult to come by, in view of the repeated restrictions on monitoring in occupied territory, witnesses’ or victims’ fear of retaliation or persecution for speaking out, and the fact that many of them could only share their accounts years later (after their release, in the case of detainees, or after Ukraine had reacquired control over occupied territory, for example). The Court, therefore, was satisfied that it could draw relevant inferences when assessing the evidence before it.
The Court relied in particular on primary evidence from the monitoring missions of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (the OHCHR) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (the OSCE) and from fact-finding bodies such as the UN Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine and the OSCE Moscow mechanism experts.
On the basis of that evidence and the extensive additional evidence before it, the Court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the reported incidents had been sufficiently numerous and interconnected to amount to a pattern or system of violations constituting repetition of acts.
Moreover, reports commented on the prevailing climate of impunity and general lawlessness in eastern Ukraine from 2014 and the lack of legitimate and effective judicial services. The reports of the UN Commission of Inquiry showed starkly the huge scale of the grave violations of human rights perpetrated by Russia across Ukrainian territory following the 2022 invasion. It was inconceivable that the higher authorities of the Russian Government could have been unaware of such practices over more than eight years. The evidence attested to the erosion of the rule of law in the areas under the control of the Russian forces and the atmosphere of fear and intimidation in the areas under their control or affected by their military attacks. Moreover, many of the measures had been of a regulatory nature. The unprecedented abuses described in the judgment could not have been carried out without the direct authorisation, encouragement and support of the higher authorities. Accordingly, the Court found it proven beyond reasonable doubt that the repetition of acts in violation of the Convention had been officially tolerated by the Russian authorities.
In respect of many of the alleged violations, the Court highlighted the absence of any basis in law for the actions taken. The respondent Government had failed to provide the necessary information to enable the Court to conclude that any legal acts adopted by the “DPR” and the “LPR” might be accepted as “law” for the purposes of its assessment of alleged Convention violations. Moreover, the conditions required for Russian law or measures taken by the occupying authorities to be recognised as providing a valid legal basis, for Convention purposes, for acts undertaken in Ukraine had not been met.
Taken as a whole, the evidence presented a picture of interconnected practices of manifestly unlawful conduct by agents of the respondent State on a massive scale.
The Court also underlined, as regards the qualified rights in the Convention, that there was no evidence of any constraints applied to agents of the Russian Federation in the exercise of the functions carried out by them on behalf of the respondent State. Extensive human rights violations had been committed on a huge scale not only without sanction but frequently as part of a far-reaching administrative system put in place by the respondent State’s authorities without any apparent safeguards whatsoever. It was, therefore, important to record that the evidence overwhelmingly showed conduct by the respondent State’s agents that, as well as being unlawful, had clearly been disproportionate to any aims that might be considered legitimate under the qualified rights in the Convention.
Law ■ Article 2 (substantive) ■ Administrative practice of extrajudicial killings in the occupied territory of Ukraine from 11 May 2014 to 16 September 2022.
Russian armed forces, had killed civilians who had quite clearly not been participating in the hostilities and Ukrainian soldiers who had indisputably been detained, unarmed and hors de combat. There was evidence of summary executions, deaths due to the use of force not in the immediate vicinity of hostilities, and deaths during detention. There was also a great deal of evidence as to the conduct of the Russian armed forces during their occupation of areas of Ukraine after 24 February 2022, in particular the frequent recourse to lethal violence against civilians and Ukrainian soldiers who had been hors de combat. There was evidence of the large-scale murder of civilians perpetrated in occupied territory in the immediate aftermath of the arrival in those areas of Russian armed forces and the unprovoked shooting of civilians, including children, seeking to flee hostilities in areas under Russian control.
The Court reiterated that the protection of civilians and military personnel hors de combat was a fundamental principle of IHL and found that the use of lethal force had not been justified under IHL. The killings could also not be justified by reference to the exceptions listed in Article 2 § 2.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 2 (unanimously).
