This compilation brings together the most important judgments and decisions on prison issues delivered by the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union.
By reporting on the main trends in European prison case law, it aims to support legal practitioners in the prison field in their research and litigation, as well as to identify blind spots in European case law and to build strategic litigation avenues.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
D.T. v. GREECE ■ Application no. 51829/21
Inadequate psychiatric monitoring of a pre-trial detainee with bipolar disorder; incomplete medical documentation failing to clarify the content of the psychiatric consultation and whether follow-up took place; lack of clarity in domestic rules on the contents of medical records; CPT findings on incomplete medical records: violation of Article 3.
Complaint to the prison council, with the possibility of judicial review, considered an effective remedy; complaint to the supervising prosecutor no longer considered an effective remedy owing to uncertainty about the availability of judicial review: no violation of Article 13.
BELOUS v. UKRAINE ■ Application no. 20068/21
Wheelchair-bound life sentenced prisoner held in inadequate material detention conditions; prison not adapted to his limited mobility, preventing him from participating in out-of-cell activities, and making him reliant on his cellmate for assistance, including with access the bathhouse; lack of an effective remedy in this respect: violation of Article 3 and Article 13.
Prisoner exposed to pressure from the prison administration after lodging his application with the Court (searches, attempted transfer to another cell, transfer of his cellmate to a punishment cell); applicant’s particular vulnerability due to his disability and his status as a life-sentenced prisoner: violation of Article 34.
ASCIUTTO AND OTHERS v. ITALY ■ Applications nos. 23169/16 and 3 others
Life sentence rendered irreducible due to a provision depriving prisoners convicted of mafia-related offences of eligibility for sentence adjustments and conditional release unless they cooperate with the judicial authorities; reform of this life sentence regime introduced in 2022, enabling life sentences to be reviewed based on the combined assessment of individual rehabilitation and “residual dangerousness”; compatibility of the new 30-year minimum term to be assessed in the individual circumstances of each case: violation of Article 3 during the periods in which the applicants lacked a clear and realistic prospect of release; no violation of Article 3 thereafter.
Reducible life sentence rendered irreducible through the retrospective application of a regime rendering life sentences irreducible for mafia-related crimes (three applicants) or its application despite the“mafia-type”aggravating circumstances not having been retained in the final judgment; sentence enforcement courts inferred that the offences had been committed using the “mafia method”, on the basis of case law that had developed only after the offences were committed; exclusion of life prisoners from conditional release and sentence adjustment changed the scope of the penalty; the retrospective change in the scope of the penalty was unforeseeable: violation of Article 7.
NEKRASOVA v. UKRAINE ■ Application no. 35931/19
Prisoner’s cassation appeal in civil proceedings rejected by the Supreme Court for failure to pay a court fee of approximately EUR 80; request to defer payment refused despite a certificate by the prison administration attesting that the applicant had no income and was receiving the State’s “full financial maintenance”; no guidance given by the Supreme Court as to what additional documents were required from the applicant to substantiate her claim; “excessively formalistic” decision denying the applicant practical and effective access to the Supreme Court: violation of Article 6 § 1.
First-instance hearing of the applicant’s civil claim held in her absence after the video link with the detention facility could not be established; applicant failed to demonstrate that her personal testimony had been necessary for the determination of the case, and was represented by her lawyer during those proceedings; applicant had been able to participate in the appellate hearings via video conference and to make oral and written submissions: complaint inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
BĄCLER v. POLAND ■ Application no. 47190/16
Indigent prisoner required to pay court fees eight times higher than his savings in compensatory proceedings against the prison administration; domestic courts’ reasoning based on assumptions not corroborated by the factual evidence concerning the applicant’s financial situation: violation of Article 6 § 1.
MANAVIDIS v. GREECE (dec.) ■ Application no. 28849/23
Preventive and compensatory remedies for inadequate conditions of detention considered effective following a 2022 reform; a two-and-a-half-month delay in transferring the applicant to improve his detention conditions was not sufficient to deprive the remedy of its effectiveness; the fact that redress was awarded only through a reduction in the applicant’s sentence rather than monetary compensation did not, in itself, render the remedy ineffective: complaints under Articles 13 and 3 inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded.
STANTON AND BOWEN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM ■ Application no. 49096/19
Delay in the release of two indeterminate sentence prisoners who had completed their minimum terms of imprisonment due to a lack of immediate availability of places in designated facilities; Parole Board’s direction to release subject to conditions, including residence in a designated facility, owing to the risk that they were perceived to pose to the public if released directly into the community; causal link between the applicants’ convictions and detention not broken; delay not caused by a structural capacity shortage; delays in release (118 days and 69 days, respectively ) did not render continued detention arbitrary: no violation of Article 5 § 1; complaint under Article 5 § 4 inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
TATIČ AND OTHERS v. SLOVAKIA ■ Applications nos. 6796/23 and 5 others
Domestic legal framework providing for the recording and retention of prison telephone communications; applicants have not shown that their ability to communicate by telephone had been affected by the recording and retention of their conversations, or that their ability to maintain contact by other means had been limited: complaint under Article 8 inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded)
Domestic legal framework providing for the listening, in real time or retrospectively, of prison telephone conversations; listening required an individual decision by the prison governor and was permitted only for specified purposes; no such individual decision had been adopted with respect to the applicants; effective remedies available to challenge such a decision: complaint under Article 8 inadmissible (no victim status).
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
Türkiye | Monitoring of a remand prisoner’s meetings with his lawyer in the presence of a prison officer, under a legal provision lacking safeguards against arbitrariness; electronic recording and storage of his private correspondence on a judicial network system, under unpublished instructions to which prisoners did not have access (Benli v. Türkiye, no. 29949/20, 15 September 2026): violation of Article 8.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
D.T. v. GREECE ■ Application no. 51829/21 ■ Third Section ■ 1 September 2026
Art 3 (substantive) ■ Lack of adequate psychiatric monitoring of a pre-trial detainee with a serious bipolar disorder ■ Treating psychiatrist’s opinion on the need for regular psychiatric monitoring brought to the attention of the authorities, shifting the burden of proof to the Government ■ Only one psychiatric consultation in fourteen months, with incomplete medical documentation ■ Inadequate medical records, consistent with CPT findings on the brevity and incompleteness of prison medical records ■ Absence of clear domestic rules on what must be recorded in a detainee’s medical file.
Art 13 (+ Art 3) ■ Effective remedy ■ Complaint to the prison council and appeal to the court for the execution of sentences (Articles 6 and 86 of the Penal Code) constituted an effective remedy ■ Complaint to the supervising prosecutor under Article 567 (formerly 572) of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not constitute an effective remedy in view of the absence of the possibility of judicial review.
Facts ■ The applicant had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and drug addiction. In December 2020, he was placed in pre-trial detention. The pre-trial detention was prolonged several times, despite the applicant’s requests for its termination on health grounds, relying on medical opinions indicating that he needed special therapeutic care and treatment.
