This compilation brings together the most important judgments and decisions on prison issues handed down by the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union.
By reporting on the main trends in European prison case law, it aims to support legal practitioners in the prison field in their research and litigation, as well as to identify blind spots in European case law and to build strategic litigation avenues.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
PETROV v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA ■ Application no. 38066/18
Failure of respondent State to comply with its positive obligations to protect applicant against the forced labour associated with his belonging to the “outcast” group within informal prisoner hierarchy: violation of Article 4.
Failure by State authorities to comply with their obligation to protect the applicant, without discrimination, against the segregation, assignment to menial labour and denial of access to basic prison resources imposed by his co-detainees on account of his “outcast” status within informal prisoner hierarchy: violation of Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14.
Article 46: Respondent State required to take general measures to address systemic issue of informal prisoner hierarchies.
SEKOUR v. FRANCE ■ Application no. 52496/19
Prisoner detained for terrorism-related offences placed in security solitary confinement for over four years in total pursuant to successive decisions; domestic remedies concerning the extension of solitary confinement as a protective or security measure considered effective; Court’s review limited, on account of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of the other decisions, to two decisions imposing solitary confinement for periods of three months each; existence of procedural safeguards against the risk of arbitrariness: no violation of Article 3, no violation of Article 13.
ÖZTÜRK v. TÜRKİYE ■ Application no. 50205/20
Prisoner sentenced to five days’ solitary confinement for statements made out prison officers during a telephone conversation with his wife, also detained; domestic courts failed to explain why statements made during a private telephone conversation set a bad example for other prisoners or posed any risk to prison security; Government’s objection that the applicant’s statements amounted to an abuse of rights under Article 17 of the Convention dismissed: violation of Article 10.
YENOKYAN v. ARMENIA ■ Application no. 10761/16
Prisoner held in poor detention conditions for about nine years; continuing period of detention interrupted by the applicant’s escape from prison; detailed submission, corroborated by photographs and CPT reports: violation of Article 3.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
PETROV v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA ■ Application no. 38066/18 ■ Fifth Section ■ 5 March 2026
This legal summary has been drafted by the Court’s registry.
Art. 3 (+ Art. 14) ■ Degrading treatment ■ Discrimination ■ Segregation, assignment to menial tasks and denial of access to basic prison resources imposed on the applicant by his fellow inmates due to his status as an ‘outcast’ within the informal hierarchy among prisoners ■ The authorities could not have been unaware of the risks to which the applicant’s vulnerable situation exposed him, yet failed to take adequate measures to protect him ■ The authorities were fully aware of the seriousness and scale of the problem of the informal hierarchy among prisoners in Moldovan prisons and of its discriminatory effect on prisoners regarded as ‘outcasts’, yet took no action to remedy it ■ Violation of the applicant’s right to equal protection under the law.
Art 4 § 2 ■ Positive obligations ■ The respondent State’s failure to fulfil its positive obligations to protect the applicant from ‘forced or compulsory labour’ associated with his membership of the ‘outcast’ group ■ Arduous and thankless tasks imposed by his fellow inmates with the consent of the prison administration ■ Elements of physical and psychological coercion ■ Tasks performed by the applicant cannot be regarded as ‘work normally required of a person in detention’.
Art. 46 ■ Enforcement of the judgment ■ Respondent State required to take general measures to remedy the systemic problem of informal hierarchies among prisoners.
Facts ■ Between 2006 and 2021 the applicant served a prison sentence in various prisons. He complained about being required to work without remuneration, his conditions of detention and the discrimination to which he had allegedly been subjected on account of his “outcast” status within the lowest category of an informal prisoner hierarchy. His complaints were dismissed by the prison authorities and the domestic courts.
Law ■ Article 3 taken together with Article 14
(a) Establishment of the facts
The Court considered it established, first, that the applicant had belonged to the lowest “caste” of the informal prisoner hierarchy and, secondly, that he had indeed been subjected to at least physical and social segregation, denial of access to certain basic prison resources and assignment to menial labour imposed on him by the other prisoners on account of his “outcast” status.
