This compilation gathers the most important judgments and decisions on prison issues handed down by the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union. By reporting on the main trends in European prison case law, it aims to support legal practitioners in the prison field in their research and litigation, as well as to identify blind spots in European case law to build strategic litigation avenues.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
BRYSKA AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE■ Applications nos. 11706/13 and 5 others
Failure of applicants residing in Ukraine to provide the Court with a valid email address: struck out.
LANG v. UKRAINE ■ Application no. 49134/20
No evidence showing a real risk of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole in the event of the applicant’s extradition to, and conviction in, the US: no violation of Article 3.
CANAVCI AND OTHERS v. TÜRKIYE ■ Applications nos. 24074/19 and 2 others
Monitoring and recording of prisoners’ meetings with their lawyers, pursuant to a legislative decree adopted under the state of emergency declared in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt: violation of Article 8.
VUKUŠIĆ v. CROATIA ■ Application no. 37522/16
Unjustified prolonged placement of a prisoner, without clothing, in a specially secured padded cell and with lights continuously on: violation of Article 3.
Inadequate conditions of detention: violation of Article 3.
MARIYA ALEKHINA AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA (No. 2) ■ Application no. 10299/15
Refusal to register a human rights organisation providing legal assistance to prisoners, for not complying with legal registration formalities, not based on relevant and sufficient reasons: violation of Article 11.
SCHMIDT AND ŠMIGOL v. ESTONIA ■ Application nos. 3501/20 and 2 others
Consecutive enforcement of disciplinary punishments and security measures in prison resulting in protracted periods of solitary confinement: violation of Article 3.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
BRYSKA AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE ■ Applications nos. 11706/13 and 5 others ■ Fifth Section Committee ■ 2 November 2023
Article 37 § 1 ■ Striking out application ■ Communication with the court ■ Interruption of the international postal services ■ Applicants regarded as no longer wishing to pursue their applications
Facts ■ Following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the Court adopted a series of measures concerning Ukraine, including a decision to limit outgoing correspondence to information sent to the parties. A few months later, in September 2022, the Court decided to resume outgoing correspondence with applicants. In view of the interruption of the international postal services to and from Ukraine, the Court informed that it would communicate via its electronic communication system (eComms), using for that purpose the email address provided by the applicants.
In the cases listed in the decision, the Court was unable to contact the applicants by email or by phone. The Court added that, in its view, “it must have been obvious to the applicants in the present applications that the full-scale military attack launched by the Russian Federation against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 disrupted the Court’s communication with them and should have prompted them to contact the Court with a view to establishing an effective channel of communication and thus ensure that the applications could be duly processed” (para. 14).
Law ■ Article 37 § 1
Building on its decisions on cases brought by applicants residing in Ukrainian territories in which the Ukrainian postal service does not operate, the Court considered that the applicants “could […] be regarded as no longer wishing to pursue their applications” (para. 17, see among others as regards Crimea A. v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 42289/09, 2017; as regards the Donetsk and Luhansk regions Yuldashev and Others v. Russia and Ukraine (dec.), no. 35139/14 and 326 others, 5 May 2020).
Conclusion ■ Struck out.
LANG v. UKRAINE ■ Application no. 49134/20 ■ Fifth Section ■ 9 November 2023
Art 3 ■ Extradition ■ No evidence showing a real risk of a de jure or de facto irreducible sentence of life imprisonment in the event of the applicant’s extradition to, and conviction in, the US ■ First stage of the Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC] test not fulfilled.
Facts ■ The applicant is a citizen of the United States of America (“US”) residing in Kyiv. The case concerned the decision made by the Ukrainian authorities to extradite him to the US, where he would face a number of charges corresponding to custodial sentences ranging from five years’ imprisonment to twenty years’ imprisonment, life sentence or death penalty (see para. 7). The extradition request was granted after assurances in respect of the death penalty were provided by the US Department of Justice. The applicant, casting doubts on the validity of the assurances provided by the US authorities, alleged that if extradited, he would risk receiving a death sentence or an irreducible sentence of life imprisonment.