He spent five days in Korydallos Prison Psychiatric Hospital, three months in Amfissa Prison and 14 months in Korydallos Prison. He was eventually released in April 2022, pending the outcome of his appeal in his criminal proceedings.
The applicant complained about insufficient psychiatric monitoring and inadequate medication while in prison, and about the absence of an effective remedy in this respect.
Law ■ Article 3
Although a Single Judge having declared inadmissible the parts of the complaint concerning the applicant’s detention in Korydallos Prison Psychiatric Hospital and Amfissa Prison, the Court considered that “in ascertaining the adequacy of the medical treatment received in Korydallos Prison, [it] cannot but have regard to the relevant aspects of his medical treatment in the other facilities where the applicant was previously detained in so far as they had an impact on the medical treatment the applicant received in Korydallos Prison”(§ 29).
The Court considered that the Government knew that the applicant needed regular psychiatric monitoring, as evidenced by a medical opinion issued by the applicant’s treating psychiatrist at a public psychiatric institution in the context of his criminal proceedings. Yet, the evidence adduced by the Government showed that, following his initial psychiatric assessment in Korydallos Prison Psychiatric Hospital, the applicant had seen a psychiatrist only once during his 14-month detention in Korydallos prison. This was contrary to domestic legislation requiring prison doctors to ensure medical follow-up at least every six months.
Furthermore, the Court noted with concern the incomplete medical documentation provided, both regarding the initial psychiatric assessment at Korydallos Prison Psychiatric Hospital and the only psychiatric consultation recorded in Korydallos prison. The record of the latter did not clarify the reason for the consultation, the psychiatrist’conclusions and whether there had been any follow-up session. The Court noted in this respect the absence of “clear guidelines” in the national legal framework “with regards to what should be recorded in a detainee’s medical file to document medical examinations and consultation” (§ 52). It also referred to the CPT’s findings regarding the brevity and incompleteness of medical records at Korydallos Prison Special Health Centre, which led the CPT to recommend that “an adequate medical records system as well as an individual care plan for each patient be introduced” ( ibid.).
As the applicant’s state of health required regular psychiatric monitoring, but his medical file did not establish that he had received such monitoring, the Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 3, without examining whether he had received adequate medication.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 3.
Law ■ Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3
The Court rejected the argument that the procedure for reviewing the applicant’s pre-trial detention constituted an effective remedy, as it was unclear whether domestic courts could assess the adequacy of the medical care provided to the applicant and order the authorities to take necessary steps in that regard.
It went on to examine whether complaints to the supervising prosecutor and to the prison council (with a right to appeal to the court for the execution of sentences) could be considered effective remedies for complaints about inadequate medical care in prison. Such remedies had been found to be effective in cases concerning specific circumstances affecting prisoners individually and which the prison authorities could put an end to (such as passive smoking, insomnia, placement in cells with sick detainees, placement in solitary confinement, inadequate treatment for a prisoner suffering from drug addiction – § 68).
As regards to complaints to the supervising prosecutor (Article 567 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), the Court departed from its earlier approach and considered this remedy ineffective in the applicant’s circumstances, owing to a lack of certainty as to whether a decision by the supervising prosecutor could be appealed before a court for the execution of sentences. The Government argued that although the relevant legal provisions did not explicitly provide for such a possibility, it followed from a “systematic interpretation” of the applicable provisions (§ 74). The Court rejected this argument, noting that although 19 years had elapsed since it had considered this avenue an effective remedy (Tsivis v. Greece, no. 11553/05, §§ 18‑20, 6 December 2007), the Government could not provide examples of case law in which a court for the execution of sentences had heard an appeal against a decision by a supervising prosecutor under this procedure. In the absence of judicial review, a complaint to the supervising prosecutor alone could not be considered an effective remedy since such authority lacked the necessary independence (being “actively involved in the administration of the supervised prison”, § 75) and could not adopt legally binding decisions which the prison authorities are obliged to enforce. The Court also pointed to procedural shortcomings, noting that the complaint does not give rise to legal proceedings to which the prisoner was a party.
Conversely, a complaint to the prison council (Articles 6 and 86 of the Penal Code), with the possibility of appealing to the court for the execution of sentences, was found to constitute an effective remedy. The applicant had acknowledged that this remedy “could in principle be effective with respect to complaints of inadequate medical care in detention” ( § 78), and the Court therefore saw no reason to depart from its case law on this point. The Court was not convinced that the applicant’s mental condition had prevented him from using this remedy in view of “the circumstances of the present case, namely his alleged inability to communicate with his lawyer with sufficient clarity regarding his exact state of health” ( § 79). It noted that he had sought release on health grounds, relying on a detailed psychiatric opinion, and had lodged his application with the Court, being represented by the same lawyer in both proceedings.
Conclusion ■ No violation of Article 13.
Article 41 ■ EUR 12,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 2,500 in respect of costs and expenses.
BELOUS v. UKRAINE ■ Application no. 20068/21 ■ Fifth Section Committee ■ 3 September 2026
Art 3 and Art 13 ■ Wheelchair-bound life sentenced prisoner held in inadequate detention conditions ■ Material detention conditions ■ Prison not adapted to the needs of persons with reduced mobility ■ Prisoner unable to participate in out-of-cell activities ■ Prisoner relied on the assistance of his cellmate for his daily routine and to reach the bathhouse
Art 34 ■ Prisoner exposed to pressure by the prison administration after lodging his application with the Court ■ Searches, attempted transfer to another cell, transfer of his cellmate to a punishment cell ■ Particular vulnerability of the applicant.
Facts ■ The applicant, a life sentenced prisoner, had been detained since April 2012 at Zhytomyr prison, except for a five-week period (between August and September 2019), when he was detained at Bucha Prison Hospital.
The applicant complained about the inadequate material conditions of his detention (lack of ventilation, heating and hot water; lack of proper toilet partitioning; insufficient access to natural light and fresh air, etc.). Furthermore, as he was partially paralysed and wheelchair-bound, he complained that the prison was not adapted to his needs, preventing him from participating in out-of-cell activities. He was also reliant on his cellmate’s support to reach the bathhouse once every two weeks.
The second part of the complaint concerned the pressures exerted on the applicant by the prison administration following the lodging of his application with the Court. He alleged, in particular, that he had been threatened by the prison rehabilitation officer, subjected to repeated and excessive searches of his cell and the seizure of his personal belongings, that an attempt had been made to transfer him to a “worse” cell, and that he had been left alone in his cell for several days after his cellmate was transferred to a punishment cell.
Law ■ Articles 3 and 13
(1) Admissibility
The Court considered that the applicant’s detention at Bucha Prison Hospital for five weeks between August and September 2019 had brought the “continuing situation”of inadequate detention conditions complained of to an end. Therefore, it considered the applicant’s complaint concerning his detention prior to 4 August 2019 to be time-barred and therefore inadmissible.
