This compilation brings together the most important judgments and decisions on prison issues delivered by the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union.
By reporting on the main trends in European prison case law, it aims to support legal practitioners in the prison field in their research and litigation, as well as to identify blind spots in European case law and to build strategic litigation avenues.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
FEDERICO AND RADDI v. ITALY ■ Application no. 5053/24
Prisoner with health conditions (drug addiction, anxiety and depression) died in custody after critical weight loss over eight months; weight loss initially dismissed by the prison administration as “a manipulative strategy aimed at obtaining secondary benefits”; no diagnosis or targeted therapeutic intervention until his condition became critical; transfer to the prison ward of a hospital delayed due to lack of available bed; prisoner’s lack of compliance with medical supervision not established; National Guarantor’s alerts left without an effective response: violation of Article 2 and 3 (substantive).
G.K. and A.S. v. SWITZERLAND ■ Applications nos. 55299/20 and 31515/22
Prisoner’s request for a vegan diet; failure by the authorities to fulfil their positive obligation to address the applicant’s requests in substance: violation of Article 9.
Practical impossibility for the applicant to obtain an administrative “decision” on his request, which was a prerequisite for his claims to be examined on the merits by domestic authorities; ineffective remedy in practice owing to the excessively formalistic manner in which the domestic authorities had applied domestic law: violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 9.
ORDULJ v. CROATIA ■ Application no. 5899/23
Domestic courts failed to examine on their own motion and within the statutory time limit whether a prisoner serving a juvenile detention sentence should be granted conditional release; examination based on the applicant’s behaviour and rehabilitation prospects, matters liable to change over time; examination took place with a six-month delay, in breach of the speediness requirement: violation of Article 5 § 4.
Applicant sentenced to a fixed-term sentence; examination took place before the expiry of the sentence; causal link with the conviction order remained unbroken; no right to conditional release enshrined in domestic law; no proof that the applicant would have been released earlier had the examination taken place with the statutory time limit: complaint under Article 5 § 1 inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
A.G. v. SWITZERLAND ■ Application no. 15345/20
Pregnant prisoner not allowed to receive visits from her partner for three and a half months and to have him present at the birth; authorities’ based their refusal of visits solely on security grounds, namely the need to mitigate the risk of collusion, without giving sufficient weight to the applicant’s specific situation or considering less restrictive alternatives; insufficient reasoning provided by the domestic courts concerning the request for the applicant’s partner to be present at the birth prevented the Court from exercising its “European supervisory function”; Court’s finding in line with CPT’s concerns regarding an “excessively security-oriented approach to contact with the outside world of remand prisoners”: violation of Article 8.
EKİCİKOL v. TÜRKİYE ■ Application no. 1991/21
Prisoner denied family visits on weekends on grounds of capacity and staff shortages; school-age children unable to visit on weekdays; domestic authorities failed to assess the impact of the decision on the applicant’s family life: violation of Article 8.
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
Russia | Administrative practice of detaining prisoners in inadequate conditions in Simferopol remand prison SIZO-1 (Russia-controlled Crimea) – severe overcrowding, inadequate temperatures, poor ventilation, infestation, lack of privacy of toilets and poor food (Chertok and Others v. Russia [Committee], nos. 20332/17 and 11 others, 9 July 2026): violation of Article 3.
Greece | Inadequate conditions of detention in Patras Prison (2.81 m² in dormitories and 2.87 m² in cells); certificate provided by the Patras prison administration not considered piece of evidence capable of discharging the burden of proof and contradicting the applicants’ submission, which was supported by the findings of CPT reports (Pentarakis and Others v. Greece [Committee], no. 82914/17, 9 July 2026; Akin and Others v. Greece [Committee], no. 82379/17, 27 August 2026): violation of Article 3.
Greece | Inadequate conditions of detention in Avlona Juvenile Prison (less than 3 m² of personal space); Government failed to provide documentary evidence indicating the number of detainees accommodated in each cell; official tables on the prison population showing that the prison population exceeded the official capacity (Antonopoulos and Others v. Greece [Committee], no. 13353/18, 27 August 2026): violation of Article 3.