(b) Whether the threshold of severity had been reached
With regard to the physical and symbolic separation of “outcast” prisoners, the applicant’s situation was substantially similar to that of the applicant in D v. Latvia. Following the same approach in the present case, the Court therefore considered that, coupled with his assignment to menial labour and denial of access to basic prison resources, the stigmatisation and physical and social segregation the applicant had suffered on account of his belonging to the “outcast” group of prisoners had exposed him to mental anxiety and physical suffering that had to have exceeded the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention, even though he had not been subjected to physical violence. That situation, which the applicant had endured over a period of years, amounted to degrading treatment, and the threshold of severity required to fall within the scope of Article 3 taken together with Article 14 had therefore been reached.
(c) The State’s positive obligation to protect the applicant, without discrimination, against ill-treatment
Given that the phenomenon of informal prisoner hierarchies was widespread and well-documented within Moldovan prisons, the Court considered that the State authorities, which had repeatedly been alerted by the applicant about his subordinate position, could not have been unaware of the risks to which his vulnerable situation exposed him.
The domestic authorities had, however, failed to put in place any measures to reduce the applicant’s vulnerability. In addition, nothing allowed the Court to conclude that there were effective mechanisms in place to address the more general issue of informal prisoner hierarchies. The national authorities had therefore failed to take sufficient measures to protect the applicant against the treatment associated with his belonging to the “outcast” group.
The Court found that the applicant’s belonging to that group had placed him in a distinct situation compared to other prisoners, that this status had affected almost every aspect of his daily life in prison and that, as such, it had been inextricably linked to his personal situation and his existence during his detention. The fact of his belonging to the “outcast group” therefore brought him within the ambit of “other status”, for the purposes of Article 14 of the Convention.
The Court considered that, in a contemporary democratic society built on respect for human dignity, no difference in treatment based on compulsory membership of the lowest “caste”, the members of which were dehumanised and denied recognition of their very existence as human beings, was capable of being objectively justified.
In the Court’s view, the combination of the above-mentioned factors clearly demonstrated that the authorities’ inaction had not constituted a mere failure to protect the applicant against degrading treatment in prison, but indeed a tolerance, or even condoning, of such treatment which reflected a discriminatory attitude towards him, motivated by his status in the informal prisoner hierarchy. The materials in the present case also demonstrated that the authorities had been fully aware of the seriousness and scale of the issue of informal prisoner hierarchies in Moldovan prisons and its discriminatory effect on prisoners categorised as “outcasts” but had done nothing to address it. In consequence, the State’s failure to afford the applicant protection against the degrading treatment he had suffered in prison on account of his belonging to the “outcast” group had amounted to a violation of his right to the equal protection of the law.
There had accordingly been a failure by the State authorities to comply with their obligation to protect the applicant – without discrimination – against treatment prohibited by Article 3.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14
Law ■ Article 4
(a) Establishment of the facts
The Court considered it established that, during his detention, the applicant had performed arduous and menial tasks (renovating cells, carrying heavy loads, cleaning toilets, collecting dustbins and refuse within the prison, and so on) and that these tasks had been compulsory on account of his “outcast” status within the informal prisoner hierarchy that was in place. The prison authorities had known about the applicant’s “outcast” status and could not have been unaware that the arduous and menial tasks were generally carried out by “outcast” prisoners. In addition, those authorities, the responsibilities of which included the supervision of prisoners, could not have been unaware of the work actually carried out by the applicant. The Court concluded from this that the work had been imposed on the applicant with the agreement of the prison administration.
In view of the above considerations, the Court decided to examine the present complaint from the standpoint of the State’s positive obligations to protect the applicant against forced or compulsory labour.
(b) Whether the tasks performed by the applicant were “forced or compulsory labour”
The work performed by the applicant had been assigned to him in accordance with the informal “code of conduct” to which he had been subject on account of his “outcast” status, and failure to comply with that “code” would have resulted in retaliation by fellow prisoners. The applicant had not alleged any actual violence against him, but the Court considered that in the circumstances of the case, there had been a genuine risk of such violence on the part of fellow prisoners or of additional humiliating treatment had he refused to perform the tasks assigned to him. In the light of this physical and mental coercion, the Court was therefore satisfied that the applicant had been performing work “under the menace of [a] penalty and for which [he had] not offered himself voluntarily”.