Law ■ Article 3
The Court rejected the applicant’s claim that he would receive a death sentence upon conviction in the US. It recalled that it had found in similar cases there was no reason to doubt the validity of the assurances provided by the US authorities to the effect that the death penalty would not be sought or imposed on him (see Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), nos. 24027/07 and others, 2010; Harkins and Edwards v. the United Kingdom, nos. 9146/07 and 32650/07, 2012; and McCallum v. Italy (dec.) [GC], no. 20863/21, 2022).
Consequently, the Court analysed the application against the test developed in its recent judgment Sanchez-Sanchez v. the United Kingdom [GC] (no. 22854/20, 2022), the first stage of which consisted of examining whether the applicant “has adduced evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if extradited, and in the event of his conviction, there is a real risk that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole would be imposed on him” (para. 34). In this respect, the Court observed that the applicant “despite being represented, failed to present any evidence […] to elucidate the level of likelihood that he would be sentenced to life imprisonment in the US” (para. 36). The mere fact that “some of the charges against [the applicant] may carry a life imprisonment sentence” (para. 37) is not a sufficient element to reach a conclusion, as opposed to examples of “defendants with records similar to his own who were found guilty of similar conduct and were sentenced to life imprisonment in the federal system” (idem).
The Court added that this latter element would have been read in conjunction with “pre-trial factors, such as [the applicant’s] agreeing to cooperate with the US government and the fact that he would enjoy procedural safeguards, such as the opportunity available […] to offer evidence regarding any mitigating factors relevant to sentencing and to appeal against any sentence imposed” (idem).
The Court therefore considered it unnecessary to proceed to the second limb of the test set out in Sanchez-Sanchez, namely the examination of the domestic mechanism for reviewing life sentences.
Conclusion ■ No violation of Article 3.
CANAVCI AND OTHERS v. TÜRKIYE ■ Applications nos. 24074/19 and 2 others ■ Second Section ■ 14 November 2023
Art 8 ■ Monitoring and recording of the applicants’ meetings with their lawyers while in prison, pursuant to a legislative decree adopted under the state of emergency declared in the aftermath of the coup attempt of 15 July 2016 ■ Application of impugned measures not based on a public prosecutor’s decision as required by the decree ■ Lack of individualised grounds in decisions to apply impugned measures ■ Open-ended application of measures undermined legal certainty ■ Absence of sufficient legislative safeguards against abuse and arbitrariness not justified by respondent State’s derogation ■ Judicial review not adequate or effective ■ Interference “not in accordance with the law”
Art 15 ■ Derogation in time of emergency
Facts ■ The applicants were placed in pre-trial detention in 2016 for alleged membership of the organisation referred to by the authorities as the FETÖ/PDY and considered a terrorist organisation. Relying on Article 8, the applicants complained about the monitoring and recording of their meetings with their lawyers while they were in prison, pursuant to a legislative decree which had been adopted under the state of emergency declared in the aftermath of the attempted coup in the same year. The applicants’ applications to the Constitutional Court were dismissed for failure to exhaust available remedies, which were not specified by the court.
Law ■ Article 8
The Court recalled that the “fundamental rule of respect for lawyer-client confidentiality may only be derogated from in exceptional cases and on condition that adequate and sufficient safeguards against abuse are in place” (para. 96).
The existence of an interference with the applicants’ rights, illustrated by the duration of the impugned measure and the number of meetings that have been monitored (up to 18 for the second applicant), was not disputed by the parties.
As regards the justification of the measure, the Court first noted that it had not been implemented in accordance with the law in respect of the third applicant, since the monitoring of his meetings with his lawyer had not been ordered by the public prosecutor.
While the measure had been lawfully implemented in respect of the first and second applicants, the Court observed that “the extent of and the procedures for the exercise of the discretionary power left to the authorities were not defined and no sufficient safeguards against abuse and arbitrariness were put in place” (para. 101). Furthermore, the Court noted that such measures were widely imposed on detainees charged with membership of the FETÖ/PDY, without an assessment of the risk that individual applicants’ meetings with their lawyers would constitute a security risk. This lack of individual assessment “inherently created difficulties for the applicants in raising their counter-arguments before a court during a review of the necessity of the measures and gave rise to a risk of arbitrariness in their application” (para. 102).
In addition, the said measures could be prolonged indefinitely as the relevant legal provisions did not define a maximum duration for their imposition, nor did they establish review mechanisms to determine their necessity after a given period of time, thereby undermining the principle of legal certainty.