Türkiye | Inadequate detention conditions in Konya E-Type Closed Prison, with between 1.69 and 2.31 m² of personal space (Demirci v. Türkiye [Committee], no. 41715/20, 27 August 2026): violation of Article 3.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
FEDERICO AND RADDI v. ITALY ■ Application no. 5053/24 ■ First Section Committee ■ 9 July 2026
Art 2 and Art 3 (substantive) ■ Prisoner with health conditions (drug addiction, anxiety and depression) died in custody from septic shock after critical weight loss over eight months ■ Weight loss initially dismissed by prison administration as “a manipulative strategy aimed at obtaining secondary benefits” ■ No diagnosis targeted therapeutic intervention until the condition became critical ■ Transfer to hospital’s prison ward delayed due to lack of available bed ■ Prisoner’s lack of compliance with medical supervision not established ■ National Guarantor’s alerts left without effective response.
Facts ■ The complaint concerned the alleged failure of prison authorities to provide the applicants’ son (A.R.) with adequate medical care in response to significant and progressive weight loss that he experienced during his detention.
A.R. entered Turin prison in April 2019. He suffered from drug addiction, anxiety and depression and was prescribed a treatment to address drug-withdrawal symptoms. As soon as July 2019, he reported having a reduced appetite and in August 2019 his medical record indicated that he was suffering from a general state of fatigue as a consequence of his ‘condition of anorexia’. On the same day, the National Guarantor of the Rights of People Detained or Deprived of their Liberty (“the National Guarantor”) alerted the prison administration about A.R.’s weight loss and requesting additional external psychological support. This request was declined by the prison administration who excluded the possibility that A.R.’s weight loss was due to a serious health issue.
In November 2019, in response to a new request from the National Guarantor following further deterioration of A.R.’s condition, the prison authorities stated that his weight loss “was to be viewed as ‘a manipulative strategy aimed at obtaining secondary benefits’” (§ 8). The next day, the prison’s medical administration requested A.R. to be transferred to Turin Hospital’s prison ward. This transfer was delayed to 10 December due to a lack of an available bed. On the transfer date, he refused to be hospitalised, against the medical advice.
Three days later, after having been urgently hospitalised, he was diagnosed with a pulmonary infection. He went into a coma on the following day and died on 30 December in hospital from septic shock.
A criminal investigation was opened at the request of the National Guarantor. In October 2023, on the basis of expert reports that, while pointing to undue delays in the acknowledgement of the seriousness of A.R.’s situation and to a lack of coordination among the healthcare professionals involved, also noted that A.R. had refused hospitalisation, the Turin preliminary investigation judge ordered the discontinuation of the proceedings.
Law ■ Articles 2 and 3
(1) Admissibility
The Court rejected the Government’s argument that the applicants should have had recourse to a compensatory remedy before the civil courts after the criminal proceedings had been discontinued. It recalled that there is no requirement to use another remedy that has the same objective than the one that has already been used. The Court noted that the Government did not challenge the adequacy of the criminal proceedings nor provide any reasons why the civil proceedings could have been more effective.
(2) Merits
The Court considered undisputed that A.R. suffered from several medical conditions and that two of the three medical experts appointed by the public prosecutor found that his deterioration linked to his weight loss had a causal role in his death.
The Court further identified shortcomings in the medical care provided. It noted that two of the three medical experts consulted during domestic proceedings concluded “the medical response to the rapid, progressive weight loss [of A.R. had been] neither adequate nor timely” (§ 25). Furthermore, despite requests from both A.R. and the National Guarantor, no decisive action (such as weight checks and daily monitoring) was taken until his condition had seriously deteriorated.
The Court rejected the Government’s argument “that the weight loss had initially appeared voluntary” (§ 25), stressing that the authorities had failed to establish the reasons for A.R.’s refusal to eat.