(c) Whether the tasks performed by the applicant were covered by Article 4 § 3 (a) of the Convention
Having followed the same approach as in Meier v. Switzerland, the Court considered that the fact that the aim of the work imposed on the applicant on account of his status within the informal prisoner hierarchy had been to punish and humiliate him, that there was no evidence that the work – which was physically arduous and/or menial – had been appropriate to the applicant’s state of health and physical capacities, and that the work was distributed between prisoners in a discriminatory manner on the basis of belonging to the lowest “caste” within the informal prisoner hierarchy, sufficed for it to consider that the work in question fell outside the “normal” limits in this area. It therefore concluded that the work performed by the applicant could not be regarded as “work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention” and that it had therefore not been covered by the terms of Article 4 § 3 (a) of the Convention. Accordingly, it had amounted to “forced or compulsory labour” within the meaning of Article 4 § 2 of the Convention.
(d) The respondent State’s positive obligations under Article 4 of the Convention
As in its findings under Article 3 taken together with Article 14, the Court noted that in the present case the authorities had been fully aware of the applicant’s individual situation and of the seriousness of the general issue of informal prisoner hierarchies, and that they had not taken any measures to protect him from the “forced or compulsory labour” associated with his belonging to the “outcast” group.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 4 § 2.
Law ■ Article 46
It [is] for the domestic authorities to take appropriate general measures to address the systemic issue of informal prisoner hierarchies.
Article 41 ■ No claim.
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
SEKOUR v. FRANCE ■ Application no. 52496/19 ■ Fifth Section ■ 12 March 2026
Art 35 § 1 ■ Exhaustion of domestic remedies ■ Effective preventive remedies regarding the extension of solitary confinement as a protective or security measure.
Art 3 (substantive) ■ Extension of the applicant’s placement in solitary confinement as a protective or security measure during his detention for terrorism-related offences ■ Change in approach regarding the periods to be taken into account in determining the scope of the dispute ■ The Court’s review limited to decisions on solitary confinement that complied with the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies ■ Threshold of severity not reached.
Art 13 (+ Art 3) ■ Effective remedies for challenging decisions to place the applicant in solitary confinement
Facts ■ The applicant was detained first on remand (September 2016 – January 2020) and as a convicted prisoner (from January 2020) for participation in a criminal conspiracy with a view to preparing a terrorist act. During his detentions in different prisons, he was placed in solitary confinement (as a security measure) for extended periods between September 2016 and March 2023.
Law ■ Admissibility
The Court considered that the applicant had exhausted the available domestic remedies only in respect of two decisions to place him in solitary confinement out of the around twenty solitary confinement measures imposed on him. These two decisions cover limited periods (three months each). Consequently, the Court limited its examination of the complaints to these two three-month periods and declared inadmissible the parts of the complaints concerning the remaining periods of solitary confinement, based on decisions taken between September 2016 and July 2022.
The Court based its conclusion on its examination of the available preventive and compensatory remedies.
First, as regards the preventive remedies, it concluded that an application to set aside an administrative decision together with an urgent application for a stay of execution (“référé-suspension”) constituted an effective domestic remedy, since they enabled in principle the administrative court to promptly review the justification for placing the applicant in solitary confinement. Similarly, an urgent application for protection of a fundamental freedom (“référé-liberté”) was also deemed an effective remedy. The Court recalled that it had found it effective in the context of unacceptable conditions of detention caused by a strike of prison officers (Leroy and Others, no. 2439/19, §§ 61–67, 18 April 2024) and in relation to the rules governing body searches of prisoners (B.M. and Others v. France, no. 84187/17, §§ 62–65, 6 July 2023), and deducted from the applicable law and consistent case law of the Supreme Administrative Court that impose on domestic courts the duty to examine, in a timely manner, whether a decision to place a prisoner in solitary confinement constitutes a risk of breach of fundamental rights.
Second, as regards compensatory remedies, the Court recalled that it had previously ruled that an action for state liability was an adequate remedy for inadequate detention of individuals whose detention had ended (J.M.B. v. France, no. 9671/15, §§ 158 and 163, 30 January 2020).