Last, the Court found that the judicial review of the impugned measures had been inadequate. The domestic courts limited themselves to the examination of the lawfulness of the measures, without conducting an individual assessment of the case and without examining whether the reasons put forward in the decisions ordering the measures “had justified the monitoring and recording of the applicants’ meetings with their lawyers contrary to the principle of client-lawyer confidentiality” (para. 104).
Consequently, the Court considered that the impugned measures were “liable to be arbitrary and incompatible with the requirement of lawfulness” (para. 105). The Court added that the “absence of any safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse” in the legal basis for the measures cannot be regarded as having been justified by Türkiye’s derogation from the Convention in respect of Article 15, notified in the aftermath of the coup.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 8
Article 41 ■ EUR 9,750 to each applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 2,000, EUR 4,942 and EUR 2,184 respectively for each applicant in respect of costs and expenses.
VUKUŠIĆ v. CROATIA ■ Application no. 37522/16 ■ Second Section ■ 14 November 2023
Art 3 (substantive) ■ Inhuman and degrading treatment ■ Unjustified prolonged placement of prisoner, without clothing, in a specially secured padded cell and with lights continuously on ■ Period of time held indicated purpose of stay punitive ■ Restraining of applicant’s hands and ankles for four days not necessary and appeared to be contrary to domestic law
Art 3 (substantive) ■ Degrading treatment ■ Inadequate prison conditions
Facts ■ The applicant complained about his confinement in a specially secured cell, padded with rubber or other soft material to prevent self-harm (“rubber cell”) for two non-consecutive periods of time amounting to a total of 17 days. He alleged in particular that prison guards had placed him in the specially secured cell both times naked and with the lights on at all times, and the second time also with handcuffs and belts restraining his hands and ankles. Also relying on Article 3, he makes complaints about the conditions of his detention between 2011 and 2013 in Zagreb and Split Prisons, particularly on account of overcrowding.
Law ■ Article 3
While accepting that prisoners can be placed in rubber cells in order to protect them from self-harm, the Court noted that the long duration of the applicant’s stays in such a cell (12 and five days respectively) “indicate that the purpose of his stay had been punitive” (para. 38). In its reasoning, the Court referred to the CPT report CPT/Inf (2018) 44 published in 2018 strongly criticising the Croatian authorities for their punitive use of specialised secured cells.
Furthermore, the Court observed that the applicant’s conditions of detention in this cell (namely that he had been placed there naked, that the lights had remained on at all times preventing him from sleeping) “must have thus further exacerbated the applicant’s already vulnerable situation” (para. 39).
The Court also noted that the applicant had his hands and ankles restrained for four days, which not only appeared to be unnecessary since he had already been placed in a special cell, but also in breach of domestic law, which limits such practice to a period not exceeding 12 hours within a 24-hour period.
The Court added that the impugned measure “cannot be said to have been strictly required by the special circumstances of the state of emergency” following the 2016 coup attempt (para. 59).
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 3
Law ■ Article 3
The Court noted that the applicant had been held for 152 days in a cell with less than 3 sq. m of personal space in Zagreb prison, and for part of his stay in Split prison, and therefore concluded that there had been a violation of Article 3
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 3
Article 41 ■ EUR 15,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 4,000 in respect of costs and expenses.
MARIYA ALEKHINA AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA (No. 2) ■ Application no. 10299/15 ■ Third Section ■ 28 November 2023
Art 11 ■ Freedom of association ■ Refusal to register the applicants’ human rights organisation, for not complying with legal registration formalities, not based on relevant and sufficient reasons ■ Various refusal grounds unsubstantiated or insufficient in the circumstances ■ Refusal could not easily be remedied through a fresh application in the absence of any clear explanations or an opportunity to correct the purported defects ■ Refusal had a radical impact, preventing the organisation from even commencing any activity ■ Domestic courts’ failure to carry out any legal analysis and an independent judicial inquiry
Facts ■ The applicants (two members of a punk band, Pussy Riot, and a retired official from the Russian Federal Prison Service) attempted to establish a public association, “The Zone of Law”, with the object of providing legal assistance to prisoners. Each time, the authorities dismissed their application on different formalistic grounds. Their appeals before the domestic courts remained unsuccessful.
