This compilation brings together the most important judgments and decisions on prison issues delivered by the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union.
By reporting on the main trends in European prison case law, it aims to support legal practitioners in the prison field in their research and litigation, as well as to identify blind spots in European case law and to build strategic litigation avenues.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
D.T. v. GREECE ■ Application no. 51829/21
Inadequate psychiatric monitoring of a pre-trial detainee with bipolar disorder; incomplete medical documentation failing to clarify the content of the psychiatric consultation and whether follow-up took place; lack of clarity in domestic rules on the contents of medical records; CPT findings on incomplete medical records: violation of Article 3.
Complaint to the prison council, with the possibility of judicial review, considered an effective remedy; complaint to the supervising prosecutor no longer considered an effective remedy owing to uncertainty about the availability of judicial review: no violation of Article 13.
BELOUS v. UKRAINE ■ Application no. 20068/21
Wheelchair-bound life sentenced prisoner held in inadequate material detention conditions; prison not adapted to his limited mobility, preventing him from participating in out-of-cell activities, and making him reliant on his cellmate for assistance, including with access the bathhouse; lack of an effective remedy in this respect: violation of Article 3 and Article 13.
Prisoner exposed to pressure from the prison administration after lodging his application with the Court (searches, attempted transfer to another cell, transfer of his cellmate to a punishment cell); applicant’s particular vulnerability due to his disability and his status as a life-sentenced prisoner: violation of Article 34.
ASCIUTTO AND OTHERS v. ITALY ■ Applications nos. 23169/16 and 3 others
Life sentence rendered irreducible due to a provision depriving prisoners convicted of mafia-related offences of eligibility for sentence adjustments and conditional release unless they cooperate with the judicial authorities; reform of this life sentence regime introduced in 2022, enabling life sentences to be reviewed based on the combined assessment of individual rehabilitation and “residual dangerousness”; compatibility of the new 30-year minimum term to be assessed in the individual circumstances of each case: violation of Article 3 during the periods in which the applicants lacked a clear and realistic prospect of release; no violation of Article 3 thereafter.
Reducible life sentence rendered irreducible through the retrospective application of a regime rendering life sentences irreducible for mafia-related crimes (three applicants) or its application despite the“mafia-type”aggravating circumstances not having been retained in the final judgment; sentence enforcement courts inferred that the offences had been committed using the “mafia method”, on the basis of case law that had developed only after the offences were committed; exclusion of life prisoners from conditional release and sentence adjustment changed the scope of the penalty; the retrospective change in the scope of the penalty was unforeseeable: violation of Article 7.
NEKRASOVA v. UKRAINE ■ Application no. 35931/19
Prisoner’s cassation appeal in civil proceedings rejected by the Supreme Court for failure to pay a court fee of approximately EUR 80; request to defer payment refused despite a certificate by the prison administration attesting that the applicant had no income and was receiving the State’s “full financial maintenance”; no guidance given by the Supreme Court as to what additional documents were required from the applicant to substantiate her claim; “excessively formalistic” decision denying the applicant practical and effective access to the Supreme Court: violation of Article 6 § 1.
First-instance hearing of the applicant’s civil claim held in her absence after the video link with the detention facility could not be established; applicant failed to demonstrate that her personal testimony had been necessary for the determination of the case, and was represented by her lawyer during those proceedings; applicant had been able to participate in the appellate hearings via video conference and to make oral and written submissions: complaint inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
BĄCLER v. POLAND ■ Application no. 47190/16
Indigent prisoner required to pay court fees eight times higher than his savings in compensatory proceedings against the prison administration; domestic courts’ reasoning based on assumptions not corroborated by the factual evidence concerning the applicant’s financial situation: violation of Article 6 § 1.
STANTON AND BOWEN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM ■ Application no. 49096/19
Delay in the release of two indeterminate sentence prisoners who had completed their minimum terms of imprisonment due to a lack of immediate availability of places in designated facilities; Parole Board’s direction to release subject to conditions, including residence in a designated facility, owing to the risk that they were perceived to pose to the public if released directly into the community; causal link between the applicants’ convictions and detention not broken; delay not caused by a structural capacity shortage; delays in release (118 days and 69 days, respectively ) did not render continued detention arbitrary: no violation of Article 5 § 1; complaint under Article 5 § 4 inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
Türkiye | Monitoring of a remand prisoner’s meetings with his lawyer in the presence of a prison officer, under a legal provision lacking safeguards against arbitrariness; electronic recording and storage of his private correspondence on a judicial network system, under unpublished instructions to which prisoners did not have access (Benli v. Türkiye, no. 29949/20, 15 September 2026): violation of Article 8.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
D.T. v. GREECE ■ Application no. 51829/21 ■ Third Section ■ 1 September 2026
Art 3 (substantive) ■ Lack of adequate psychiatric monitoring of a pre-trial detainee with a serious bipolar disorder ■ Treating psychiatrist’s opinion on the need for regular psychiatric monitoring brought to the attention of the authorities, shifting the burden of proof to the Government ■ Only one psychiatric consultation in fourteen months, with incomplete medical documentation ■ Inadequate medical records, consistent with CPT findings on the brevity and incompleteness of prison medical records ■ Absence of clear domestic rules on what must be recorded in a detainee’s medical file.