The Court also rejected the argument about A.R.’s lack of compliance with his medical supervision. It considered that his “refusals to accept treatment were occasional and occurred while he was in isolation […] or during the final stage of detention” (§ 26) and declared unfounded the Government’s allegation that he refused to take nutritional supplements. A.R.’s refusal to be hospitalised in December 2019 was also not considered decisive since, although the need for hospitalisation had been acknowledged in November 2019 due to A.R.’s critical health condition, the authorities delayed it by three weeks due to a lack of capacity.
Consequently, in view of “the protracted delays in addressing A.R.’s condition and the lack of earlier efforts to secure appropriate treatment”, the Court concluded that the medical care provided to him had been inadequate.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Articles 2 and 3.
Article 41 ■ EUR 6,790 jointly in respect of pecuniary damage (funeral costs); EUR 20,000 jointly in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 1,000 in respect of costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings.
G.K. and A.S. v. SWITZERLAND ■ Applications nos. 55299/20 and 31515/22 ■ Fifth Section ■ 16 July 2026
This legal summary was drafted by the Court’s Registry.
Art 9 ■ Positive obligations ■ Freedom of thought and conscience • Art 13 (+ Art 9) ■ Effective remedy ■ Domestic authorities’ failure to provide the applicants, in pre-trial detention and involuntary psychiatric care respectively, a substantive examination of their arguable grievances regarding access to a vegan diet in accordance with their ethical beliefs ■ Veganism considered by Council of Europe member States as a non-religious belief ■ Sincerity and consistency of the applicants’ beliefs ■ Existence of a sufficiently close connection between those beliefs and the applicants’ abstaining from the consumption of food derived from animal sources ■ Applicants’ beliefs had met the required level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance to fall within the scope of Art 9 ■ Art 13 applicable ■ Practical impossibility for the applicants to obtain the administrative “decisions” necessary for their claims under Art 9 to be examined on the merits ■ Applicants considered to lack a sufficient legal interest within the meaning of the relevant law ■ Excessively formalistic approach of administrative and judicial authorities ■ Ineffective remedy in practice due to the way in which the domestic authorities had applied domestic law ■ Positive obligation stemming from Art 9 to address the applicants’ requests in substance ■ Failure to strike a fair balance between the competing interests at stake.
Facts ■ Between November 2018 and October 2019, the first applicant was held in pre-trial detention. Between February and April 2021, the second applicant was subjected to involuntary hospitalisation in the psychiatric unit of a hospital.
Both applicants complained about the lack of access to nutritionally balanced and entirely vegan diets. In both cases the respective administrations replied to the applicants’ complaints not with formal decisions, but with letters. Specifically, the prison administration replied to the first applicant that several measures had been put in place to ensure that he could benefit from a diet which accommodated his beliefs as well as possible. The Head of the Department of Psychiatry of the hospital replied to the second applicant that his complaint had been forwarded to the head of the care unit, who would contact him in order to find a solution.
The first and second applicants’ attempts to challenge those letters before the Administrative Chamber and the Cantonal Court, respectively, failed. Both applicants’ appeals were declared inadmissible owing to the lack of a appealable “decision”, within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Acts on administrative procedure in each canton. Their attempts to challenge those decisions before the Federal Supreme Court were also unsuccessful.
Law ■ Article 13 in conjunction with Article 9
(1) Whether there has been an arguable claim under Article 9 of the Convention
The terms “freedom of thought, conscience and religion” were not defined in Article 9 or in the Court’s case-law. While the Court had previously found that observance of dietary rules dictated by a religion fell within the scope of religious practice protected by Article 9, it had not yet been called upon to examine whether compliance with dietary rules linked to a belief such as veganism was also protected by this Article.
If a personal or collective conviction or belief is to benefit from the right to “freedom of thought, conscience and religion” under Article 9, it must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. In order to count as a “manifestation” within the meaning of Article 9, the act in question must be intimately linked to the religion or belief. The existence of a sufficiently close and direct nexus between the act and the underlying belief must be determined on the facts of each case.
