Newsletter no.16 (8 January 2017) - Round-up of the ECtHR case-law (October - November 2016)

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Summaries

Klibisz v. Poland (no. 2235/02) – poor detention conditions / high security regime. The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in general were inadequate. He also claimed that his confinement under the high security regime constituted inhuman and degrading treatment. (violation of Article 3).

 Klimov v. Russia (no. 54436/14) & Maylenskiy v. Russia (no. 12646/15) & Piskunov v. Russia (no. 3933/12) – medical care. All three cases concerned allegations of inadequate medical care in detention (violation of Article 34 and Article 3 for Klimov and Maylenskiy, violation of Article 3 and Article 13 for Piskunov)

 T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary (no. 37871/14 and 73986/14) – review ofwhole life sentences. The case concerned new legislation introduced in Hungary in 2015 for reviewing whole life sentences. The legislation was introduced in order to comply with an ECtHR judgment of 2014 in which the Court found that the system for reviewing whole life sentences in Hungary should be reformed (violation of Article 3)

 W.P. v. Germany (no. 55594/13) – preventive detention. Relying on Article 5§1 and Article 7§1, the applicant complained that the extension of his detention beyond the ten-year maximum had unlawfully breached his right to liberty that it had been based on insufficient expert evidence and that it had amounted to retrospective punishment (no violation of Article 5§1, no violation of Article 7§1)

Alexopoulos and Others v. Greece (no. 41804/13) – material conditions of detention / effective remedy. The applicants complained about their conditions of detention (violation of Article 3, violation of Article 3 in conjunction with Article 13)

 Kalandia v. Greece (no. 48684/15) – material conditions of detention / medical care / interim measure. Relying on Article 3, the applicant complained of his conditions of detention and transfer and alleged that the treatment provided to him in detention had been inadequate. He complained in that regard that the interim measure indicated by the Court had not been implemented (violation of Article 3, no violation of Article 3, violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 13)

Pivovarnik v. Ukraine (no.29070/15) – medical care / interim measure. Relying on Article 3, the applicant complained that he had not been provided with adequate medical care in detention (violation of Article 3). Relying on Article 34 he also alleged that the Ukrainian government had failed to comply with the ECtHR interim measure (violation of Article 34).

 Konovalchuk v. Ukraine (no. 31928/15) – medical care / transportation / interim measure. The applicant alleged in particular that she had not been provided with adequate medical assistance in detentation and that the conditions of her transportation had been inhuman and degrading (violation of Article 3). The applicant further complained that the Government failed to ensure her medical examination and treatment following indication of the interim measure by the Court (violation of Article 34).

 [GC] Muršić v. Croatia (no. 7334/13) – material conditions of detention / overcrowding. The applicant complained about his material conditions of detention (violation of Article 3, no violation of Article 3).

Goryachkin v. Russia (no.34636/09) – right to a fair hearing. The applicant lodged several complaints before the national courts against his detention condition and the medical treatment he received in detention. He alleged that he had been denied an opportunity to appear in person before a court (violation of Article 6§1).

 Hamdemir and Others v. Turkey (no. 41896/08) – right to life. The applicants criticised the authorities for having used excessive and disproportionate force during a police operation in Bayrampaşa Prison in 2000 (violation of article 2)

4 October 2016

Klibisz v. Poland (no. 2235/02)

 The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention in particular that the imposition of the high-security regime in 2004 and 2010, entailing his solitary confinement, strip searches and surveillance, constituted inhuman and degrading treatment. During the total period of over five or six months, the applicant was committed to solitary cells.

The Court explained it cannot accept that the continued and indiscriminate application of the full range of measures that were available to the authorities under the regime for “prisoners posing a serious threat to society and the security of a prison” for up to more than ten months in 2004 and for three months in 2010, was necessary for maintaining prison security and compatible with Article 3 of the Convention. In particular, it considered that the negative psychological and emotional effects of the applicant’s social isolation, even if not complete, were aggravated by the routine application of other special security measures, in particular the strip searches

Taking into account the cumulative effect of the “dangerous detainee” regime on the applicant, the Court found that the authorities did not provide sufficient and relevant reasons which could justify, in the circumstances of the case, the severity of the measures taken. In particular, the authorities failed to show that the impugned measures were necessary in their entirety to attain the legitimate aim of ensuring prison security (§ 326). There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (§ 327).