Law ■ Article 3
(a) Definition of the scope of the dispute
The Court departed from the approach it had previously adopted in similar cases, whereby it had considered the total duration of the measures of solitary confinement (adding up the duration of successive measures) without investigating whether or not the decisions leading to these successive periods of solitary confinement had been challenged before the domestic courts. It justified this change in approach by the establishment in 2003 of effective remedies enabling challenges to solitary confinement measures. Doing otherwise would led it “to rule on decisions which the national courts have not been able to review” ((§ 117), which would be contrary to the principle of subsidiarity (§ 112).
However, the Court declared that it would take into account periods spent in solitary confinement that do not strictly fall within the scope of the dispute, when examining the evidence to determine whether the threshold of severity required to establish treatment contrary to Article 3 has been reached, “in light of the practical impact of the cumulative duration of such periods on the applicant’s personal circumstances” (§ 119).
(b) Examination on the merits
The Court considered that the treatment to which the applicant was subjected during his solitary confinement was not of such a serious nature as to constitute a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
The Court declared it was aware of the challenge posed by the detention of individuals charged with or convicted of terrorism-related offences. In particular, it considered that “[g]iven the very nature of such offences, these individuals may pose a particular risk to the security of prisons and prison staff, as well as to that of other inmates; a risk which the authorities have a duty to manage” (§ 122).
In its examination of the applicant’s complaint, the Court pointed out four main elements that prevent prolonged solitary confinement from having effects contrary to Article 3.
Firstly, it concluded that the measures of solitary confinement could not be considered arbitrary since they were based on “a detailed examination of the applicant’s situation and conduct” (§ 124) revealing “the existence of a risk such that, for the safety of the various institutions where he was detained, such a preventive measure was necessary” (§ 123).
Secondly, the Court noted that the solitary confinement to which the applicant was subjected was not a disciplinary sanction. Consequently, individuals held under this regime “cannot take part in the outdoor exercise and group activities typical of the standard prison regime, [but] they retain, in particular, their rights to information, visits, written and telephone correspondence, and the practice of their religion; they are entitled to at least one hour of outdoor exercise each day; and they see the prison doctor for a check-up at least twice a week” (§ 125). As a matter of fact, the Court observed that the applicant did not “complain about the physical conditions in which he was held, [… or] claim to have been subjected to complete sensory deprivation or total social isolation” (§ 127). It further noted that material detention conditions in the cells in the solitary confinement wings were similar to cells in “ordinary” detention – “both in terms of furnishings and the presence of a window to allow for natural light and ensure adequate ventilation, and […] the […] rules regarding hygiene and cleanliness […]” (§ 126).
Thirdly, the Court was satisfied with the procedural safeguards associated with the imposition and prolongation of measures of solitary confinement, notably the fact that the concerned person is informed of the grounds of the measure, has access to “documents relating to the legal framework for solitary confinement” (§ 130), is entitled to legal aid at any stage of the proceedings and can request an oral hearing in the presence of their lawyer. The Court also took note of the fact that beyond a certain period, the decision to prolong such a measure is to be taken by Interregional Director of Prison Services (beyond six months) or by the Ministry of Justice (beyond one year). Lastly, the Court was satisfied with the fact that the opinion of the prison doctor is required beyond six months of solitary confinement, as well as the opinion of the judiciary beyond one year.
Fourthly and finally, the Court emphasised that decisions concerning solitary confinement may be challenged through various legal remedies, which have been considered effective (see above “admissibility).
Conclusion ■ No violation of Article 3.
Law ■ Article 13.
With reference to its finding concerning the effectiveness of domestic remedies in respect of decisions to prolong measures of solitary confinement (see above), the Court concluded that there had been no violation of Article 13.
Conclusion ■ No violation of Article 13.
ÖZTÜRK v. TÜRKİYE ■ Application no. 50205/20 ■ Second Section Committee ■ 17 March 2026
Art 10 ■ Prisoner sentenced to five days’ solitary confinement for statements during a telephone conversation with his wife, who was also held in prison.