Art 13 (+ Art 3) ■ Effective remedy ■ Complaint to the prison council and appeal to the court for the execution of sentences (Articles 6 and 86 of the Penal Code) constituted an effective remedy ■ Complaint to the supervising prosecutor under Article 567 (formerly 572) of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not constitute an effective remedy in view of the absence of the possibility of judicial review.
Facts ■ The applicant had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and drug addiction. In December 2020, he was placed in pre-trial detention. The pre-trial detention was prolonged several times, despite the applicant’s requests for its termination on health grounds, relying on medical opinions indicating that he needed special therapeutic care and treatment.
He spent five days in Korydallos Prison Psychiatric Hospital, three months in Amfissa Prison and 14 months in Korydallos Prison. He was eventually released in April 2022, pending the outcome of his appeal in his criminal proceedings.
The applicant complained about insufficient psychiatric monitoring and inadequate medication while in prison, and about the absence of an effective remedy in this respect.
Law ■ Article 3
Although a Single Judge having declared inadmissible the parts of the complaint concerning the applicant’s detention in Korydallos Prison Psychiatric Hospital and Amfissa Prison, the Court considered that “in ascertaining the adequacy of the medical treatment received in Korydallos Prison, [it] cannot but have regard to the relevant aspects of his medical treatment in the other facilities where the applicant was previously detained in so far as they had an impact on the medical treatment the applicant received in Korydallos Prison”(§ 29).
The Court considered that the Government knew that the applicant needed regular psychiatric monitoring, as evidenced by a medical opinion issued by the applicant’s treating psychiatrist at a public psychiatric institution in the context of his criminal proceedings. Yet, the evidence adduced by the Government showed that, following his initial psychiatric assessment in Korydallos Prison Psychiatric Hospital, the applicant had seen a psychiatrist only once during his 14-month detention in Korydallos prison. This was contrary to domestic legislation requiring prison doctors to ensure medical follow-up at least every six months.
Furthermore, the Court noted with concern the incomplete medical documentation provided, both regarding the initial psychiatric assessment at Korydallos Prison Psychiatric Hospital and the only psychiatric consultation recorded in Korydallos prison. The record of the latter did not clarify the reason for the consultation, the psychiatrist’conclusions and whether there had been any follow-up session. The Court noted in this respect the absence of “clear guidelines” in the national legal framework “with regards to what should be recorded in a detainee’s medical file to document medical examinations and consultation” (§ 52). It also referred to the CPT’s findings regarding the brevity and incompleteness of medical records at Korydallos Prison Special Health Centre, which led the CPT to recommend that “an adequate medical records system as well as an individual care plan for each patient be introduced” ( ibid.).
As the applicant’s state of health required regular psychiatric monitoring, but his medical file did not establish that he had received such monitoring, the Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 3, without examining whether he had received adequate medication.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 3.
Law ■ Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3
The Court rejected the argument that the procedure for reviewing the applicant’s pre-trial detention constituted an effective remedy, as it was unclear whether domestic courts could assess the adequacy of the medical care provided to the applicant and order the authorities to take necessary steps in that regard.
It went on to examine whether complaints to the supervising prosecutor and to the prison council (with a right to appeal to the court for the execution of sentences) could be considered effective remedies for complaints about inadequate medical care in prison. Such remedies had been found to be effective in cases concerning specific circumstances affecting prisoners individually and which the prison authorities could put an end to (such as passive smoking, insomnia, placement in cells with sick detainees, placement in solitary confinement, inadequate treatment for a prisoner suffering from drug addiction – § 68).