See Piechowicz v. Poland, no. 20071/07, §§ 158-165, 17 April 2012; and, recently, Prus v. Poland, no. 5136/11, § 27, 12 January 2016 and Paluch v. Poland, no. 57292/12, § 36, 16 February 2016.

Klimov v. Russia (no. 54436/14) & Maylenskiy v. Russia (no. 12646/15) & Piskunov v. Russia (no. 3933/12)

All three cases concerned allegations of inadequate medical care in detention.  Violation of Article 34 and Article 3 (Klimov, Maylenskiy), violation of Article 3 and Article 13 (Piskunov)

The applicants in the first two cases, Vladimir Klimov and Artem Maylenskiy, are both now deceased.

In April 2012 Mr Klimov was diagnosed with kidney cancer. Medical panels subsequently confirmed this diagnosis on three occasions, comparing his medical condition against a list of illnesses provided for by Government decree which could have warranted his release. All his requests for release were, however, rejected by the courts on the ground that he was a particular danger to society and, in any case, was regularly receiving symptomatic treatment for his illness with anaesthetics. He was transferred to a prison hospital by court order in October 2014. He started receiving cancer-related treatment in December 2014, but died in April 2015.

Already suffering from advanced HIV and tuberculosis when arrested in May 2012, Mr Maylenskiy was admitted to the medical wing of his remand prison and prescribed with anti-tuberculosis treatment. However, a drug susceptibility test in January 2013 showed that the drugs he was taking were totally ineffective and in April 2013 his treatment was altered. In September 2014 a medical panel, assessing his condition against the list of illnesses in the Government decree, found him eligible for early release on health grounds. His application for release was however rejected by the courts due to his prior convictions and his failure to reform. He was eventually released in August 2015 and was admitted to a civilian hospital where he died in October 2015.

In these first two cases the Court decided to apply interim measures under Rule 39 (in November 2014 and March 2015, respectively), indicating to the Russian Government that the applicants should immediately be examined by independent medical experts. The Government responded by submitting a number of documents (including the applicants’ medical history, reports by the medical panels, certificates, reports and statements), asserting that the applicants’ medical treatment in detention corresponded to their needs. Both Mr Klimov and Mr Maylenskiy were examined by independent doctors at the request of their lawyers: their reports concluded that the medical care both men were receiving in detention was inadequate.

In the third case, Mr Piskunov started experiencing leg and back pain in May 2013. The detention authorities ignored his complaints and he therefore took painkillers supplied by his relatives. He was eventually diagnosed with prostate cancer in January 2014 after being sent to a civilian clinic for a scan. Between 2011 and 2014 he complained to various authorities about the quality of his medical care in detention, without success. A report by a medical panel subsequently concluded that he should be released on medical grounds, but a local court dismissed his application for release on the ground that he had been receiving adequate treatment in detention. This decision was then quashed on procedural grounds and the case was remitted for fresh consideration in December 2014. There is however no official information as regards the outcome of these proceedings or about his subsequent medical treatment.

Relying in particular on Article 3, all three applicants alleged that their medical care in detention was inadequate. Also relying on Article 34 (right of individual petition), the applicants in the first two cases alleged that the Russian Government had failed to have them examined by independent doctors in breach of an ECtHR interim measure. Mr Piskunov also complained that he had no effective remedies for his complaints either about his inadequate medical care in detention or about the conditions of his detention, in breach of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy).

In the Klimov case, the Court found that “as a result of the lack of comprehensive and adequate medical treatment, the applicant was exposed to prolonged mental and physical suffering that diminished his human dignity. The authorities’ failure to provide him with the medical care he needed amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment” (§ 68).

In the Maylenskiy case, the Court hold that the “deficiencies on the part of the medical authorities were tantamount to deprivation of the requisite medical care and amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment” (§ 53).