The Court and the former European Commission of Human Rights had previously acknowledged that the safeguards of Article 9 § 1 had applied to various coherent and sincerely-held philosophical convictions such as vegan convictions in the context of an applicant’s opposition to the manipulation of products of animal origin or tested on animals. Additionally, the Court had previously held that, in practice, observing dietary rules could be considered a direct manifestation of religion or belief in the sense of Article 9. It also followed from the comparative-law research that Council of Europe member States consider veganism as a non-religious belief.
In the light of the foregoing, and in the absence of any submissions from the Government challenging the sincerity and consistency of the applicants’ vegan beliefs or the existence of a sufficiently close direct connection between those beliefs and the applicants’ abstaining from the consumption of food derived from animal sources, the Court considered that those beliefs had met the required level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance to fall within the scope of Article 9. There had accordingly been an arguable claim under Article 9 and, consequently, Article 13 was applicable.
(2) Whether there existed an effective domestic remedy for the applicants’ complaints under Article 9
The domestic administrative-procedure law had provided for the same procedure to challenge the alleged failure of the respective administrative authorities to accommodate the applicants’ special dietary needs. Decisions of administrative authorities could be appealed against to the ordinary higher authorities for appeal in administrative matters.
The Government contended that the first applicant could have benefited from an effective remedy before a national authority if he had explicitly requested the prison administration to issue a “decision” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act of the Canton. However, when the first applicant had explicitly requested that the prison administration issue a “decision” to change his diet, the reply had again been given to him in the form of a letter.
The Court was mindful of the fact that the first applicant had not challenged that second letter before the domestic authorities. It considered, however, that such an appeal would have been obviously futile. In the proceedings before the Cantonal Court of Justice the prison administration had indicated that it had considered that the first applicant had not had a sufficient legal interest to obtain a formal decision within the meaning of the law in question. The second applicant had explicitly requested a “declaratory decision” acknowledging his right to receive nutritionally balanced vegan meals. Nevertheless, like the first applicant he had never received such a decision, on the basis that he had lacked a sufficient legal interest for him to challenge the letter he had received.
The Government had not adduced any evidence of the practical effectiveness of the other remedies they had referred to, nor had they provided relevant national case-law or administrative decisions in a similar case.
In such circumstances the Court considered that the way in which the domestic authorities had applied the domestic law in the present case – starting with the practical impossibility for the applicants to obtain administrative “decisions”– had rendered the remedy pursued ineffective in practice, with the result that their claims concerning the accommodation of their vegan dietary needs when in the care and control of the State authorities had never been examined on the merits at the national level. The approach of the administrative and judicial authorities had therefore been excessively formalistic and showed that the applicants’ complaints had not been taken seriously.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 9.
Law ■ Article 9
The applicants, both dependent on the domestic authorities for the provision of food over lengthy periods of time, had repeatedly asked the domestic authorities to provide them with meals consistent with a vegan diet, in accordance with their vegan beliefs. While the parties disputed the extent to which the applicants’ dietary requirements had been accommodated it was clear that they had not been systematically provided with meals corresponding entirely to the requirements of a vegan diet.
The comparative law research had showed the existence of divergent approaches among the Member States of the Council of Europe regarding whether prisoners and involuntary psychiatric patients were entitled to diets based on non-religious beliefs, such as veganism. The majority of the Member States had agreed, however, on the necessity to take requests for such diets into account. The research had showed that many courts had applied a proportionality or reasonableness test, assessing whether accommodating the requested diet had been feasible in light of organisational, financial and nutritional constraints. Moreover, some legal systems had emphasised the State’s positive obligations to respect freedom of religion or belief and human dignity in detention, while others had limited the State’s role to facilitating self‑provision.
In the circumstances of the present case, and having regard to the above comparative research, the Court considered that, faced with the applicants’ consistent and genuine vegan beliefs and their requests for a vegan diet while deprived of liberty, the authorities had been under a positive obligation stemming from Article 9 to address those requests in substance and within a clear domestic legal framework. Failing this, it was difficult to consider that the authorities had done what had been necessary to strike a fair balance between the competing interests at stake, having regard to the aims mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 9.