(2) Merits
The Court established that the applicant had between 2.9 and 3.3 sq. m. of personal space during his detention. As regards other aspects of the applicant’s detention, the Court noted that the Government’s submissions relied solely on a certificate issued by a prison official describing general aspects of his detention. Furthermore, given that the facility was not adapted to the needs of wheelchair users, the Court observed that the applicant spent nearly 24 hours a day in his cell without being able to participate in activities, to access fresh air, or to reach the bathhouse independently. In addition, although he required assistance to use the toilet, and had to wash himself in the in-cell sink, no assistance was provided by the prison staff.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Articles 3 and 13.
Law ■ Article 34
The Court stated at the outset that it drew “strong inferences from the fact that no specific observations were provided by the Government in response to the applicant’s allegations of verbal pressure and threats” (§ 18).
As regards the searches to which the applicant had been subjected, noting that alongside prohibited objects, ordinary objects “the prior presence of which could hardly have gone unnoticed” (ibid.) were also seized, the Court concluded that they were “reactive and unusually thorough rather than routine in nature” (ibid.).
As to the purpose of those searches and the other measures alleged (the attempt to transfer the applicant to a cell further from the bathhouse, the placement of the applicant’s cellmate in a punishment cell for several days), the Court noted that, while the applicant had consistently argued that these constituted pressure aiming at forcing him to withdraw his application, the Government did not provide any elements aiming at refuting this interpretation – including reports of internal investigations.
The Court stressed that the applicant was in a situation of particular vulnerability, as he, as “a life prisoner, [had] only limited contact with the outside world and [remained] permanently under the exclusive control of the prison authorities, who [had] at their disposal various means capable of aggravating his situation”, including by depriving him of the assistance of his cellmate (§ 20).
The Court therefore found that the elements in its possession were “sufficient for the Court to conclude that the applicant could reasonably have felt intimidated by the measures undertaken by the prison authorities following his recourse to the Court” (§ 21)
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 34.
Article 41 ■ EUR 12,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 1,000 in respect of costs and expenses.
ASCIUTTO AND OTHERS v. ITALY ■ Applications nos. 23169/16 and 3 others ■ First Section ■ 3 September 2026
Art 3 (substantive) ■ Irreducible life sentences for prisoners convicted of mafia-related crimes who did not cooperate with the judicial authorities ■ Situation of uncertainty with no clear and realistic prospect of early release (Marcello Viola (no. 2)) ■ 2022 reform, as interpreted by the domestic courts consistently with the Court’s case-law, affording a realistic prospect of review under clear conditions ■ Review focused mainly on rehabilitation, balanced against residual dangerousness ■ Compatibility of the 30-year minimum term to be assessed in the circumstances of each case ■ Violation confined to the pre-reform periods.
Art 7 ■ Heavier penalty ■ Retroactivity ■ Initially reducible life sentences rendered irreducible by the enforcement courts’ inference that the murders had been committed using the “mafia method” ■ Change in the scope of the penalty going beyond mere measures of enforcement ■ Lack of foreseeability contrary to the principle of legal certainty.
Art 7 ■ Nulla poena sine lege ■ Application of the ergastolo ostativo regime to one applicant although the “mafia-type” circumstances had been ruled out by the judgment convicting him ■ Lack of foreseeability contrary to the principle of legal certainty.
Facts ■ The four applicants were serving cumulative life sentences for multiple offences, including murders. They had also been sentenced to fixed terms of imprisonment for mafia-related crimes. In 1991 and 1992 respectively, specific provisions concerning aggravating “mafia-type” circumstances (section 7 of Decree-Law no. 152 of 13 May 1991, hereinafter“section 7”) and mafia-related crimes (section 4 bis of the Prison Administration Act, hereinafter “section 4 bis”) were introduced in the domestic legal framework.
In particular, “section 4 bis” (1992) introduced a ban on eligibility for conditional release, sentence adjustments in respect of prisoners convicted of mafia-related offences who did not cooperate with the judicial authorities. When applied to life sentences, this regime (known as ergastolo ostatitvo), made life imprisonment irreducible in practice by preventing lifers from the prospect of release if they refuse to cooperate with the authorities. In Marcello Viola v. Italy (no. 2) (no. 77633/16, 13 June 2019), the Court found the ergastolo ostativo to be contrary to Article 3.
The applicants complained that the domestic courts had retrospectively applied “section 4 bis” to their life sentences, depriving them of access to sentence adjustment and conditional release.
The case concerned two different situations. For three out of four applicants, the offences for which they had been sentenced to life imprisonment had been committed before the entry into force of “section 7” (1991) and “section 4 bis” (1992). However, when examining their applications for sentence adjustments, the sentence enforcement courts interpreted the judgments convicting them as indicating that the offences had been committed using the so-called “mafia method”, even though such aggravating circumstance had not been formally included in the charges. They consequently applied the “section 4 bis”regime to the applicants’ life sentences, rendering them irreducible in practice.
The fourth applicant (no. 17937/20) was in a different situation, as the murder for which he had been sentenced to life imprisonment was committed after the entry into force of “section 4 bis”(1992). However, the trial court had ruled out the “mafia-type” aggravating circumstances (as defined in “section 7”, 1991) because, under the legislation applicable at the time, those circumstances could not be applied to offences punishable by life imprisonment. Nevertheless, as for the three first applicants, the sentence enforcement courts applied the “section 4 bis” regime to his life sentence as well.
The applicant complained under Article 3 about the irreducibility of their life sentence, and under Article 7 against the retrospective application of section 4 bis and the lack of foreseeability of the penalty that had been imposed on them.
In October 2022, following the Marcello Viola (no. 2) judgment and subsequent developments in domestic case law, the ergastolo ostativo regime was reformed. The amended framework allows life sentence prisoners who refuse to cooperate with the judicial authorities to seek sentence adjustment and conditional release, subject to specific conditions, including demonstrating that they no longer have links with organised crime and that there is no risk that such links will be restored in the future.
Law ■ Article 3
TThe Court stressed from the outset that domestic courts had had a “contradictory approach” (§ 158) to the applicants’ eligibility to sentence adjustments, preventing them from establishing “whether or not their life sentence[s] w[ere] reducible” or not (ibid.).
The Court nevertheless considered it undisputed that the applicants had been subjected to the ergastolo ostativo regime through the application of “section 4 bis” to their life sentences. In line with its findings in Marcello Viola (no. 2), it found a violation of Article 3 for the period during which they were subject to this regime without a clear and realistic prospect of release, ending with the entry into force of the reform of ergastolo ostativo in October 2022 for three applicants, and in May 2022 for the fourth applicant, when the competent domestic court recognised that “section 4 bis”did not apply to his life sentence.
As regards the applicants’ detention following these developments, the Court found no violation of Article 3, considering that they had a realistic prospect of review.