Law ■ Article 3 (substantive) ■ Torture and inhuman and degrading treatment of civilians and prisoners of war in occupied territory from 11 May 2014 to 16 September 2022.
The armed separatists had used violence against detainees, both civilian and military, in areas under the effective control of the Russian Federation. There had been regular reports of incidents of violence across “DPR” and “LPR” territory in the context of abductions, deprivations of liberty, interrogations and forced entry between 11 May 2014 and 24 February 2022. A network of places existed of deprivation of liberty where people had been tortured and ill-treated and subjected to inhuman conditions of detention. After the 2022 invasion, the evidence showed a significant increase in the scale and in the gravity of acts of ill-treatment. The nature of the violence inflicted had been set out in details in reports before the Court and included beatings, forced nudity and intimate searches conducted during filtration and in detention places; mock executions; cutting off of body parts; electric shocks; use of prolonged stress positions in detention; exposure to extreme temperatures and forcing prisoners of war (“POWs”) to ingest their insignia. The evidence also showed that detainees had been forced to witness the severe beatings or summary executions of others.
There was evidence of a widespread and systemic use of sexual violence by armed separatists and Russian troops, in respect of men and women, old and young, from the outset of the conflict, which had escalated after the 2022 invasion. Rapes had been committed at gunpoint, with extreme brutality and accompanied by acts of torture, such as beatings, strangling or electric shocks. Women and men had often been subjected to sexual violence and rape in detention. There was also extensive evidence of rape outside classical situations of detention. Some victims had been gang-raped, others subjected to sexual slavery over long periods. Family members who had tried to intervene to stop the attacks had been killed.
Civilians and POWs had been subjected to repeated threats of violence, including threats of summary execution. The perpetrators had threatened to harm the victims’ close family members, including threatening to rape their children. Those threats had been made in a context where many of the victims had witnessed sexual violence or summary execution being perpetrated on others, with no regard for the age or vulnerabilities of victims.
In the face of the overwhelming evidence, the Court found it indisputable that there were multiple, repeated instances of the ill-treatment of civilians and POWs. There was a pattern of treatment, encompassing the practices described, that amounted to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering and involving the intentional infliction of severe pain and suffering with the aim, inter alia, of obtaining information, inflicting punishment and intimidating and humiliating victims. The prevalence of sexual violence and rape by Russian soldiers in occupied territory was especially abhorrent. It was persuaded that sexual violence and rape had been deployed in Ukraine following the 2022 invasion as part of a military strategy to dehumanise, humiliate and break the morale of the Ukrainian population, as individuals and as a community, and to assert dominance over Ukrainian sovereign territory. The sexual assaults and rape of civilians in communities across occupied territory in Ukraine, had been carried out within an overall context of lawlessness and with complete impunity, leaving women and men powerless to protect themselves and their families and living in fear. The systematic rape of women as a weapon of war was an act of extreme atrocity that amounted to torture.
Overall, the pattern of ill-treatment of civilians and POWs in occupied areas of Ukraine between 11 May 2014 and 16 September 2022 had amounted to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.
There was also ample evidence for the same period of civilians and POWs being held in inadequate detention conditions, in blatant contravention of the applicable IHL provisions, which had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment.
Finally, abductions and disappearances after 24 February 2022 had occurred in a context of mass arbitrary detentions and systematic and horrific abuse, with no possibility for the relatives to seek information or obtain an investigation. The Court found that flagrant, continuous and callous disregard of the obligation to account for the whereabouts and fate of missing relatives had caused suffering which had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 3 (unanimously).
Law ■ Article 4 § 2 ■ Administrative practice of forced labour in occupied territory from 11 May 2014 to 16 September 2022.