Due to the practical impossibility for the applicants to obtain the administrative “decisions” necessary for their claims under Article 9 to be examined on the merits, the domestic courts’ findings had concerned technical matters only, and there had thus been no domestic findings on the substance of the applicants’ claims.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court considered that the failure of the domestic authorities to provide a substantive examination of the applicants’ serious and arguable grievances regarding their access to a vegan diet in accordance with their ethical beliefs while in the care and control of the State authorities, had amounted to a violation of Article 9.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 9.
Article 41 ■ EUR 12,000 to the first applicant and EUR 4,000 to the second applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 10,000 to the second applicant in respect of costs and expenses.
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
ORDULJ v. CROATIA ■ Application no. 5899/23 ■ First Section Committee ■ 16 July 2026
Art 5 § 1 a) ■ Complaint inadmissible ■ Belated examination of conditional release from detention after conviction to a fixed-term sentence ■ Causal link with conviction unbroken ■ No right to early release under domestic law and no proof that the applicant would have been release sooner in case of timely examination of his request.
Art 5 § 4 ■ Provision applicable ■ Belated examination of conditional release (six-month delay) ■ Mandatory review by domestic courts, on their own motion and within a precise timeframe, of the necessity of continued detention, on the basis of the applicant’s behaviour ■ Criteria susceptible to change over time ■ Speediness requirement not met.
Facts ■ In September 2011, the applicant started serving a two-year prison sentence in juvenile detention, for several criminal offences he had committed when he was 19 years old. On the basis of the rules governing juvenile detention, which provide that he could be considered for conditional release two months before he would have served two thirds of his sentence, the applicant made such request in October 2012.
Due to the applicant’s age (23 years old) and his place of detention (juvenile detention), the domestic courts were uncertain as to which rules governing conditional release should apply – those applying to adult prisoners or juveniles – leading the applicant’s request to be forwarded to several courts and the Ministry of Justice’s Commission for Conditional Release. The applicant was eventually granted conditional release in April 2013, that is four months before the completion of the serving of his sentence.
The applicant’s sought compensation before domestic courts. He argued that the domestic court failed to examine his request for conditional release in a timely manner, and failed to comply with their obligation to examine juvenile detainees’ eligibility for conditional release on their own motion. His claim for compensation and his subsequent constitutional complaint were both rejected in 2022.
Law ■ Article 5 § 1
The Court declared the applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 1 inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded.
While the applicant argued that his detention had become arbitrary on account of the domestic courts’ failure to decide in a timely manner on his conditional release, the Court stressed that the causal link between his conviction and his detention had not been broken in between. He had been sentenced to a fixed-term sentence (a centr), and his request for conditional release, also belated, led to his release four month before his sentence was set to expire.
It further added that provision requiring domestic court to examine juvenile detainees’ eligibility for conditional release on their own motion did not guarantee a right to early release and held that it could not be said that the applicant would have been released sooner should his application have been examined earlier (see Del Río Prada v. Spain [GC], no. 42750/09, § 126-130, 21 October 2013).
The Court stressed the substantial difference between this case, and other cases when applicants were serving sentences without a fixed term (see Miklić v. Croatia [Committee], no. 42613/19, §§ 4 and 26, 18 March 2025) or detained on the basis of detention orders which had either expired or had been found to be defective (see H.W. v. Germany,no. 17167/11, §§ 68-70 and 83, 19 September 2013).
Conclusion ■ Inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
Law ■ Article 5 § 4
(1) Admissibility
Rejecting the Government’s objection, the Court considered that although, in the present case, “the procedure for the examination of the possibility of conditional release from juvenile detention […] went beyond the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention”, it was “of such nature to attract the applicability thereof” (§ 21).
It observed that the domestic legal framework entailed a mandatory review by domestic courts, on their own motion, of the need for juveniles’ continued detention, within a specific timeframe. What is more, this review is based on the applicant’s behaviour, in particular his rehabilitation and socialisation prospects, an element that is “susceptible to change with the passage of time” (§ 20).