(1) Scope of review
The Court was satisfied with the scope of the review. In view of the “specific nature of mafia-type criminal organisations” (§ 168), it considered justified that, under the new framework, domestic courts examining requests for sentence adjustments examine both prisoners’progress towards rehabilitation and their “residual dangerousness”( § 169), and require them to demonstrate that they no longer have links (and will not restore them) with their criminal organisation (ibid., referring to Bodein v. France, no. 40014/10, § 60, 13 November 2014, concerning the combined scope of the review mechanism).
(2) Criteria and conditions for review
The Court acknowledged that due to a lack of clarity of the amended legal framework concerning the criteria and conditions for review, divergent interpretations have been made by domestic courts. However, it considered that the observed divergence in case law does not amount to “a profound and persistent conflict” (§ 175). It noted that most judicial decisions placed particular emphasis on the prisoner’s individual progress towards rehabilitation, in line with its own principles.
The Court was also confident that, although the domestic case law is “still consolidating” ( § 176), domestic courts will eventually be guided by its case law, which has been recalled in this judgment (see § 174: “The Court further considers that in the exercise of their power of assessment under the newly introduced provisions, domestic courts will be guided by its case-law. In this regard, by setting out its relevant case-law in the preceding paragraphs […] the Court’s purpose was precisely to aid the domestic courts to fulfil their statutory duty to act compatibly with the Convention in this area”).
The procedure was also deemed satisfactory. Although the applicants are required to provide elements demonstrating they have severed their links with criminal organisations, this burden of proof “is counterbalanced by the domestic authorities’ responsibility to provide detailed, concrete and updated information and the domestic courts’ duty to base their assessment on all the adduced circumstances” (§ 172). The competent courts must also give reasons for accepting or rejecting applications for sentence adjustment, enabling prisoners to understand what they must do to be considered for release.
(3) Time frame for review
While the amended legal framework sets a minimum of 30 years’ imprisonment before a prisoner may become eligible for conditional release (compared to 26 years under the “ordinary” life sentence regime), Italian law also allows account to be taken of periods spent in pre‑trial detention, periods of detention imposed in respect of separate offences and any period of early release. The Court concluded that a case-by-case assessment is necessary to determine whether, notwithstanding the 30-year minimum, prisoners serving life sentences under the ergastolo ostativo regime could become eligible for conditional release within 25 years of the imposition of their life sentence, in accordance with the Court’s case-law.
(4) Applications to the individual cases
The Court noted that three out the four applicants had neither applied for conditional release following the entry into force of the 2022 reform nor provided information enabling it to assess whether, and within what time frame, they could become eligible for release. It therefore found no violation of Article 3 in respect of the period following the reform.
As regards the fourth applicant (no. 23834/18), the Court observed that in May 2022, the competent sentence enforcement court had concluded that “section 4 bis” did not (retroactively) apply to his life sentence. He was consequently eligible to apply for conditional release under the rules governing “ordinary” life sentences – that is, after 26 years. The Court considered that this decision had ended the continuing violation of Article 3, irrespective of the fact that the applicant’s application for conditional release was subsequently unsuccessful.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 3 during the periods in which the applicants were subject to the ergastolo ostativo regime without a realistic prospect of release: until the October 2022 reform (in respect of three applicants), and until May 2022 for the fourth applicant; no violation thereafter.
Law ■ Article 7
(1) Admissibility
The Court confirmed that Article 7 applied in the present case. Although the penalties imposed on the applicants at the time of their convictions were reducible life sentences, the retrospective application of the “section 4 bis”regime rendered those sentences irreducible. The Court considered that this change, which deprived the applicants of a realistic prospect of release, could not be regarded as merely a measure governing the execution of a sentence but rather modified the scope of the penalty (§ 214, referring to Kupinskyy v. Ukraine, no. 5084/18, § 52, 10 November 2022).
The Court also examined the applicants’ victim status. For two applicants (nos. 23169/16 and 17937/20) who had also been convicted of offences committed after the entry into force of “section 4 bis”, the Court examined the Government’s objection together with the merits of their complaints. As regards the third applicant (no. 23834/18), a domestic court had acknowledged that “section 4 bis” could not be applied retrospectively to his life sentence. However, he retained his victim status since the domestic authorities had not acknowledged a violation of his rights and afforded redress. Likewise, the fourth applicant (no. 37683/19) retained his victim status, as the domestic courts had not acknowledged a violation of his rights.
The Court rejected the Government’s objection that the six-month time limit had expired. It considered that the starting points were not the first domestic decisions rejecting the applicants’ requests for sentence adjustment, but the final domestic decisions clarifying that the“section 4 bis” regime applied to their life sentences, depriving them of a prospect of release unless they cooperated with the authorities. All applications had been lodged within six months of those decisions.
Lastly, the Court rejected the Government’s objection concerning the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies since it had not demonstrated that the recent developments in domestic case law and legislation provided an effective remedy capable of affording redress for the applicants’ complaint under Article 7.
(2) Merits
The Court concluded that the application of “section 4 bis” to the applicants’ initially reducible life sentences had rendered them irreducible, thereby changing the scope of the original punishment and imposing a heavier penalty than that applicable at the time of the offences. It found that this change was unforeseeable and therefore violated Article 7 in respect of all four applicants.
As regards the three applicants who had been sentenced to life imprisonment for offences committed before the entry into force of provisions introducing the the “mafia-type” aggravating circumstances (1991) and the ergastolo ostativo regime (1992), the Court noted that those aggravating circumstances had not been formally included in the charges relating to those offences. The domestic courts had subsequently inferred that the offences had been committed using the “mafia method” and applied “section 4 bis” when determining the regime governing the execution of their life sentences.
The fact that two applicants had also been convicted for offences committed after the entry into force of “section 4 bis” was immaterial, since those offences had been punished by fixed-term sentences. Those separate convictions could not justify transforming their reducible life sentences into irreducible ones.
The Court further considered that the domestic case law allowing sentence enforcement courts to infer the use of the “mafia method” from a final judgment even when “mafia‑type” aggravating circumstances had not been formally included in the charges, had developed only after the offences had been committed. The retrospective application of “section 4 bis” on the basis of that case law had therefore not been foreseeable at the relevant time.
The Court also noted that the Italian Constitutional Court had recognised, in 2020, that excluding prisoners from eligibility for conditional release transforms the nature of the penalty. It welcomed the fact that the 2022 reform, while extending “section 4 bis” to offences committed using the “mafia method”, excluded the retrospective application of this extension.
The situation of the fourth applicant (no. 17937/20) differed in that the offence for which he had been sentenced to life imprisonment had been committed after the entry into force of “section 4 bis”. However, the trial court had ruled out “mafia-type” circumstances because, under the legislation applicable at the time, they could not be applied to offences punishable by life imprisonment. The domestic case law allowing those aggravating circumstances to be applied in those cases as well had developed only several years after the offence.
Moreover, the case law permitting sentence enforcement courts to infer the use of the “mafia method” even in the absence of formally established “mafia-type” aggravating circumstances, had developed only later and was limited to offences committed before the entry into force of such aggravating circumstances in domestic law (1991). It could not therefore have been foreseen to apply to the fourth applicant’s offence, committed after that date.