As regards to complaints to the supervising prosecutor (Article 567 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), the Court departed from its earlier approach and considered this remedy ineffective in the applicant’s circumstances, owing to a lack of certainty as to whether a decision by the supervising prosecutor could be appealed before a court for the execution of sentences. The Government argued that although the relevant legal provisions did not explicitly provide for such a possibility, it followed from a “systematic interpretation” of the applicable provisions (§ 74). The Court rejected this argument, noting that although 19 years had elapsed since it had considered this avenue an effective remedy (Tsivis v. Greece, no. 11553/05, §§ 18‑20, 6 December 2007), the Government could not provide examples of case law in which a court for the execution of sentences had heard an appeal against a decision by a supervising prosecutor under this procedure. In the absence of judicial review, a complaint to the supervising prosecutor alone could not be considered an effective remedy since such authority lacked the necessary independence (being “actively involved in the administration of the supervised prison”, § 75) and could not adopt legally binding decisions which the prison authorities are obliged to enforce. The Court also pointed to procedural shortcomings, noting that the complaint does not give rise to legal proceedings to which the prisoner was a party.
Conversely, a complaint to the prison council (Articles 6 and 86 of the Penal Code), with the possibility of appealing to the court for the execution of sentences, was found to constitute an effective remedy. The applicant had acknowledged that this remedy “could in principle be effective with respect to complaints of inadequate medical care in detention” ( § 78), and the Court therefore saw no reason to depart from its case law on this point. The Court was not convinced that the applicant’s mental condition had prevented him from using this remedy in view of “the circumstances of the present case, namely his alleged inability to communicate with his lawyer with sufficient clarity regarding his exact state of health” ( § 79). It noted that he had sought release on health grounds, relying on a detailed psychiatric opinion, and had lodged his application with the Court, being represented by the same lawyer in both proceedings.
Conclusion ■ No violation of Article 13.
Article 41 ■ EUR 12,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 2,500 in respect of costs and expenses.
BELOUS v. UKRAINE ■ Application no. 20068/21 ■ Fifth Section Committee ■ 3 September 2026
Art 3 and Art 13 ■ Wheelchair-bound life sentenced prisoner held in inadequate detention conditions ■ Material detention conditions ■ Prison not adapted to the needs of persons with reduced mobility ■ Prisoner unable to participate in out-of-cell activities ■ Prisoner relied on the assistance of his cellmate for his daily routine and to reach the bathhouse
Art 34 ■ Prisoner exposed to pressure by the prison administration after lodging his application with the Court ■ Searches, attempted transfer to another cell, transfer of his cellmate to a punishment cell ■ Particular vulnerability of the applicant.
Facts ■ The applicant, a life sentenced prisoner, had been detained since April 2012 at Zhytomyr prison, except for a five-week period (between August and September 2019), when he was detained at Bucha Prison Hospital.
The applicant complained about the inadequate material conditions of his detention (lack of ventilation, heating and hot water; lack of proper toilet partitioning; insufficient access to natural light and fresh air, etc.). Furthermore, as he was partially paralysed and wheelchair-bound, he complained that the prison was not adapted to his needs, preventing him from participating in out-of-cell activities. He was also reliant on his cellmate’s support to reach the bathhouse once every two weeks.
The second part of the complaint concerned the pressures exerted on the applicant by the prison administration following the lodging of his application with the Court. He alleged, in particular, that he had been threatened by the prison rehabilitation officer, subjected to repeated and excessive searches of his cell and the seizure of his personal belongings, that an attempt had been made to transfer him to a “worse” cell, and that he had been left alone in his cell for several days after his cellmate was transferred to a punishment cell.
Law ■ Articles 3 and 13
(1) Admissibility
The Court considered that the applicant’s detention at Bucha Prison Hospital for five weeks between August and September 2019 had brought the “continuing situation”of inadequate detention conditions complained of to an end. Therefore, it considered the applicant’s complaint concerning his detention prior to 4 August 2019 to be time-barred and therefore inadmissible.
(2) Merits
The Court established that the applicant had between 2.9 and 3.3 sq. m. of personal space during his detention. As regards other aspects of the applicant’s detention, the Court noted that the Government’s submissions relied solely on a certificate issued by a prison official describing general aspects of his detention. Furthermore, given that the facility was not adapted to the needs of wheelchair users, the Court observed that the applicant spent nearly 24 hours a day in his cell without being able to participate in activities, to access fresh air, or to reach the bathhouse independently. In addition, although he required assistance to use the toilet, and had to wash himself in the in-cell sink, no assistance was provided by the prison staff.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Articles 3 and 13.
Law ■ Article 34
The Court stated at the outset that it drew “strong inferences from the fact that no specific observations were provided by the Government in response to the applicant’s allegations of verbal pressure and threats” (§ 18).
As regards the searches to which the applicant had been subjected, noting that alongside prohibited objects, ordinary objects “the prior presence of which could hardly have gone unnoticed” (ibid.) were also seized, the Court concluded that they were “reactive and unusually thorough rather than routine in nature” (ibid.).