The evidence of alleged forced labour had arisen almost exclusively in the context of detention by armed separatists or Russian armed forces. Although Article 4 § 3 excluded from the definition of “forced labour” any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed according to the provisions of Article 5, the Court found that that exception to the Article 4 § 2 prohibition of forced labour was inapplicable in the present case in the light of the widespread context of unlawful arrest and detention in breach of Article 5 in which those instances of alleged forced labour had occurred.
There had been credible reports of the separatists forcing detained Ukrainian soldiers and civilians to work from the early days of the conflict. They had been forced to carry out reconstruction and maintenance duties, to dig trenches, load and unload ammunition and engage in demining work. Tasks closely linked to the hostilities appeared t incompatible with IHL and demining work amounted to dangerous labour which was proscribed by IHL. Detainees had also been coerced or obliged to join the separatist forces and, later, the Russian armed forces to fight at the front lines. Shortly before the start of the 2022 invasion, the “DPR” and the “LPR” authorities had ordered the “general mobilisation” requiring all men between the ages of 18 and 55 to enlist in the separatist armed forces. Forcing civilians in occupied territory or POWs to serve in the forces of a hostile power was strictly prohibited by IHL. There was no evidence that the forced labour had been justified under IHL.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 4 § 2 (unanimously).
Law ■ Article 5 ■ Administrative practice of unlawful and arbitrary detention in occupied territory from 11 May 2014 to 16 September 2022.
There was comprehensive and detailed evidence as to the prevalence of abductions, kidnappings, arrests and detention across occupied areas of Ukraine in a general climate of fear and impunity. Journalists, religious leaders, Ukrainian civil servants, activists and those holding pro-Ukrainian unity views had been particularly targeted. The Court noted in particular the practice of administrative or preventive arrest widely employed in the “DPR” and the “LPR”. Those practices had been purportedly authorised for certain periods by legal instruments of the separatist entities, but had also occurred in the absence of any purported legal framework. Countless civilians had been detained between 2014 and 2022. Following the 2022 invasion Russian armed forces had unlawfully confined large numbers of civilians in areas under their control. Victims had included local authority personnel, government personnel, veterans of the Ukrainian armed forces, volunteers evacuating civilians and civilians arrested for reasons which had not been apparent and without any review from a judicial or administrative body. Detainees had frequently not been informed of the reasons for their detention. The evidence also revealed that a process of filtration had been implemented across occupied territory to screen individuals seeking to leave besieged cities or other dangerous areas, including areas of military operations, for connections with or allegiance to the Ukrainian administration. That had often resulted in further screening at “filtration camps” and the detention of civilians on a large scale for long periods of time.
The respondent Government had not identified the purported legal grounds for the deprivations of liberty of countless civilians between 2014 and 2022 in the occupied areas of Ukraine. They had not provided the Court with any arrest warrants or judicial decisions authorising any of the detentions. In the circumstances of the conflict, the Court was not in a position to identify any legal framework enabling the deprivation of liberty in occupied areas. Insofar as detention was purportedly authorised by regulatory measures adopted by the “DPR” or the “LPR”, or by the application of the Russian federal Law on Martial law in the occupied territories, none of these measures could provide a legal basis for the deprivation of liberty of civilians in Ukraine. There was also no evidence that the conditions permitting internment of civilians under IHL had been satisfied or that any procedural safeguards had been put in place.
The Court was satisfied beyond any doubt whatsoever that the pattern of unlawful and arbitrary detention of civilians had taken place across the occupied territories in Ukraine, without the most basic procedural safeguards.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 5 (unanimously).
Law ■ Article 8 ■ Administrative practice of unjustified displacement and transfer of civilians in occupied territory and application of filtration measures from 24 February to 16 September 2022.
After the 2022 invasion millions of Ukrainian nationals had left their homes in the occupied territory or had been removed.
Some people had been detained and removed to Russian detention facilities, without any legal framework or official individual decisions authorising and regulating transfers.