Consequently, the applicant could not have foreseen, at the time of the offence, that his reducible life sentence would become irreducible due to the application of “section 4 bis”.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 7.
Article 41 ■ EUR 2,400 to each applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 3,000 and EUR 2,800 in respect of costs and expenses for two applicants.
NEKRASOVA v. UKRAINE ■ Application no. 35931/19 ■ Fifth Section Committee ■ 3 September 2026
Art 6 § 1 (access to the Supreme Court) ■ Cassation appeal rejected for failure to pay a court fee of approximately EUR 80 ■ Deferral refused despite the prisoner’s lack of any income while under the State’s “full financial maintenance”, confirmed by the prison administration ■ No guidance as to the additional documents required ■ Excessively formalistic approach.
Art 6 § 1 (hearing in the applicant’s absence) ■ Complaint inadmissible ■ Video link with the detention facility not established at first instance ■ Case presented through a lawyer at first instance and personal participation via video conference on appeal.
Facts ■ In January 2017, while serving a prison sentence, the applicant brought civil proceedings against a private individual concerning matters unrelated to her imprisonment. Following a hearing that took place in her absence because a video link with her detention facility could not be established, her claims were dismissed as unfounded. In July 2018, the Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s judgment, without addressing the applicant’s allegation that her inability to participate in the first-instance proceedings had affected the outcome of the case.
In January 2019, the Supreme Court refused to examine the applicant’s cassation appeal, because she had failed to pay a UAH 2,560 court fee (ca. EUR 80). Although the applicant argued that she had no income since the beginning of her detention in March 2012, and submitted a certificate issued by the Kyiv Pre-Trial Detention Facility attesting that she had no income during her detention there between February and October 2018 and and had been receiving the State’s “full financial maintenance”, the Supreme Court considered that she had failed to present sufficient grounds for deferring payment of the court fees.
Law ■ Article 6 § 1 (access to the Supreme Court)
The Court found that the Supreme Court’s decision to reject the applicant’s request to defer payment of court fees had been “excessively formalistic” (§ 9).
Ukrainian law provided for exemption from or deferral of the court fee where the fee exceeds 5% of the party’s income over the previous year. Although the certificate provided by the Kyiv Pre-Trial Detention Facility covered only an eight-month period, the applicant explained that she had had no income since the beginning of her detention in 2012. The Court also noted that the applicant had not been given any guidance as to which additional documents or information she needed to provide to substantiate her claim.
The Court concluded that, in the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court denied the applicant practical and effective access to that court without sufficient justification.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 6 § 1.
Law ■ Article 6 § 1 (hearing in the applicant’s absence)
According to the Court, the applicant had not shown that her personal testimony had been necessary for determining the merits of her claim, nor that she or her lawyer had been unable to obtain or submit supporting documents during the first-instance proceedings, which had lasted almost a year. Moreover, she had participated in the appellate hearings by video conference, with the opportunity to make oral and written submissions on all the relevant points of fact and law, which the appellate court had the power to review.
Even assuming that the authorities bore some responsibility for the failed video connection, her non-participation in that single hearing had not deprived her of the right to present her case effectively.
Conclusion ■ Inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
Article 41 ■ EUR 1,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 57 in respect of costs and expenses.
BĄCLER v. POLAND ■ Application no. 47190/16 ■ First Section Committee ■ 3 September 2026
Art 6 § 1 ■ Prisoner wishing to initiate compensatory proceedings against the prison administration required to pay courts fees eight time higher than his savings ■ Prisoner “indigent”, unemployed in prison and receiving occasional financial support from his relatives ■ Domestic court disregarded his indigent situation and based their refusal to exempt him from court fees on assumptions not corroborated by the factual evidence submitted.
Facts ■ At the material time, the applicant was detained in the hospital unit of a prison in Poland. In October 2015, he initiated proceedings for compensation against the prison administration on account of inadequate medical care. In particular, he complained that between January and April 2015 he had been deprived of a respiratory assistance device. In addition to claiming compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered, he requested exemption from court fees.
The domestic court exempted the applicant from fees exceeding PLN 600 (ca. EUR 150). In support of its decision to require the applicant to pay the remaining PLN 600, the court held that, as most of his daily expenditures were covered by the prison administration, he should have been able to gather the necessary amount. Furthermore, the court noted that he had received PLN 1250 from his relatives in the preceding months, of which PLN 75 remained.
The applicant unsuccessfully challenged this decision before domestic courts, which also rejected his request to allow him to pay the fees in instalments. As the applicant had been unable to pay the PLN 600 fee, his compensation claim was rejected on 16 February 2016.
Law ■ Article 6 § 1
The Court noted at the outset that the applicant’s compensatory complaint was not “frivolous or manifestly ill-founded” (§ 16). Concerning the domestic courts’ reasoning, the Court noted that at the material time, the applicant had only PLN 75 – a sum eight times lower than the PLN 600 fees requested – that he was unemployed in prison and had no other resources other than financial support from his relatives, who, as the applicant was an adult, had no legal obligation to support him.
The Court stressed that the applicant was undoubtedly “indigent” (§ 17). It also rejected the domestic courts’ reasoning that, as the applicant had received PLN 1250 in the preceding months, he would have been able to save the requested sum, as this was not corroborated by the factual evidence submitted by the applicant.
The Court therefore concluded that requiring the applicant to pay PLN 600 in order to pursue his compensation claim constituted a disproportionate restriction on his right of access to a court.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 6 § 1.
Article 41 ■ EUR 7800 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
MANAVIDIS v. GREECE (dec.) ■ Application no. 28849/23 ■ Third Section ■ 15 September 2026
This legal summary was prepared by the Court’s Registry
Art 13 (+3) ■ Effectiveness from 2024 onwards, of the preventive and compensatory remedy introduced by 2022 reform for complaints concerning inadequate conditions of detention ■ Preventive remedy offering reasonable prospects of appropriate relief through measures to improve conditions of detention, including transfer to another facility ■ Compensatory remedy providing for measurable sentence reductions and monetary compensation ■ Adequate procedural safeguards and binding and immediately enforceable decisions ■ Remedy effective in the applicant’s individual case; sentence reduction providing adequate and sufficient redress notwithstanding the refusal to award monetary compensation ■ Two-and-a-half-month delay in implementing the transfer order not sufficient to deprive the remedy of its effectiveness ■ Complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded.
Art 3 ■ Applicant no longer a victim of the alleged inadequate conditions of detention, having obtained appropriate and sufficient redress through his transfer to another prison and a measurable reduction in his sentence ■ Complaint inadmissible ratione personae.
Facts ■ The The applicant has been detained in a prison since June 2022 following his conviction. Making use of the domestic remedy introduced in October 2022 by Article 8 of Law no. 4985/2022, in March 2023 and May 2024 respectively, the applicant filed two appeals under Article 6A of the Prisons Code (Law no. 2776/1999). He complained about the conditions of his detention: severe overcrowding and a wide range of inadequate material conditions, including, insufficient light and ventilation, poor hygiene, inadequate heating and hot water, infestations, deficient food and medical care, and limited recreational and educational opportunities. He sought compensation for non-pecuniary damage and a reduction in his sentence.