As to the purpose of those searches and the other measures alleged (the attempt to transfer the applicant to a cell further from the bathhouse, the placement of the applicant’s cellmate in a punishment cell for several days), the Court noted that, while the applicant had consistently argued that these constituted pressure aiming at forcing him to withdraw his application, the Government did not provide any elements aiming at refuting this interpretation – including reports of internal investigations.
The Court stressed that the applicant was in a situation of particular vulnerability, as he, as “a life prisoner, [had] only limited contact with the outside world and [remained] permanently under the exclusive control of the prison authorities, who [had] at their disposal various means capable of aggravating his situation”, including by depriving him of the assistance of his cellmate (§ 20).
The Court therefore found that the elements in its possession were “sufficient for the Court to conclude that the applicant could reasonably have felt intimidated by the measures undertaken by the prison authorities following his recourse to the Court” (§ 21)
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 34.
Article 41 ■ EUR 12,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 1,000 in respect of costs and expenses.
ASCIUTTO AND OTHERS v. ITALY ■ Applications nos. 23169/16 and 3 others ■ First Section ■ 3 September 2026
Art 3 (substantive) ■ Irreducible life sentences for prisoners convicted of mafia-related crimes who did not cooperate with the judicial authorities ■ Situation of uncertainty with no clear and realistic prospect of early release (Marcello Viola (no. 2)) ■ 2022 reform, as interpreted by the domestic courts consistently with the Court’s case-law, affording a realistic prospect of review under clear conditions ■ Review focused mainly on rehabilitation, balanced against residual dangerousness ■ Compatibility of the 30-year minimum term to be assessed in the circumstances of each case ■ Violation confined to the pre-reform periods.
Art 7 ■ Heavier penalty ■ Retroactivity ■ Initially reducible life sentences rendered irreducible by the enforcement courts’ inference that the murders had been committed using the “mafia method” ■ Change in the scope of the penalty going beyond mere measures of enforcement ■ Lack of foreseeability contrary to the principle of legal certainty.
Art 7 ■ Nulla poena sine lege ■ Application of the ergastolo ostativo regime to one applicant although the “mafia-type” circumstances had been ruled out by the judgment convicting him ■ Lack of foreseeability contrary to the principle of legal certainty.
Facts ■ The four applicants were serving cumulative life sentences for multiple offences, including murders. They had also been sentenced to fixed terms of imprisonment for mafia-related crimes. In 1991 and 1992 respectively, specific provisions concerning aggravating “mafia-type” circumstances (section 7 of Decree-Law no. 152 of 13 May 1991, hereinafter“section 7”) and mafia-related crimes (section 4 bis of the Prison Administration Act, hereinafter “section 4 bis”) were introduced in the domestic legal framework.
In particular, “section 4 bis” (1992) introduced a ban on eligibility for conditional release, sentence adjustments in respect of prisoners convicted of mafia-related offences who did not cooperate with the judicial authorities. When applied to life sentences, this regime (known as ergastolo ostatitvo), made life imprisonment irreducible in practice by preventing lifers from the prospect of release if they refuse to cooperate with the authorities. In Marcello Viola v. Italy (no. 2) (no. 77633/16, 13 June 2019), the Court found the ergastolo ostativo to be contrary to Article 3.
The applicants complained that the domestic courts had retrospectively applied “section 4 bis” to their life sentences, depriving them of access to sentence adjustment and conditional release.
The case concerned two different situations. For three out of four applicants, the offences for which they had been sentenced to life imprisonment had been committed before the entry into force of “section 7” (1991) and “section 4 bis” (1992). However, when examining their applications for sentence adjustments, the sentence enforcement courts interpreted the judgments convicting them as indicating that the offences had been committed using the so-called “mafia method”, even though such aggravating circumstance had not been formally included in the charges. They consequently applied the “section 4 bis”regime to the applicants’ life sentences, rendering them irreducible in practice.
The fourth applicant (no. 17937/20) was in a different situation, as the murder for which he had been sentenced to life imprisonment was committed after the entry into force of “section 4 bis”(1992). However, the trial court had ruled out the “mafia-type” aggravating circumstances (as defined in “section 7”, 1991) because, under the legislation applicable at the time, those circumstances could not be applied to offences punishable by life imprisonment. Nevertheless, as for the three first applicants, the sentence enforcement courts applied the “section 4 bis” regime to his life sentence as well.
The applicant complained under Article 3 about the irreducibility of their life sentence, and under Article 7 against the retrospective application of section 4 bis and the lack of foreseeability of the penalty that had been imposed on them.