Those circumstances, the Court held, “call for the possibility of recourse to a body satisfying the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention” (ibid., referring to Kafkaris v. Cyprus (dec.), no. 9644/09, § 58, 21 June 2011).
(2) Merits
The Government did not dispute the fact that the Split County Court had examined the applicant’s conditional release some six months later than prescribed by law. The Court rejected the Government’s argument that this delay had been caused by legal uncertainties as to the applicable law due to the applicant’s age, stressing that those shortcomings are “entirely imputable to the domestic authorities” (§ 27).
The Court therefore concluded that the domestic courts failed to decide speedily on the applicant’s request for conditional release, in breach of Article 5 § 4.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 5 § 4.
Article 41 ■ EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 830 in respect of costs and expenses.
A.G. v. SWITZERLAND ■ Application no. 15345/20 ■ Fifth Section ■ 23 July 2026
Art 8 ■ Pregnant prisoner not allowed to receive visits from her partner or to have him present at the birth ■ Authorities based their assessment solely on security grounds, namely mitigating the risk of collusion ■ Applicant’s specific situation not taken into account, contrary to the relevant international framework (PACE Recommendation, European Parliament resolution) ■ No less restrictive alternatives examined ■ Lack of reasoning by the domestic courts prevented the Court from exercising its “European supervisory function” ■ Court’s finding in line with CPT’s concerns regarding an “excessively security-oriented approach to contact with the outside world of remand prisoners.
Facts ■ In December 2019, the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention in connection with a drug-related offence. She was pregnant at the time, with the expected date of child birth in March 2020. In January and February 2020, she requested permission to make telephone calls and to receive visits from her partner, and for him to be present at the birth of their child.
The authorities rejected the applicant’s requests, on the grounds that preventing contact between her and her partner was necessary to avoid the risk of collusion in the context of the criminal proceedings. The domestic courts dismissed the applicant’s complaints against the authorities’ decisions. The applicant was only authorised to make a supervised and recorded phone call to her partner.
The applicant gave birth in April 2020, without her partner being present.
Law ■ Article 8
(1) Admissibility
The Court rejected the Government’s argument that the applicant and her partner did not officially have a common domicile as irrelevant. Indeed, it was undisputed that the applicant’s partner was also the father of the child to be born, and that they had been living together when the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention. The Court therefore concluded that the refusal to allow the applicant’s partner to visit her in prison fell within the scope of her “family life” under Article 8.
As regards the authorities’ refusal to allow the applicant’s partner to be present at the birth, the Court considered that this part of the complaint fell within the scope of both the applicant’s “private life” and “family life” under Article 8.
(2) Merits
Observing that the measures complained of constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her private and family life, that the interference was provided for by law and pursued the legitimate aim of preventing criminal offences, the Court focused on the examination of whether the interference had been necessary in a democratic society.
First, it considered that the domestic administrative and judicial authorities had failed to conduct a Convention-compliant proportionality assessment of the refusal to allow the applicant to receive telephone calls and visits from her partner, and to allow her partner to be present at the birth.
The authorities, while pursuing primarily the aim of reducing the risk of collusion, had failed to take into account “the suffering that the complete absence of visits may have caused the applicant, a young pregnant woman who was then at an advanced stage of her pregnancy and was detained” (§ 80), in the light of the established international framework mentioned in the judgment (including PACE Recommendation 1469 (2000) on mothers and babies in prison, the European Parliament Resolution of 13 March 2008 on the particular situation of women in prison and the impact of the imprisonment of parents on social and family life (2007/2116(INI)), and the Bangkok Rules. Furthermore, the duration of the measures (three and a half months) was found by the Court to be excessive, in view of the applicant’s “particular vulnerability” (§ 81).
As regards specifically the refusal to allow the applicant’s partner to be present at the birth, the Court also pointed to the lack of reasoning provided by the domestic courts – a circumstance that prevented the Court from “exercising its European supervisory function” in this respect (§ 82).