Some had been directed to leave or escorted to Russia by armed men, allegedly as a result of a purported humanitarian evacuation. The coercion involved in their removal from their homes was sufficient in itself to lead to the conclusion that such removal amounted to an interference for the purposes of Article 8. However, the available reports did not identify legitimate grounds for such “evacuations”. Nor had there been any explanation as to why people could not have been moved to safety within Ukraine. Moreover, it had not been shown that the “evacuation” of civilians from Ukraine to Russia could be justified under IHL/international law.
A large number of civilians had left their homes because of military action, the destruction of their homes and generalised violence and human-rights violations. The absence of direct physical force did not automatically render displacement voluntary. The Court found that the level of coercion caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression and abuse of power by Russian and separatist forces had been such that it had resulted in the forced displacement of civilians in occupied territory. The ongoing environment of coercion and terror in occupied territory had actively prevented, and continued to prevent, people from returning to their homes. The Court was satisfied that the displacement of civilians at liberty in occupied areas of Ukraine had amounted to an interference under Article 8.
The transfer and displacement of civilians in detention and at liberty in the occupied territories of Ukraine had not been “in accordance with the law”.
Individuals had also been subjected to “filtration” measures in the form of invasive and abusive security checks, involving body searches and interrogation, detailed checks of mobile phones and personal belongings at “filtration” points or sites. The extensive database generated by the recording of all this information had likely been of assistance to the Russian authorities in the further identification, screening and surveillance of persons who opposed Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory. The sheer number of filtration sites and the equipment used indicated that the measures had been systemically applied. They had not been limited to combatants but had also been applied to civilians, including children. There was no evidence of any clear, detailed rules governing the scope and methods of the measures. Nor were there any minimum safeguards providing sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness. For these reasons, the filtration measures had also not been “in accordance with the law”.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 8 (unanimously).
Law ■ Article 38
The respondent Government’s lack of cooperation had unnecessarily rendered more difficult the Court’s task to determine whether violations of fundamental human rights protected by the Convention had occurred; the Court had had to identify and consider the application of relevant IHL provisions ex proprio motu and spent considerable time and resources in ensuring that the respondent State had not suffered prejudice in the application of the Convention to the facts of the present case.
The respondent Government’s failure to provide information requested by the Court, its lack of constructive engagement with the examination of the case at the separate admissibility stage of the proceedings and its failure to participate in the examination of the outstanding admissibility issues and the merits of the present case, had been in breach of its obligations under Article 38.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 38 (unanimously).
Article 46 ■ Individual Measures
The Court indicated individual measures to be taken. In particular, the respondent State, had to without delay release or safely return all persons who were deprived of liberty on Ukrainian territory under occupation by the Russian and Russian-controlled forces in breach of Article 5 before 16 September 2022 and who were still in the custody of the Russian authorities.
Article 41 ■ The Court adjourned the question of the application of Article 41.
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
GULLOTTI v. ITALY ■ Application no. 64753/14 ■ First Section ■ 10 July 2025
This legal summary was prepared by the Court’s Registry.
Art 8 ■ Correspondence ■ Additional limitation of applicant’s right to correspondence during special regime detention ■ Lack of any explicit reference to specific circumstances justifying the impugned measure ■ Insufficient evidence of a genuine assessment having been made.
Facts ■ The applicant, convicted of mafia-type offences, was imprisoned under the special regime provided for in section 41 bis of the Prison Administration Act, consisting of, inter alia, limited visits by family members.
He was subjected to the monitoring of his correspondence between July 2012 and May 2013. At least from December 2012, under section 18 ter of the Act, his right to correspondence was limited to relatives admitted for family visits. Following the prison governor’s request of 7 January 2013 and on the basis of the “dossier concerning the applicant”, on 8 January 2013 the sentence supervision judge renewed this limitation for three months. The decision was justified by the applicant’s maintenance of a prominent role within the mafia-type organisation, Cosa Nostra, despite his continued detention since 1998. The Bologna sentence supervision court upheld the order of 8 January 2013 and in March 2014 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible, finding that the limitation was justified.