In June 2023 the first appeal was dismissed on the merits as unfounded by the Sentence Execution Court. In June 2024 the second appeal was granted in part by the Sentence Execution Court which held that, although the general material conditions complied with the standards of dignified person living, the reduction of personal space below the 3 Sq. m minimum was not minor and had persisted over a prolonged period, exceeding therefore the threshold of severity required for the application of Article 3 of the Convention. In accordance with Article 6A § 3 of the Prisons Code, the court ordered the applicant’s transfer to another cell where he would have a minimum of 3.14 sq. m of personal space or, alternatively, his priority transfer within one month of the delivery of the decision to another detention facility meeting the minimum living standards. The applicant had sought compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage at a rate of EUR 30 per day spent in poor conditions of detention, amounting to EUR 21,000 in total, and a reduction of his sentence by 61 days, proportional to the period during which he had been detained in the prison. The court awarded compensation in the form of a sentence reduction credit of 74.5 days amounting to one day for every ten days the applicant had spent in conditions violating his rights under Article 3.
In July 2024 the prison director requested the priority transfer of the applicant to another facility, as during the period in question it had proved impossible to place him in another cell meeting the living-space requirements set out in the decision. In September 2024 the applicant was transferred to a new prison. Furthermore, the prosecutor-supervisor of the previous prison applied the 74.5-day sentence reduction credit to the applicant’s sentence.
Law ■ Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3
The specific domestic remedy which had entered into force nearly four years ago with the insertion by Article 8 of Law no. 4985/2022 of Article 6A into the Prisons Code enabled detainees to complain of conditions of detention alleged to be contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. That marked a significant departure from the previous legal framework, which the Court had consistently found to lack an effective remedy for complaints concerning general conditions of detention. The present case constituted the Court’s first assessment of this remedy following a long line of repetitive judgments finding violations of Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention over more than two decades.
(1) Preventive remedy
Under Article 6A §§ 1 and 3 of the Prisons Code a detainee might lodge an appeal with the sentence execution court where a failure to comply with domestic or international rules governing detention conditions infringed human dignity. If the appeal was upheld, the court might order any measure it considered appropriate to bring the appellant’s living conditions into compliance with those standards, including relocation within the same detention facility. Where such measures were not feasible, it might order the appellant’s priority transfer to another appropriate institution. The directors of correctional facilities, other detention facilities and public hospitals must comply immediately with the decisions of the sentence execution court which were immediately enforceable. Having regard to the nature of the preventive remedy established by Article 6A of the Prisons Code, the broad powers conferred on the competent sentence execution courts to order any measure they considered appropriate to remedy inadequate conditions of detention, the binding nature of their decisions on the authorities and the implementation in practice of the preventive limb of the remedy, the Court considered that it offered, a priori, reasonable prospects of appropriate relief for complaints concerning conditions of detention under Article 3.
The preventive remedy operated within a broader framework of measures aimed at addressing prison overcrowding and improving detention conditions. Those measures were capable, in principle, of supporting the effective operation of the preventive remedy, they were consistent with the types of wider measures which the Court had previously regarded as relevant when assessing the effectiveness of domestic remedies in a similar and – if effectively implemented – they could contribute to the long-term improvement of detention conditions.
(2) Compensatory remedy
Article 6A § 4 of the Prisons Code provided that, upon the request of an appellant, the sentence execution court might award monetary compensation for non-pecuniary damage and sentence reduction credit. Such a judicial decision was immediately enforceable.
The wording of the provision included both monetary compensation and a reduction of sentence. In decisions where appeals had been upheld the sentence execution courts, sitting as judicial councils, had generally awarded either one or the other and only in very limited cases both. Furthermore, the provision stated that an appeal might be lodged where a failure to comply with the rules governing living conditions infringed human dignity. From the domestic decisions submitted, the judicial councils appeared largely to have proceeded on the basis that an impairment of human dignity had been presumed where detention conditions had been found to be contrary to Article 3, without requiring proof of fault on the part of the authorities or characterisation of their conduct as unlawful under domestic law. Likewise, compensation had not been made dependent on the appellant’s ability to establish, by means of external evidence, that he or she had suffered non-pecuniary damage.
(a) Reduction of sentence – The Court had affirmed on numerous occasions that a reduction of a prison sentence offered adequate redress in respect of poor material conditions of detention, provided that the reduction was carried out in an express and measurable way. That form of redress had the undeniable advantage of helping to address the problem of prison overcrowding by accelerating the release of persons in detention.
Article 69 of Law no. 5282/2026, which had entered into force in February 2026, had significantly enhanced the compensatory aspect of the remedy. Whereas the initial version of the provision had allowed the awarding of one day of sentence credit for every ten days spent in conditions contrary to Article 6A § 1 of the Prisons Code, the amended provision allowed for the awarding of one day of sentence credit for every three to seven days spent in such conditions, depending on the severity thereof. In that connection, the Court reiterated that it had found effective sentence reductions between one and three days for every ten days (Draniceru v. the Republic of Moldova (dec.)), and of six days for every thirty days (Dîrjan and Ştefan v. Romania (dec.)) spent in inadequate conditions of detention.
Sentence reduction was applied immediately to the remaining sentence, irrespective of eligibility for conditional release, and previous restrictions relating to aggregation of sentence credits and maximum reduction limits had been removed.
(b) Monetary compensation – The amount of monetary compensation for non-pecuniary damage which might be awarded under Article 6A § 4 of the Prisons Code ranged from EUR 5 to EUR 30 per day depending on the gravity of the violation. Domestic decisions submitted showed that the large majority of the awards had been calculated at a rate of EUR 5 per day. However, in 2026 there had been decisions awarding higher amounts, namely EUR 15 or EUR 20 per day, when warranted by the circumstances. In the light of its case-law and the wider margin of appreciation left to the domestic authorities, the Court considered that the compensation assessment by the domestic courts had been made in a manner consistent with the domestic legal system and traditions, taking into account the standard of living in the country, and that the awarded amounts could not be regarded as unreasonable.
Moreover, the sentence execution courts considered the principles enshrined in this Court’s case-law and took into account the particular circumstances of each case, such as the time spent in inadequate conditions and the severity of those conditions, the extent to which the detention had affected the appellants’ personhood and dignity, whether they had worked or spent significant periods outside their cells, and whether access to out-of-cell activities had alleviated their distress.
As regards the promptness with which compensation awarded in such proceedings was paid, the Court did not consider that the described delays were capable, at this stage, of calling into question the effectiveness of the compensatory remedy.
Lastly, the compensation awarded was not subject to automatic set-off against debts owed by appellants to the Greek State.