Lastly, the Court observed that the authorities had failed to examine whether a less restrictive measure to the applicant’s right to private and family life would have enabled them to mitigate the risk of collusion. It noted an inconsistency in the authorities’ approach, since, while they had authorised the applicant to make a supervised and recorded telephone call to her partner, they had not considered allowing a supervised visit. It stressed that this finding was consistent with the finding of the CPT, which underlined the “excessively security-oriented approach to contact with the outside world of remand prisoners”.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 8.
Article 41 ■ EUR 1,730 for non-pecuniary damage; EUR 4,000 for costs and expenses.
EKİCİKOL v. TÜRKİYE ■ Application no. 1991/21 ■ Second Section Committee ■ 25 August 2026
Art 35 § 2 b) ■ Examination of the Court’s own motion ■ One of the prison administration decisions had been examined in a separate case ■ Decisions considered to have a different scope, cover different periods and challenged in distinct domestic proceedings.
Art 8 ■ Family life ■ Denial of weekend prison visits due to overcrowding, staff shortage and security concern ■ School-age children not able to attend visits on weekdays ■ Lack of consideration of the proportionality of the measure, due to its impact on the applicant’s family life.
Facts ■ In September 2018, the İzmir T-Type Prison, in which the applicant was detained, adopted a general decision excluding visits at weekends on the grounds of prison overcrowding, staff shortages at weekends and security concerns. The applicant, who at the time had two daughters, one of preschool age and one of school age, challenged this decision. His complaints having been rejected by domestic courts, including by the Constitutional Court in June 2020, he filed a complaint with the Court in December 2020.
In November 2019, the prison administration delivered a new decision allowing prisoners who have children of school age to have visits weekend once per month, on similar grounds. His complaints were rejected by domestic courts. He filed a complaint with the Court in June 2021: the Court ruled that such restriction to family visits constituted a breach to his right for respect to private and family life and awarded him EUR 1,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage (Altıntop and Others v. Türkiye, [Committee], nos. 39386/20 and 28 others, 20 January 2026).
Law ■ Article 8
(1) Admissibility
The Court rejected the Government’s objection that the applicant had still have the possibility of receiving weekdays visits from his children and had not been deprived of other means of communication with them (telephone calls and correspondence). Without further argumentation, it referred to a recent judgment in which it had held that “mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other’s company constitutes a fundamental element of family life” (Subaşı and Others v. Türkiye, nos. 3468/20 and 18 others, § 63, 6 December 2022). It also rejected as factually inaccurate the Government’s objection that the applicants’ children had not reach the age of compulsory education at the time the impugned decision had been taken.
Having recalled that part of the applicant’s complaint had been examined in Altıntop, the Court went on to examine on its own motion whether the present application should be declared inadmissible for being “substantially the same” as a previous application. Noting that the decisions challenged in Altıntop and in the present application “were different in scope […], concerned different periods of time and were accordingly contested by the applicant in separate sets of proceedings before the domestic courts” (§ 24), the Court considered that the two applications cannot be considered as relating to the same facts and concluded that the present application was admissible.
(2) Merits
The Court limited its examination of the 2018 decision, which prohibited weekend visits – the 2019 decision, restricting weekend visits to once a month, having been examined in Altıntop.
It recalled that it, in Subaşı, which also concerned denial of weekend visits, it had found a violation of Article 8 on the grounds that the impugned decision had been taken on the basis of capacity-related considerations without taking into account the prisoners’ right to respect for their family life and their relationships with their children, and that the court having examined the case had failed to conduct a Convention-compliant assessment of the applicant’s situation.
It saw no reason to depart from this case and concluded that there had been a violation of Article 8.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 8.
Article 41 ■ The Court noted that the applicant had been awarded EUR 1,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage in Altıntop and therefore concluded that he had already been awarded compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered; the Court dismissed the applicant’s claim for costs and expenses since his claim had not been accompanied by any supporting document.
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