While these appeal proceedings were still pending, the sentence supervision judge renewed the limitation in question in April, July and October 2013 for a duration of three months each time.
In October 2013 the Minister of Justice renewed the application of the section 41 bis regime for two years because the applicant had been and still was the leader of a mafia-clan.
In November 2013 the Bologna sentence supervision court granted an appeal by the applicant in which he argued that the order of April 2013 was inadequately reasoned. Subsequently, the applicant requested that the orders of July and October 2013 be declared unlawful as based on the same arguments as the order of April 2013, but the Bologna sentence supervision court found the request inadmissible as it was not provided for by the Prison Administration Act.
In December 2013, after taking note of the November order of the Bologna sentence supervision court, the sentence supervision judge rejected a new request of the prison governor to renew the limitation of applicant’s right to correspondence for a further three months.
The applicant complained that the limitation on his right to correspondence breached the Article 8 of the Convention as the order of 8 January 2013 (“the impugned order”) and the subsequent domestic decisions in the appeal proceedings had not been adequately reasoned.
Law ■ Article 8
Even though the applicant could maintain contact with his close family, representatives and other public bodies, limiting the number of people with whom he could maintain correspondence had constituted an interference with his right under Article 8.
The interference had been prescribed by law, namely section 18 ter of the Prison Administration Act. This provision, differently from section 18 considered by the Court as not being in accordance with Article 8 (Enea v. Italy, Labita v. Italy), provided that the measure be adopted with reasoned order by the judicial authority under specific circumstances and for a limited period of time. Therefore, the authorities had no longer been granted unfettered discretion.
The interference had pursued legitimate aims, namely the protection of public order and national security and the prevention of disorder and crime, by ensuring that correspondence was not used as a means of conveying prohibited messages.
As regards the necessity of the interference, in order to determine whether it had been convincingly justified, the Court had to assess whether the reasons provided by the national authorities had been “relevant and sufficient” and whether the measure taken had been “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”.
While the impugned order broadly referred to the applicant’s maintenance of a prominent role within the organisation, there appeared to be no discernible trace in the text of that order of an explicit and autonomous assessment of the need to limit the applicant’s correspondence to only relatives admitted for family visits, as would have been required by section 18 ter of the Prison Administration Act.
In the light of the close link between the ministerial order applying the section 41 bis regime and the judicial order imposing monitoring of correspondence, the reasons for the latter could be clearly traced back to those advanced by the Minister of Justice. However, as limiting the number of people with whom a prisoner could maintain correspondence amounted to an additional limitation of the applicant’s right, the Court was not convinced that a general reference to the ministerial order was in itself sufficient to justify further restrictions. The autonomy of the impugned order rather suggested the need for individualised reasons, or at least an explanation of the reasons why the general monitoring of the prisoner’s correspondence, without limitations as to the senders or addressees, had been deemed insufficient.
In any event, the impugned order did not refer to the ministerial order renewing the section 41 bis regime, but generally to the “dossier concerning the applicant”. Although it was reasonable to presume that the dossier available to the sentence supervision judge had included the ministerial order, the Court was not able to assess which documents had been in concreto taken into account.
Moreover, the Government had failed to provide a copy of the ministerial order in force at that time. The parties had only provided the ministerial order of 30 October 2013 renewing the section 41 bis regime, which had referred to wiretapped conversations between the applicant and members of the criminal organisation to which he had belonged, during which the impossibility of contacting the applicant in person or by mail had been discussed. Even assuming that that information had also been contained in the ministerial order in force at the relevant time and that its seriousness had justified further limitations of the applicant’s right to correspondence, the domestic authorities had failed to clarify the importance of such information, especially considering that the wiretapped conversations in question appeared to have taken place about ten years before.