In October 2022, following the Marcello Viola (no. 2) judgment and subsequent developments in domestic case law, the ergastolo ostativo regime was reformed. The amended framework allows life sentence prisoners who refuse to cooperate with the judicial authorities to seek sentence adjustment and conditional release, subject to specific conditions, including demonstrating that they no longer have links with organised crime and that there is no risk that such links will be restored in the future.
Law ■ Article 3
TThe Court stressed from the outset that domestic courts had had a “contradictory approach” (§ 158) to the applicants’ eligibility to sentence adjustments, preventing them from establishing “whether or not their life sentence[s] w[ere] reducible” or not (ibid.).
The Court nevertheless considered it undisputed that the applicants had been subjected to the ergastolo ostativo regime through the application of “section 4 bis” to their life sentences. In line with its findings in Marcello Viola (no. 2), it found a violation of Article 3 for the period during which they were subject to this regime without a clear and realistic prospect of release, ending with the entry into force of the reform of ergastolo ostativo in October 2022 for three applicants, and in May 2022 for the fourth applicant, when the competent domestic court recognised that “section 4 bis”did not apply to his life sentence.
As regards the applicants’ detention following these developments, the Court found no violation of Article 3, considering that they had a realistic prospect of review.
(1) Scope of review
The Court was satisfied with the scope of the review. In view of the “specific nature of mafia-type criminal organisations” (§ 168), it considered justified that, under the new framework, domestic courts examining requests for sentence adjustments examine both prisoners’progress towards rehabilitation and their “residual dangerousness”( § 169), and require them to demonstrate that they no longer have links (and will not restore them) with their criminal organisation (ibid., referring to Bodein v. France, no. 40014/10, § 60, 13 November 2014, concerning the combined scope of the review mechanism).
(2) Criteria and conditions for review
The Court acknowledged that due to a lack of clarity of the amended legal framework concerning the criteria and conditions for review, divergent interpretations have been made by domestic courts. However, it considered that the observed divergence in case law does not amount to “a profound and persistent conflict” (§ 175). It noted that most judicial decisions placed particular emphasis on the prisoner’s individual progress towards rehabilitation, in line with its own principles.
The Court was also confident that, although the domestic case law is “still consolidating” ( § 176), domestic courts will eventually be guided by its case law, which has been recalled in this judgment (see § 174: “The Court further considers that in the exercise of their power of assessment under the newly introduced provisions, domestic courts will be guided by its case-law. In this regard, by setting out its relevant case-law in the preceding paragraphs […] the Court’s purpose was precisely to aid the domestic courts to fulfil their statutory duty to act compatibly with the Convention in this area”).
The procedure was also deemed satisfactory. Although the applicants are required to provide elements demonstrating they have severed their links with criminal organisations, this burden of proof “is counterbalanced by the domestic authorities’ responsibility to provide detailed, concrete and updated information and the domestic courts’ duty to base their assessment on all the adduced circumstances” (§ 172). The competent courts must also give reasons for accepting or rejecting applications for sentence adjustment, enabling prisoners to understand what they must do to be considered for release.
(3) Time frame for review
While the amended legal framework sets a minimum of 30 years’ imprisonment before a prisoner may become eligible for conditional release (compared to 26 years under the “ordinary” life sentence regime), Italian law also allows account to be taken of periods spent in pre‑trial detention, periods of detention imposed in respect of separate offences and any period of early release. The Court concluded that a case-by-case assessment is necessary to determine whether, notwithstanding the 30-year minimum, prisoners serving life sentences under the ergastolo ostativo regime could become eligible for conditional release within 25 years of the imposition of their life sentence, in accordance with the Court’s case-law.
(4) Applications to the individual cases
The Court noted that three out the four applicants had neither applied for conditional release following the entry into force of the 2022 reform nor provided information enabling it to assess whether, and within what time frame, they could become eligible for release. It therefore found no violation of Article 3 in respect of the period following the reform.
As regards the fourth applicant (no. 23834/18), the Court observed that in May 2022, the competent sentence enforcement court had concluded that “section 4 bis” did not (retroactively) apply to his life sentence. He was consequently eligible to apply for conditional release under the rules governing “ordinary” life sentences – that is, after 26 years. The Court considered that this decision had ended the continuing violation of Article 3, irrespective of the fact that the applicant’s application for conditional release was subsequently unsuccessful.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 3 during the periods in which the applicants were subject to the ergastolo ostativo regime without a realistic prospect of release: until the October 2022 reform (in respect of three applicants), and until May 2022 for the fourth applicant; no violation thereafter.