(3) Assessment in accordance with the Court’s Article 3 standards
The statistical material submitted revealed a significant evolution in the domestic case-law around Article 6A of the Prisons Code from 2023 to April 2026. The proportion of favourable decisions had increased markedly after the first year following the introduction of the remedy and the proportion of decisions displaying shortcomings in their reasoning appeared to have declined.
(4) Procedural guarantees and reasonable time requirement
An appeal under Article 6A of the Prisons Code could be lodged in writing either directly with the sentence execution court or through the administration of the correctional or police facility in which the detainee was held. There were no court fees. Nor was a time-limit prescribed for bringing an appeal by persons who remained detained in a correctional facility while those who had been released from detention were required to lodge their appeal within a mandatory time-limit of four months from the date of their release. The procedure was thus not complex, it provided detainees with several accessible channels for lodging an appeal and did not appear to impose any excessive procedural burden on them.
Appeals were examined by the sentence execution court which was independent of the authorities in charge of the prison system. The absence of a second instance review did not raise any issue under Article 13 based on the Court’s case-law. Moreover, the burden of proof imposed on appellants did not appear, overall, to be excessive.
Article 6A of the Prisons Code treated the appellant’s personal appearance before the sentence execution court as exceptional, albeit providing that the court might, at the appellant’s request and where specific reasons so justify, order his or her transfer and personal attendance in order to present his or her observations. Article 86 § 3 of the Prisons Code required that the appellant be notified of the hearing and invited to submit written observations at least ten days before it took place. Provided that that guarantee was consistently applied and that appellants were afforded an opportunity to acquaint themselves with the observations submitted by the relevant prison administration and to comment on them, the procedure was capable of ensuring the appellants’ effective participation in the proceedings, in accordance with the requirements of its case-law.
The Court considered that the length of proceedings before the domestic courts must be assessed in the light of the operation of the remedy as a whole and that the delays observed did not, at the present stage, suffice in themselves to call into question the effectiveness of the remedy under Article 13. The authorities, however, had to ensure that those delays were further reduced, particularly having regard to the preventive nature of the remedy and the need for it to be capable of providing prompt relief to persons who remained in inadequate conditions of detention. Compensation claims did not require the same degree of promptness, as they served a different purpose.
(5) Absence of negative consequences
The material before the Court did not provide a sufficient basis for concluding that prisoners who made use of the Article 6A remedy were exposed in practice to punitive measures or to other adverse consequences capable of undermining its effectiveness.
(6) Whether the remedy was effective for the applicant
As regards the applicant’s complaint that the Sentence Execution Court had not granted his request to be awarded monetary for the non-pecuniary damage suffered and his allegation that that had been contrary to Article 6A of the Prisons Code, the Court referred to its analysis as regards its case-law in respect of sentence reductions. It further observed that the Sentence Execution Court, sitting as a judicial council, had considered that the sentence reduction calculated on the basis of the total duration of his detention in poor conditions had been sufficient to adequately compensate the non-pecuniary damage suffered and to afford full redress for the violation of Article 3, having regard to the particular circumstances of the applicant’s detention such as the impact on his personhood and the fact that he had spent a significant part of each working day outside the cell. Having regard to the measurable impact of the reduction of the length of the applicant’s sentence, the Court considered that the redress afforded to the applicant, who had been still detained, had been appropriate and sufficient for the purposes of the Convention. Accordingly, the fact that the judicial council had not awarded monetary compensation did not, in itself, lead to the conclusion that the remedy had not been effective for the applicant. Nor could the Court accept that the sentence credit had been theoretical and had not guaranteed his earlier release. The fact that such a reduction had not entailed his immediate release, given also that he had been sentenced to more than eleven years’ imprisonment, did not show that it had no practical effect.
Furthermore, the decision had been immediately enforceable, and the director of the correctional facility had been required to comply with it immediately, pursuant to Article 6A §§ 3 and 4 of the Prisons Code. The Sentence Execution Court had ordered his transfer and the prison director had requested it the very next day. The authorities had explained that no suitable place had been immediately available and the transfer had been thus implemented two and a half months later. That implementation timespan was not sufficient to deprive the remedy of its effectiveness, particularly if the authorities had been genuinely attempting to find accommodation compatible with Article 3.
(7) Conclusion
The Court noted that very shortly after the introduction of the remedy, institutional and capacity-building measures had been initiated which had continued throughout the subsequent years to support its effective implementation. Having regard to the characteristics of the provisions establishing the remedy and the substantial body of domestic practice which had been developed during the last years, and in the light of all its findings, the Court concluded that the domestic remedy, both as regards its preventive and compensatory limb, had been effective, in law and in practice, from 2024 onwards for challenging poor conditions of detention in prisons. It had been shown that Article 6A of the Prisons Code combined preventive and compensatory forms of redress, which operated in a complementary manner. The remedy was therefore capable of effectively dealing with the substance of prisoners’ complaints and the courts could take cognisance of the merits of a complaint, make findings of fact and order redress that was tailored to the nature and gravity of the violation. The procedure was accessible and not unduly complex and, subject to the procedural guarantees being observed in practice, enabled detainees to participate effectively in the determination of their complaints. Furthermore, decisions were binding and immediately enforceable.
The Court did not overlook the fact that certain shortcomings remained apparent in individual decisions, and that some disparities persisted in the processing times before different sentence execution courts. Nonetheless, the remedy, viewed as a whole and as it operated in practice, offered reasonable prospects of bringing conditions contrary to Article 3 to an end and of obtaining appropriate redress for violations which had already occurred.
That conclusion did not, however, dispense the respondent State from its obligation to address the structural causes underlying inadequate conditions of detention, in particular prison overcrowding – a problem in Greece that had not yet been eradicated. The Court’s finding as to the effectiveness of the remedy had to moreover be understood in the light of the need for its preventive limb to produce, in practice, the required improvement in detention conditions. Nor did that finding prejudice the Court’s power to review its assessment in the future should subsequent applications and material disclose persistent deficiencies in the operation of the remedy, including failures to implement preventive measures promptly, systemic departures from the standards of the Court’s case-law under Article 3, excessive procedural delays or negative consequences for detainees making use of the remedy. In particular, the effectiveness of the preventive limb necessarily depended on the domestic authorities’ continuing capacity to secure, in practice, conditions of detention compatible with Article 3.
In the applicant’s individual case, the remedy had been effective; he had availed himself of the remedy, which had enabled him to obtain adequate and sufficient redress for the inadequate conditions of his detention.
Conclusion ■ Inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded)
Law ■ Article 3
Lastly, the Court found the complaint under Article 3 inadmissible as being incompatible ratione personae. In its decision given in June 2024, the Sentence Execution Court had clearly and unequivocally acknowledged that the conditions of the applicant’s detention had constituted inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of Article 3. It had also afforded appropriate and sufficient redress, in the circumstances of the case, as the applicant had been transferred to another prison and the sentence reduction had been expressly granted to remedy the Article 3 violation and its impact on the length of the applicant’s sentence had been measurable. Therefore, the applicant could no longer claim to be victim of the facts complained of, namely the poor conditions of his detention in the prison in question.