Whereas the sentence supervision judge had referred to the request submitted by the prison governor in January 2013, the Government had failed to produce it to the Court, instead submitting his extension request of March 2013 and granted in April 2013. It was not possible to determine whether the information which had possibly been relevant with a view to applying further limitations on the applicant’s right to correspondence had also been contained in the prison governor’s request of 7 January 2013.
Lastly, the domestic authorities had raised no additional arguments to justify the limitation in the appeal proceedings concerning the impugned 2013 order. In the appeal proceedings against the subsequent order of April 2013, which had been grounded on the same arguments as the impugned order, the Bologna sentence supervision court had found the reasoning insufficient. The reasoning of this court had been reaffirmed by the sentence supervision judge in December 2013.
The lack of any explicit reference to specific circumstances justifying the additional limitation on the applicant’s right to correspondence and the Government’s failure to provide the documents that might have supplemented the reasoning of the impugned order made it difficult to ascertain which circumstances, had been weighed up, in what manner and to what extent, when assessing whether to renew the restriction. Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence in the reasoning of the impugned order of a genuine assessment having been made.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court was not persuaded that the Government had convincingly demonstrated that, in the case circumstances, the renewal of the limitation of the applicant’s right to correspondence of 8 January 2013 had been justified.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 8.
Article 41 ■ EUR 1,200 in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 500 in respect of costs and expenses.
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
ZLOBIN AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA ■ Applications nos. 9096/13 and 9 others ■ Third Section Committee ■ 10 July 2025
Art 10 ■ Freedom of expression ■ Prisoners’ rights organisation and its director ordered to delete and refute online publications on detention conditions following a defamation dispute ■ Courts’ failure to make a proper analysis of the claimant’s status
Facts ■ The 12 applicants complained of the various restrictions on the right to freedom of expression. This summary focuses on application no. 28964/21 brought by the organisation Assotsiatsiya Pravovaya Osnova (Legal Basis Association) and its director, Aleksey Veniaminovich Sokolov, which directly concerns prisoners’ rights defenders. Legal Basis and its director defend prisoners’ rights in the Sverdlovsk Region of Russia.
They published the results of an investigation they carried out into detention conditions as well as practices of torture and other inhuman treatment against women held in the IK-16 correctional colony in the Sverdlovsk Region of Russia. The administration of IK-16 lodged an application against the applicants, stating that the materials published by the applicants constituted defamation and sought the rebuttal of the statements and the deletion of the said materials.
Domestic courts partially allowed the prison’s claims, found several statements to be defamatory and ordered the applicants to delete and refute them. They also imposed a fine of RUB 12,000 and 1,200 in costs. Alexey Sokolov and Legal Basis appealed against the court’s order, up to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, but without success.
Law ■ Article 10
General principles: Morice v. France [GC], no. 29369/10, § 124, 23 April 2015; Pentikäinen v. Finland [GC], no. 11882/10, § 87, 20 October 2015; Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], no. 56925/08, § 48, ECHR 2016; Porubova v. Russia, no. 8237/03, §§ 39-41, 8 October 2009; Kunitsyna v. Russia, no. 9406/05, §§ 6-48, 13 December 2016.
All applications were examined by the Court in a summary fashion, without detailed analysis of the facts.
With regard to Mr Sokolov and the Legal Basis Association, the Court considered in particular that the reasoning of the courts’ decisions was inadequate, that the courts had failed to properly analyse the claimant’s status, and to distinguish between the statments of facts and value judgments, and to analyse the citations made in the publications.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 10.
Article 41 ■ EUR 7,500 for each of the applicants.
GÜNGÖRAY v. TÜRKİYE ■ Application no. 33975/21 ■ Second Section Committee ■ 26 August 2025
Art 3 ■ Passive smoking of prisoner with allergic asthma ■ COVID-19 limiting possibility of swift transfer to other cells ■ Medical reports recommending applicant’s transfer ■ Prison authorities have not taken all required steps to protect the applicant’s health, in particular during the period following the initial stages of the pandemic.