Law ■ Article 7
(1) Admissibility
The Court confirmed that Article 7 applied in the present case. Although the penalties imposed on the applicants at the time of their convictions were reducible life sentences, the retrospective application of the “section 4 bis”regime rendered those sentences irreducible. The Court considered that this change, which deprived the applicants of a realistic prospect of release, could not be regarded as merely a measure governing the execution of a sentence but rather modified the scope of the penalty (§ 214, referring to Kupinskyy v. Ukraine, no. 5084/18, § 52, 10 November 2022).
The Court also examined the applicants’ victim status. For two applicants (nos. 23169/16 and 17937/20) who had also been convicted of offences committed after the entry into force of “section 4 bis”, the Court examined the Government’s objection together with the merits of their complaints. As regards the third applicant (no. 23834/18), a domestic court had acknowledged that “section 4 bis” could not be applied retrospectively to his life sentence. However, he retained his victim status since the domestic authorities had not acknowledged a violation of his rights and afforded redress. Likewise, the fourth applicant (no. 37683/19) retained his victim status, as the domestic courts had not acknowledged a violation of his rights.
The Court rejected the Government’s objection that the six-month time limit had expired. It considered that the starting points were not the first domestic decisions rejecting the applicants’ requests for sentence adjustment, but the final domestic decisions clarifying that the“section 4 bis” regime applied to their life sentences, depriving them of a prospect of release unless they cooperated with the authorities. All applications had been lodged within six months of those decisions.
Lastly, the Court rejected the Government’s objection concerning the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies since it had not demonstrated that the recent developments in domestic case law and legislation provided an effective remedy capable of affording redress for the applicants’ complaint under Article 7.
(2) Merits
The Court concluded that the application of “section 4 bis” to the applicants’ initially reducible life sentences had rendered them irreducible, thereby changing the scope of the original punishment and imposing a heavier penalty than that applicable at the time of the offences. It found that this change was unforeseeable and therefore violated Article 7 in respect of all four applicants.
As regards the three applicants who had been sentenced to life imprisonment for offences committed before the entry into force of provisions introducing the the “mafia-type” aggravating circumstances (1991) and the ergastolo ostativo regime (1992), the Court noted that those aggravating circumstances had not been formally included in the charges relating to those offences. The domestic courts had subsequently inferred that the offences had been committed using the “mafia method” and applied “section 4 bis” when determining the regime governing the execution of their life sentences.
The fact that two applicants had also been convicted for offences committed after the entry into force of “section 4 bis” was immaterial, since those offences had been punished by fixed-term sentences. Those separate convictions could not justify transforming their reducible life sentences into irreducible ones.
The Court further considered that the domestic case law allowing sentence enforcement courts to infer the use of the “mafia method” from a final judgment even when “mafia‑type” aggravating circumstances had not been formally included in the charges, had developed only after the offences had been committed. The retrospective application of “section 4 bis” on the basis of that case law had therefore not been foreseeable at the relevant time.
The Court also noted that the Italian Constitutional Court had recognised, in 2020, that excluding prisoners from eligibility for conditional release transforms the nature of the penalty. It welcomed the fact that the 2022 reform, while extending “section 4 bis” to offences committed using the “mafia method”, excluded the retrospective application of this extension.
The situation of the fourth applicant (no. 17937/20) differed in that the offence for which he had been sentenced to life imprisonment had been committed after the entry into force of “section 4 bis”. However, the trial court had ruled out “mafia-type” circumstances because, under the legislation applicable at the time, they could not be applied to offences punishable by life imprisonment. The domestic case law allowing those aggravating circumstances to be applied in those cases as well had developed only several years after the offence.
Moreover, the case law permitting sentence enforcement courts to infer the use of the “mafia method” even in the absence of formally established “mafia-type” aggravating circumstances, had developed only later and was limited to offences committed before the entry into force of such aggravating circumstances in domestic law (1991). It could not therefore have been foreseen to apply to the fourth applicant’s offence, committed after that date.
Consequently, the applicant could not have foreseen, at the time of the offence, that his reducible life sentence would become irreducible due to the application of “section 4 bis”.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 7.
Article 41 ■ EUR 2,400 to each applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 3,000 and EUR 2,800 in respect of costs and expenses for two applicants.
NEKRASOVA v. UKRAINE ■ Application no. 35931/19 ■ Fifth Section Committee ■ 3 September 2026
Art 6 § 1 (access to the Supreme Court) ■ Cassation appeal rejected for failure to pay a court fee of approximately EUR 80 ■ Deferral refused despite the prisoner’s lack of any income while under the State’s “full financial maintenance”, confirmed by the prison administration ■ No guidance as to the additional documents required ■ Excessively formalistic approach.
Art 6 § 1 (hearing in the applicant’s absence) ■ Complaint inadmissible ■ Video link with the detention facility not established at first instance ■ Case presented through a lawyer at first instance and personal participation via video conference on appeal.