Conclusion ■ Inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded)
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
STANTON AND BOWEN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM ■ Application no. 49096/19 ■ Second Section ■ 22 September 2026
Art 5 § 1 ■ Delay in the release of two indeterminate sentence prisoners due to a lack of immediate availability of accommodation at designated Approved Premises at the time the Parole Board directed release ■ Continued detention, pending availability of accommodation, in conformity with domestic law and consequently to the perceived risk to the public of releasing the applicants directly into the community ■ Causal connection between the applicants’ conviction and sentences and their continued detention not broken ■ No structural issue ■ In case circumstances delays not rendering detention, or any part of it, arbitrary.
Facts ■ The two applicants were both serving indeterminate sentences when, after the expiry of their minimum terms, the Parole Board directed their release subject to conditions requiring them to reside at designated “Approved Premises” as part of their preparation for release from prison. Approved premises are facilities that provide temporary accommodation with enhanced supervision to selected offenders outside prisons or to persons granted bail in criminal proceedings, who are considered to represent “a high or very high risk of harm in the community” (§ 44).
In both cases, the Parole Board decisions anticipated a delay in release owing to a lack of immediate availability of accommodation at the Approved Premises and indicated the date at which a place was expected to become available. For both applicants, this date became their actual date of release, as no places had been available earlier. The first applicant was eventually released to the Approved Premises 118 days after the Parole Board’s decision, and the second applicant after 69 days.
In national proceedings, both applicants argued that the delay between the Parole Board’s decision and their actual release constituted a breach of domestic law and of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention. The High Court rejected their claims, and the Court of Appeal upheld that outcome.
Law ■ Article 5 § 1
The Court endorsed the domestic courts’ conclusion that the applicants’ detention had been lawful, noting that “it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law” ( § 60).
The Court also found that domestic law met the requirements of clarity and foreseeability under Article 5 § 1, as it clearly set out the process for release – a process that the law itself did not define as immediate, but as contingent to the conditions that would render it safe (specifically, in this case, the availability of places at the designated Approved Premises). While the Court did not exclude the possibility that issues of lawfulness could arise if the decisions were to “leave a prisoner in a significant amount of uncertainty as to when, or even if, his release will actually take place” (§ 62) that was not the case as the Parole Board gave a clear indication of the anticipated date of release, a date that was ultimately respected for both applicants.
The Court lastly held that the Parole Board’s decision to release the applicants to Approved Premises had neither broken the causal link between their conviction and detention nor rendered their detention arbitrary. It observed that the applicants had received indeterminate sentences because they were considered to pose a risk to the public, and that their release depended on the fulfilment of conditions, set by the Parole Board, to manage that risk, including residence at Approved Premises. Consequently, their continued detention pending their transfer to Approved Premises “was the consequence of the risk that they were perceived to pose to the public if released directly into the community” (§ 64).
The Court also accepted that “where release is contingent on the availability of required facilities”it would be “unrealistic, and too rigid an approach, to expect the authorities to ensure that relevant treatment or facilities be available immediately”, provided that the delay remained reasonable (§ 65, referring to James, Wells and Lee v. the United Kingdom, nos. 25119/09 and two others, 18 September 2012). Contrary to its finding of a violation in James, Wells and Lee, where structural deficiencies had led to excessive delays in the applicants’ progress towards release, the Court endorsed the domestic courts’ conclusion that the delay in the applicants’ release did not result from a structural shortage of places in Approved Premises.
Finally, the Court, having examined the circumstances of each case, including whether their progression to open prison and proceedings before the Parole Board had occurred in a timely manner, concluded that the delay in their release had not rendered their continued detention arbitrary. It also noted that, in both cases, the specific Approved Premises to which the applicants were awaiting transfer had been selected by the Board for “a number of relevant and rational reasons” (§ 67) such as family and community ties and, in the case of the first applicant, the presence of organisations that might assist with his reintegration into society.
Hence, the Court concluded that no breach had taken place under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
Conclusion ■ No violation of Article 5 § 1.
Law ■ Article 5 § 4
The applicants furthermore complained that, since their release “had depended upon the actions of the executive” (§ 70) and not a judicial body, they had not had the lawfulness of their detention determined by a judicial body with the power to order their release, in breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. They added that, had the release date had subsequently changed because of availability issues, the Parole Board would have been unable to intervene.
The Court however dismissed the claim, as “the implementation of the Parole Board’s decisions happened precisely in accordance with the timescale given to the Board” (§ 71): this therefore made the applicants’ claim that the Parole Board could not have intervened had the anticipated release dates changed purely hypothetical.
The Court therefore declared the complaint raised under Article 5 § 4 manifestly ill-founded.
Conclusion ■ Complaint inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
TATIČ AND OTHERS v. SLOVAKIA ■ Applications nos. 6796/23 and 5 others ■ First Section ■ 29 September 2026
Art 8 ■ Recording and listening of prison telephone conversations ■ No indication that applicants’ prison telephone conversations had been listened to, in the absence of any individual decision in this respect ■ Effective remedies available to challenge such individual decision ■ No victim status in respect of the complaint about listening ■ Applicants failed to demonstrate that the recording of prison telephone conversation had prevented them from communicating ■ Complaint about recording lacking individual substantiations.
Facts ■ At the material time, the first applicant had been serving a prison sentence since 2016, and had been held in a maximum-security prison until July 2023. The remaining applicants were members of his family and a friend. They complained about the statutory framework governing the monitoring of their prison telephone communications by the prison administration.
Under domestic law, prison telephone communications were recorded and retained for twelve months, except communications between prisoners and their legal counsel. Listening to such communications in real time of retrospectively required a decision of the prison governor, and was permitted for specified purposes. Information relating to recorded telephone communications could also be provided to authorised third parties.
Law ■ Article 8
On the basis of the applicants’ application forms, which focused on the recording and listening of telephone communications, the Court considered that the possibility of providing authorised third parties with information relating to recorded telephone communications was beyond the scope of the present case.
As regards listening to prison telephone communications, the Court considered that the applicants could not claim to be victims of a violation of their rights under Article 8. While the listening of prison telephone communications required an individual decision by the prison governor, there was no indication that such a measure had been adopted in relation to the applicants. The Court further noted that, in the event of an individual decision of this kind, effective remedies were available to challenge it (see Ribár v. Slovakia, no. 56545/21, §§ 71-87, 12 December 2024).
As regards the recording of prison telephone communications, the Court found this part of the complaint to be manifestly ill-founded as “entirely abstract” (§ 73) and lacking in individual substantiation. The Court noted that the applicants had not shown that their ability to communicate by telephone had been affected by the recording and retention of their conversations, or that their ability to maintain contact by other means had been limited. While not ruling on the Government’s objection concerning non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, it also noted that a constitutional complaint appeared to have become available following a legislative amendment that entered into force on 1 January 2025
Conclusion ■ Inadmissible.
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