Facts ■ The applicant suffers from certain chronic diseases including asthma and diabetes. In May 2017 he was placed in pre-trial detention in the Silivri L-Type Prison. He argued that following his transfer to a cell with a high number of smokers in November 2019, his asthma deteriorated. In May 2020 he requested the suspension of his sentence on health grounds or his transfer to an individual cell or a cell with a lower number of prisoners. He insisted that he was particularly vulnerable in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic.
On 5 June 2020, the prison administration rejected his request, due to a lack of available cells (the only non-smoking collective cell for this category of prisoners already held 28 prisoners) and due to the COVID-19 context which limited transfers between cells. The individual cells were being used for isolation purposes due to COVID-19. The administration stated that the applicant’s situation would be reassessed when the COVID-19-related risk decreased. The Silivri enforcement judge, the Assize Court and the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s complaints against this decision.
On 17 June 2020, after a medical examination was commisioned by the prison administration, a medical report recommended the applicant should be held in a non-smoking cell due to his allergic asthma. A similar report was issued in April 2021.
In June 2021, the applicant was release on probation.
Law ■ Article 3
(a) Admissibility
The Court rejected the Government’s objection that the applicant had not exhausted the available domestic remedies because he had not lodged a compensation claim before administrative courts.
The Court reiterated that it had found that this remedy could not be considered effective with regard to claims concerning conditions of detention involving overcrowding in Turkish prisons (İlerde and Others v. Türkiye, nos. 35614/19 and 10 others, § 164, 5 December 2023) and this conclusion applies to the case under examination.
The Court stressed that administrative courts distinguish between fault-based liability and no-fault liability, “whereas poor conditions of detention were not necessarily due to the failings of individual officials, but were often the product of more wide‑ranging factors” (§ 15). Moreover, the Court noted that domestic courts (including the Constitutional Court) rejected the applicant’s complaints as manifestly ill-founded and considered that “a compensation claim before the administrative courts was bound to fail” (ibid.).
(b) Merits
General principles: Elefteriadis v. Romania no. 38427/05, §§ 47-48, 25 January 2011; Florea v. Romania, no. 37186/03, § 62, 14 September 2010; Stoine Hristov v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 36244/02, §§ 43-45, 16 October 2008
The Court noted that it was not disputed that the applicant suffered from allergic asthma and that he was detained in a cell with smoking prisoners for a period of one year and seven months (November 2019-June 2021).
The Court noted the prison administration’s argument (relied upon by the enforcement judge) that the applicant could not be easily transferred to a non-smoking cell or a less crowded cell because of COVID-19 restrictions, but also observed that neither domestic authorities nor the Government “clarified the reasons preventing them from transferring the applicant […] in compliance with those measures, namely, by placing him in a quarantine cell, as was done following each of his transfers to the hospital” (§ 21).
The Court also noted that the non-smoking cell for prisoners of the same category of the applicant, which was accommodating 28 prisoners, had a capacity of 42 prisoners and was therefore not overcrowded.
Lastly, the Court noted that although the first medical report was only communicated in June 2020, the applicant’s health situation was not unknown to the prison authorities. Furthermore, the medical report’s recommendations were not followed by the prison authorities, since the applicant was maintained in his cell for another year. In that regard, the Court noted that despite the Government statement that the applicant’s situation will be reassessed once the COVID-19 risk decreased, “such a reassessment was not carried out despite the change in the circumstances and the medical reports drawn up in respect of the applicant” (§ 23).
The Court concluded that it was “not convinced that the logistical difficulties adduced by the authorities rendered [the applicant’s] transfer to another cell impossible and that they had taken all required steps to that effect, in particular during the period following the initial stages of the pandemic” (§ 24).
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 3.
Article 41 ■ EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 1,000 in respect of costs and expenses.
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