Facts ■ In January 2017, while serving a prison sentence, the applicant brought civil proceedings against a private individual concerning matters unrelated to her imprisonment. Following a hearing that took place in her absence because a video link with her detention facility could not be established, her claims were dismissed as unfounded. In July 2018, the Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s judgment, without addressing the applicant’s allegation that her inability to participate in the first-instance proceedings had affected the outcome of the case.
In January 2019, the Supreme Court refused to examine the applicant’s cassation appeal, because she had failed to pay a UAH 2,560 court fee (ca. EUR 80). Although the applicant argued that she had no income since the beginning of her detention in March 2012, and submitted a certificate issued by the Kyiv Pre-Trial Detention Facility attesting that she had no income during her detention there between February and October 2018 and and had been receiving the State’s “full financial maintenance”, the Supreme Court considered that she had failed to present sufficient grounds for deferring payment of the court fees.
Law ■ Article 6 § 1 (access to the Supreme Court)
The Court found that the Supreme Court’s decision to reject the applicant’s request to defer payment of court fees had been “excessively formalistic” (§ 9).
Ukrainian law provided for exemption from or deferral of the court fee where the fee exceeds 5% of the party’s income over the previous year. Although the certificate provided by the Kyiv Pre-Trial Detention Facility covered only an eight-month period, the applicant explained that she had had no income since the beginning of her detention in 2012. The Court also noted that the applicant had not been given any guidance as to which additional documents or information she needed to provide to substantiate her claim.
The Court concluded that, in the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court denied the applicant practical and effective access to that court without sufficient justification.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 6 § 1.
Law ■ Article 6 § 1 (hearing in the applicant’s absence)
According to the Court, the applicant had not shown that her personal testimony had been necessary for determining the merits of her claim, nor that she or her lawyer had been unable to obtain or submit supporting documents during the first-instance proceedings, which had lasted almost a year. Moreover, she had participated in the appellate hearings by video conference, with the opportunity to make oral and written submissions on all the relevant points of fact and law, which the appellate court had the power to review.
Even assuming that the authorities bore some responsibility for the failed video connection, her non-participation in that single hearing had not deprived her of the right to present her case effectively.
Conclusion ■ Inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
Article 41 ■ EUR 1,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 57 in respect of costs and expenses.
BĄCLER v. POLAND ■ Application no. 47190/16 ■ First Section Committee ■ 3 September 2026
Art 6 § 1 ■ Prisoner wishing to initiate compensatory proceedings against the prison administration required to pay courts fees eight time higher than his savings ■ Prisoner “indigent”, unemployed in prison and receiving occasional financial support from his relatives ■ Domestic court disregarded his indigent situation and based their refusal to exempt him from court fees on assumptions not corroborated by the factual evidence submitted.
Facts ■ At the material time, the applicant was detained in the hospital unit of a prison in Poland. In October 2015, he initiated proceedings for compensation against the prison administration on account of inadequate medical care. In particular, he complained that between January and April 2015 he had been deprived of a respiratory assistance device. In addition to claiming compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered, he requested exemption from court fees.
The domestic court exempted the applicant from fees exceeding PLN 600 (ca. EUR 150). In support of its decision to require the applicant to pay the remaining PLN 600, the court held that, as most of his daily expenditures were covered by the prison administration, he should have been able to gather the necessary amount. Furthermore, the court noted that he had received PLN 1250 from his relatives in the preceding months, of which PLN 75 remained.
The applicant unsuccessfully challenged this decision before domestic courts, which also rejected his request to allow him to pay the fees in instalments. As the applicant had been unable to pay the PLN 600 fee, his compensation claim was rejected on 16 February 2016.
Law ■ Article 6 § 1
The Court noted at the outset that the applicant’s compensatory complaint was not “frivolous or manifestly ill-founded” (§ 16). Concerning the domestic courts’ reasoning, the Court noted that at the material time, the applicant had only PLN 75 – a sum eight times lower than the PLN 600 fees requested – that he was unemployed in prison and had no other resources other than financial support from his relatives, who, as the applicant was an adult, had no legal obligation to support him.
The Court stressed that the applicant was undoubtedly “indigent” (§ 17). It also rejected the domestic courts’ reasoning that, as the applicant had received PLN 1250 in the preceding months, he would have been able to save the requested sum, as this was not corroborated by the factual evidence submitted by the applicant.
The Court therefore concluded that requiring the applicant to pay PLN 600 in order to pursue his compensation claim constituted a disproportionate restriction on his right of access to a court.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 6 § 1.