Law ■ Article 11
Having recalled that “the ability to establish a legal entity in order to act collectively in a field of mutual interest is one of the most important aspects of freedom of association” (para. 33, see also Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], no. 44158/98, 2004 and Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and Others v. Hungary, nos. 70945/11 and others, 2014), the Court considered established that the repeated refusal of the authorities to register the applicants’ organisation amounts to an interference with the exercise of their right under Article 11.
Although the Court expressed doubts “whether the repeated refusals of registration aimed at ensuring compliance with the law and therefore at ‘prevention of disorder’ or pursued any of the other aims that could justify an interference under Article 11 of the Convention” (para. 41), it proceeded with the examination of the necessity of the decisions complained of.
The Court found the grounds provided by the authorities to refuse the registration of the applicants’ organisation to be unsubstantiated. In addition, the authorities “did not give a clear explanation or an opportunity to correct the defects” (para. 48). The repeated refusal of registration caused the applicants’ inability to start their activities.
Furthermore, the Court observed that the domestic courts failed to conduct a thorough judicial review of the authorities’ refusal to register the applicants’ organisation. Instead, they accepted the authorities’ argument “at face value as constituting true facts, without an independent judicial inquiry” (para. 49).
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 11
Article 41 ■ EUR 7,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, EUR 1,920 in respect of costs and expenses.
SCHMIDT AND ŠMIGOL v. ESTONIA ■ Application nos. 3501/20 and 2 others ■ Third Section ■ 28 November 2023
Art 3 (substantive) ■ Inhuman or degrading treatment ■ Consecutive enforcement of disciplinary punishments and security measures in prison resulting in protracted periods of solitary confinement ■ Domestic maximum 45-day legal limit for solitary confinement of considerable length and rendered practically worthless by consecutive enforcement of disciplinary punishments ■ Prolonged solitary confinement entailed an inherent risk of harmful effect on any person’s mental health, irrespective of the material or other conditions surrounding it ■ Doubtful whether solitary confinement as a form of disciplinary punishment in the instant case was a measure of last resort ■ Absence of compelling reasons as to existence of exceptional circumstances capable of justifying use of such long periods of solitary confinement as a purely disciplinary measure
Facts ■The two applicants were detained at the time in Viru prison. They each received a series of disciplinary punishments in the form of solitary confinement under the punishment-cell regime, mainly for refusing to perform their work duties. On one occasion, the first applicant was also placed in a locked isolation-cell as a security measure. Consecutive enforcement of those measures led to uninterrupted periods of solitary confinement amounting to 566 days in respect of the first applicant (20 May 2016 – 6 December 2017) and 482 days in respect of the second applicant (1 June 2016 – 26 September 2017). The first applicant also initially spent between 30 and 69 days with breaks ranging from 6 to 36 days (between 27 June 2015 and 10 May 2016) in solitary confinement under either the punishment-cell regime or under the locked isolation-cell regime.The domestic courts, in relation to the two longer aforementioned periods, found that the consecutive enforcement of the disciplinary punishments was unlawful and violated the applicants’ rights. They awarded the applicants EUR 1,700 and EUR 1,500, respectively, in compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered. However, they found that the shorter periods spent by the first applicant in solitary confinement were lawful and did not violate his rights.
Law ■ Article 3
(i) Preliminary remarks about the use of solitary confinement as a disciplinary punishment
The Court expressed strong concerns about the use of solitary confinement, as a disciplinary measure, for long and consecutive periods of time. Such practice was, in principle, incompatible with Article 3, save for the Government being able to present compelling reasons as to the existence of exceptional circumstances that would justify such practice and to show that such disciplinary punishment was indeed used as a last resort.Referring to Resolution A/RES/70/175 of the General Assembly of the United Nations on United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) and the European Prison Rules, the Court noted that solitary confinement should be imposed only exceptionally as a measure of last resort and for the shortest possible period of time.