Facts ■ The applicant was detained in Menemen prison, following conviction for membership of an organisation described by the Turkish authorities as the “Fetullahist Terror Organisation/Parallel State Structure” (Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü / Paralel Devlet Yapılanması, hereinafter “FETÖ/PDY”).
The main facts of the complaint result from a private telephone conversation he had with his wife, who was detained in a female prison, on 12 March 2019. As the applicant’s wife said: “I hope none of them die without experiencing what they made us go through”, the applicant replied: “I hope they cannot even die, pack of dogs”.
On 19 April 2019, the applicant was sanctioned with five days’ solitary confinement for the offence of “insulting or threatening prison officers”. According to the Disciplinary Board, a sanction was required to maintain order in prison, and to set an example for other detainees.
The applicant’s complaints before the enforcement judge, the Assize Court and the Constitutional Court were all dismissed as manifestly ill-founded.
Law ■ Article 10
(a) Admissibility
The Court rejected the Government’s objection that the applicant’s declaration during his phone call “had amounted to terrorist propaganda and ran counter to Article 17 of the Convention” (§ 12) which prohibits the abuse of rights. The Court observed “that the impugned statement by the applicant did not aim at inciting violence and hatred or reveal an intent to destroy the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention, despite its controversial nature” (§ 15).
(b) Merits
The Court considered that the disciplinary sanction imposed on the applicant constituted an interference with his right to freedom of expression, that the sanction was prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate aim.
However, it found that the measure was not necessary in a democratic society. It based its conclusion on the reasons given by national courts reviewing the applicant’s challenge of his disciplinary sanction. In particular, the enforcement judge and the Assize Court argued that the applicant had deliberately committed the disciplinary offence of “insulting or threatening prison officers”, while the Constitutional Court declared in general terms that there had been no interference with the applicant’s rights.
The Court found the domestic courts’ reasoning insufficient. In particular, those courts did not explain “why a statement made in prison by the applicant during a private telephone conversation with his wife had amounted to the offence of “insulting or threatening prison officers”, had set a bad example for other prisoners or had entailed any risks to the security or proper functioning of the prison” (§ 24).
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 10.
Article 41 ■ EUR 1,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 500 in respect of costs and expenses.
YENOKYAN v. ARMENIA ■ Application no. 10761/16 ■ Fifth Section Committee ■ 26 March 2026
Art 10 ■ Prisoner sentenced to five days’ solitary confinement for statements during a telephone conversation with his wife, who was also held in prison.
Facts ■ The applicant had been sentenced to life imprisonment in 1996 and detained in different prisons (Nubarashen, Goris). He complained about his detention conditions, mentioning a lack of natural light and fresh air, humidity, mould, insects, inadequate sanitary facilities, inadequate quality of food, limited outdoor exercise, lack of medical assistance or medication, exposure to passive smoking. He was released on parole in 2025.
Law ■ Article 3
(a) Admissibility
The Court rejected the Government’s objection that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies “since they raised it for the first time in their further observations of 18 March 2022” (§ 14).
As regards the period of detention to be taken into account, the Court first declared that the applicant’s complaint about his detention conditions before the entry into force of the Convention in respect of Armenia (26 April 2022) was inadmissible ratione temporis. The Court also analysed that the applicant’s escapes from prison (December 2004, November 2009) had interrupted the continuing situation complained of. Since he lodged his complaint in 2016, the period of detention before his escapes was considered inadmissible for not complying with the six-month limit.
Consequently, the Court decided to limit its examination to the applicant’s detention in Nubarashen prison between 19 December 2009 and 1 June 2018.
(b) Merits
The Court noted that the applicant made very detailed and consistent submissions regarding the conditions of his detention in the cell in which of was held for most of the considered period, and provided pictures of his cell. The Court also noted that the Government either accepted the applicant’s submission, or had been unable to submit any reliable evidence to contest it. The Court finally mentioned a CPT report which mentioned the “state of advanced dilapidation” of the prison in which the applicant was held.
In view of the cumulative effect of the applicant’s conditions of detention and the duration of his detention in such conditions, the Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 3.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 3.
Article 41 ■ EUR 7,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
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