Article 41 ■ EUR 7800 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
STANTON AND BOWEN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM ■ Application no. 49096/19 ■ Second Section ■ 22 September 2026
Art 5 § 1 ■ Delay in the release of two indeterminate sentence prisoners due to a lack of immediate availability of accommodation at designated Approved Premises at the time the Parole Board directed release ■ Continued detention, pending availability of accommodation, in conformity with domestic law and consequently to the perceived risk to the public of releasing the applicants directly into the community ■ Causal connection between the applicants’ conviction and sentences and their continued detention not broken ■ No structural issue ■ In case circumstances delays not rendering detention, or any part of it, arbitrary.
Facts ■ The two applicants were both serving indeterminate sentences when, after the expiry of their minimum terms, the Parole Board directed their release subject to conditions requiring them to reside at designated “Approved Premises” as part of their preparation for release from prison. Approved premises are facilities that provide temporary accommodation with enhanced supervision to selected offenders outside prisons or to persons granted bail in criminal proceedings, who are considered to represent “a high or very high risk of harm in the community” (§ 44).
In both cases, the Parole Board decisions anticipated a delay in release owing to a lack of immediate availability of accommodation at the Approved Premises and indicated the date at which a place was expected to become available. For both applicants, this date became their actual date of release, as no places had been available earlier. The first applicant was eventually released to the Approved Premises 118 days after the Parole Board’s decision, and the second applicant after 69 days.
In national proceedings, both applicants argued that the delay between the Parole Board’s decision and their actual release constituted a breach of domestic law and of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention. The High Court rejected their claims, and the Court of Appeal upheld that outcome.
Law ■ Article 5 § 1
The Court endorsed the domestic courts’ conclusion that the applicants’ detention had been lawful, noting that “it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law” ( § 60).
The Court also found that domestic law met the requirements of clarity and foreseeability under Article 5 § 1, as it clearly set out the process for release – a process that the law itself did not define as immediate, but as contingent to the conditions that would render it safe (specifically, in this case, the availability of places at the designated Approved Premises). While the Court did not exclude the possibility that issues of lawfulness could arise if the decisions were to “leave a prisoner in a significant amount of uncertainty as to when, or even if, his release will actually take place” (§ 62) that was not the case as the Parole Board gave a clear indication of the anticipated date of release, a date that was ultimately respected for both applicants.
The Court lastly held that the Parole Board’s decision to release the applicants to Approved Premises had neither broken the causal link between their conviction and detention nor rendered their detention arbitrary. It observed that the applicants had received indeterminate sentences because they were considered to pose a risk to the public, and that their release depended on the fulfilment of conditions, set by the Parole Board, to manage that risk, including residence at Approved Premises. Consequently, their continued detention pending their transfer to Approved Premises “was the consequence of the risk that they were perceived to pose to the public if released directly into the community” (§ 64).
The Court also accepted that “where release is contingent on the availability of required facilities”it would be “unrealistic, and too rigid an approach, to expect the authorities to ensure that relevant treatment or facilities be available immediately”, provided that the delay remained reasonable (§ 65, referring to James, Wells and Lee v. the United Kingdom, nos. 25119/09 and two others, 18 September 2012). Contrary to its finding of a violation in James, Wells and Lee, where structural deficiencies had led to excessive delays in the applicants’ progress towards release, the Court endorsed the domestic courts’ conclusion that the delay in the applicants’ release did not result from a structural shortage of places in Approved Premises.
Finally, the Court, having examined the circumstances of each case, including whether their progression to open prison and proceedings before the Parole Board had occurred in a timely manner, concluded that the delay in their release had not rendered their continued detention arbitrary. It also noted that, in both cases, the specific Approved Premises to which the applicants were awaiting transfer had been selected by the Board for “a number of relevant and rational reasons” (§ 67) such as family and community ties and, in the case of the first applicant, the presence of organisations that might assist with his reintegration into society.
Hence, the Court concluded that no breach had taken place under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
Conclusion ■ No violation of Article 5 § 1.
Law ■ Article 5 § 4
The applicants furthermore complained that, since their release “had depended upon the actions of the executive” (§ 70) and not a judicial body, they had not had the lawfulness of their detention determined by a judicial body with the power to order their release, in breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. They added that, had the release date had subsequently changed because of availability issues, the Parole Board would have been unable to intervene.
The Court however dismissed the claim, as “the implementation of the Parole Board’s decisions happened precisely in accordance with the timescale given to the Board” (§ 71): this therefore made the applicants’ claim that the Parole Board could not have intervened had the anticipated release dates changed purely hypothetical.
The Court therefore declared the complaint raised under Article 5 § 4 manifestly ill-founded.
Conclusion ■ Complaint inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
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