The CPT had strongly criticized the Estonian authorities in its reports CPT/Inf (2014) 1 and CPT/Inf (2019) 31 for excessive use of solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure and for separate sanctions being applied consecutively, resulting in very long periods of solitary confinement. The CPT had also noted that the maximum 45-day legal limit for placement in a punishment cell for adult inmates was too long and should be substantially reduced. Indeed, that limit, which should, in principle, operate as a safeguard against abuse, was not only three times longer than the maximum period considered acceptable by the CPT and the United Nations General Assembly (14 days and 15 consecutive days respectively), but also became practically worthless if in practice several disciplinary punishments could be and indeed were enforced consecutively.
The Court could not overlook what seemed to be a common practice in Viru prison to punish prisoners for their refusal to work by placing them in solitary confinement. In that connection, it noted that placement in a punishment cell was the most severe of the disciplinary sanctions available under the Imprisonment Act.
Furthermore, the Court did not underestimate the need to keep discipline and maintain security at prison. Infractions of different gravity might require different response and sanctions. However, given the information before it the Court had strong doubts whether placement in solitary confinement was indeed used exceptionally and as a measure of last resort in Viru prison. It was also open to question whether such supposed administrative practice left room for (re)assessment whether the imposed disciplinary measure had attained its purpose.
(ii) Overall assessment of the conditions of the applicants’ solitary confinement
Prolonged solitary confinement entailed an inherent risk of harmful effect on any person’s mental health, irrespective of the material or other conditions surrounding it. The Court had regard to the conditions and modalities of solitary confinement in relation to the more limited periods of its application, the fact that both applicants had been under regular medical supervision and that their long-term solitary confinement had not led to a noticeable deterioration in their physical health.
However, aside from rare opportunities to meet with a psychologist and the possibility to request a consultation with a psychiatrist, it did not appear that any measures had been in place to assess – on the prison authorities’ own initiative and at reasonably regular intervals – the applicants’ psychological capacity to deal with long-term solitary confinement and its effect on their mental health. The Court emphasised that prisoners kept in long-term solitary confinement needed particular attention in order to minimise the damage that that measure could do to them. Prisoners subjected to long-term solitary confinement could not always be expected to have the necessary awareness of and capacity to identify their own mental health problems and to ask for specialist intervention. Furthermore, in instances where, as a result of consecutive enforcement of disciplinary punishments, prisoners had spent extensive uninterrupted periods in solitary confinement, granting them a regular access to a psychologist or psychiatrist could not, in itself, justify or validate their continued placement in such conditions.
As for procedural safeguards, the applicants had been aware of the reasons for the imposition of the impugned disciplinary and security measures and could have challenged them before the domestic courts, but they had not done so. They had also had the possibility to challenge – and had challenged – the way those measures had been enforced in respect of them. Their arguments had been assessed at three levels of jurisdiction, and the domestic courts had provided a detailed analysis of their situation and the conditions in which they had had to spend their solitary confinement.
(iii) The Court’s assessment concerning the compatibility of the applicants’ solitary confinement with Article 3 of the Convention
The Court agreed with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in finding that even if the decisions to apply certain measures (disciplinary punishments or security measures) might in themselves be lawful, their uninterrupted enforcement might nonetheless be unacceptable from the perspective of Article 3.
As regards the longer periods of solitary confinement, the Court saw no reason to reach a different conclusion from that of the domestic courts which had relied, inter alia, on the Court’s case-law and had taken into account its duration combined with the scarcity of mental and physical stimulation and the lack of a mechanism to meaningfully assess the applicants’ physical and psychological capacity to deal with long-term solitary confinement.
As regards the shorter periods, the domestic courts had analysed the duration and lawfulness of each of the periods separately and considered whether each of them had been below or over the 45-day limit for each separate disciplinary punishment, the intervening periods that the first applicant had been able to spend under the regular prison regime and the fact that the locked isolation-cell regime had been imposed on him for different purposes than the punishment-cell regime.
The Court acknowledged that, if one accepted the enforcement of lawfully imposed sanctions and security measures, then alternating solitary confinement with periods during which prisoners were held under the regular prison regime did not appear to be arbitrary or excessive in itself.
The Court concurred with the Supreme Court that the longer the periods of solitary confinement, the longer should be the intervening periods during which the person was held under regular prison conditions – which presumably also afforded more possibilities to socialise and engage in other meaningful activities. By contrast, under circumstances in which extended periods of solitary confinement were interrupted only for negligible periods compared to the duration of isolation, such breaks would likely not offer the relief necessary to counteract the negative effects of the protracted isolation regime. The same applied, in principle, even when successive periods of solitary confinement were the result of the application of different disciplinary or security measures – so long as there was no marked difference between those measures in terms of the solitary nature of the detention regime arising from them. The Court acknowledged, however, that owing to the variety of security concerns that prison authorities must face and tackle in the interests of either their personnel or prisoners, it might not be possible to suspend or postpone the application of different security measures.
In the instant case the breaks, ranging between 6 and 36 days, between the periods of solitary confinement could not all be considered negligible. Further, while the period between the enforcement of two sets of disciplinary punishments in September-October 2015 had indeed been 52 days, the first applicant had nonetheless been placed under the locked isolation-cell regime for 33 of those 52 days. Thus, the period that he had spent under the regular regime had only been 19 days long.
Although alternating the enforcement of separate lawful and proportionate disciplinary punishments with reasonably long periods spent under the regular prison regime would not necessarily lead to the finding of a violation under Article 3, the specific circumstances surrounding the first applicant’s case in the instant proceedings could not be ignored: he had not only spent roughly 8 months out of approximately 11 months in solitary confinement between June 2015 and May 2016 (albeit with pauses), but that period had been followed only ten days later by a period of 566 days of uninterrupted solitary confinement. In total, between June 2015 and December 2017, the first applicant had spent only a little over 2 months under the regular prison regime. The Court found that the possibility to attend social programmes, have meetings with an inspector/contact person and a criminal probation officer, and to a lesser extent with a chaplain and with medical professionals and to have a few short-term meetings had not been sufficient to alleviate the negative effects arising from the first applicant having to spend repeated and extended periods in solitary confinement.
Lastly, the Court emphasised that the solitary confinement to which the applicants had been subjected had been imposed (in all instances but one) as a disciplinary measure, leading to their seclusion for long cumulative periods. In that regard, it was significant that the maximum 45-day limit seemed to have had no bearing on the manner the punishments had been consecutively enforced, as the applicants had been kept in solitary confinement for uninterrupted periods much longer than that limit. The Court had doubts whether, in the above circumstances, solitary confinement as a form of disciplinary punishment had been indeed imposed as a measure of last resort. In any event, the Government had not presented compelling reasons as to the existence of exceptional circumstances capable of justifying the use of such long periods of solitary confinement as a purely disciplinary measure.
Accordingly, the applicants’ solitary confinement between 27 June 2015 and 6 December 2017 and between 1 June 2016 and 26 September 2017, respectively had subjected them to hardship going beyond the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention.
(iv) The applicants’ victim status in view of the compensation awarded in the domestic proceedings
The first applicant could not be considered to have lost his victim status as regards the shorter periods of solitary confinement since the domestic courts had not found a violation of his rights in that regard.
As regards the longer periods, there had been an acknowledgement of a violation in substance by the domestic courts and thus the first condition for the loss of victim status had been fulfilled.
However, having regard to the sums it had awarded in similar cases, the Court found that the amounts awarded to the applicants had not constituted appropriate redress for the violations complained of in the light of the standards set by it in comparable situations: they had been unreasonably low, given the nature and duration of the violation of the applicants’ rights under Article 3. The Government’s objection as to the applicants’ victim status, which had been joined to the merits, was therefore dismissed.
Conclusion ■ Violation of Article 3 (unanimously) (in respect of the first applicant for all the periods between 27 June 2015 and 6 December 2017 spent under either the punishment-cell regime or the locked isolation-cell regime; and, in respect of the second applicant for the period between 1 June 2016 and 26 September 2017 spent under the punishment-cell regime).
Article 41 ■ EUR 12,500 to the first applicant and EUR 8,300 to the second applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage..
(See also Rohde v. Denmark, no. 69332/01, 21 July 2005, Legal summary; Ramirez Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 59450/00, 4 July 2006, Legal summary; Onoufriou v. Cyprus, no. 24407/04, 7 January 2010; Razvyazkin v. Russia, no. 13579/09, 3 July 2012; A.T. v. Estonia (no. 2), no.70465/14, 13 November 2018; N.T. v. Russia, no. 14727/11, 2 June 2020, Legal summary; Raudsepp v. Estonia (dec.), no. 22409/18, 9 June 2020)
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