In the Piskunov case, the Court found did not see any “legal avenues that would constitute an effective remedy for the applicant’s complaints under Article 3 of the Convention” and found “that the applicant did not have at his disposal any effective domestic remedies for his complaints regarding the quality of his medical treatment and the conditions of his detention” (§ 46; violation of Article 13). The Court also considered there had been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the authorities’ failure to meet their responsibility to ensure that the applicant received adequate medical care during his detention (§ 51).

T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary (no. 37871/14 and 73986/14)

 The case concerned new legislation introduced in Hungary in 2015 for reviewing whole life sentences. The legislation was introduced in order to comply with an ECtHR judgment of 2014 in which the Court found that the system for reviewing whole life sentences in Hungary should be reformed.

The applicants, Mr T.P and Mr A.T., are Hungarian nationals are currently serving prison terms in Sátoraljaújhely (Hungary). Both applicants were sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility of parole. These judgments were upheld on appeal. Both their petitions for review before the Supreme Court as well as their requests for pardon were subsequently dismissed. Relying on Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), the applicants alleged that, even though new legislation had been introduced in Hungary in 2015, providing for automatic review of whole life sentences after 40 years, their sentences remained inhuman and degrading as they had no hope of release.

The Court recalled that in May 2014, in the case of László Magyar v. Hungary (no. 73593/10), it had found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention because presidential clemency – at the time the only possibility of release for a prisoner sentenced to life without parole – did not allow life prisoners to know what they had to do to be considered for release and under what conditions. Nor did the law guarantee a proper consideration of the changes in life prisoners and their progress towards rehabilitation. In order to comply with the findings in that case, the State enacted new legislation, introducing an automatic review of life sentences – a mandatory pardon procedure – after a convict has served 40 years of his or her sentence. The Court concluded, however, that making a prisoner wait 40 years before he or she could expect for the first time to be considered for clemency was too long. Indeed, such a period was significantly longer than the maximum recommended time frame – 25 years – for review of life sentences as established in a previous Court judgment Vinter and Others v. the UK (application nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10) on the basis of a consensus in comparative and international law. Such a protracted waiting period also fell outside any acceptable room for manoeuvre (“margin of appreciation”) enjoyed by States to decide on matters in the area of criminal justice and sentencing. Moreover, the Court expressed a number of concerns relating to the remainder of the procedure provided by the new legislation. First, while the new legislation set out objective, pre-established criteria to be taken into account by the Clemency Board when deciding whether or not to recommend a life prisoner for pardon, those criteria did not apply to the President of Hungary, who had the last say as to possible pardon in every individual case. In other words, the new legislation did not oblige the President to assess whether continued imprisonment was justified. Second, the new legislation failed to set a time-frame in which the President had to decide on the clemency application or to oblige him to give reasons for the decision, even if it was different from the recommendation by the Clemency Board. The Court was therefore not persuaded that, at the present time, the applicants’ life sentences could be regarded as providing them with the prospect of release or a possibility of review. There had accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. 

 

6 October 2016 

W.P. v. Germany (no. 55594/13)

Relying on Article 5§1 and Article 7§1, the applicant complained that the extension of his detention beyond the ten-year maximum had unlawfully breached his right to liberty that it had been based on insufficient expert evidence and that it had amounted to retrospective punishment.

Complaint under Article 5§1

The Court notes at the outset that the order for the applicant’s continued preventive detention was made under Article 67d of the Criminal Code, interpreted in the light of the Federal Constitutional Court’s judgment of 4 May 2011.

Despite the fact that, at the time of the impugned decisions of the domestic courts, the applicant was already some 68 years old and had been detained as a result of the judgment of the Lübeck Regional Court dated 28 March 1994 for some eighteen years, the applicant’s detention cannot be considered as arbitrary. The domestic courts, having regard to objective medical expert advice, convincingly reasoned that there was still a high risk that the applicant might commit further serious sexual offences (rape) if released, and thus posed a considerable threat to the public. There has accordingly been no violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention

Complaint under Article 7§1

The applicant further claimed that his continuing preventive detention beyond the former ten-year maximum duration, in so far as it had been executed in Hamburg-Fuhlsbüttel Prison between 22 May 2013 and 24 October 2013, had also violated the prohibition on retrospective punishment under Article 7 § 1 of the Convention.

Where preventive detention was, and could only be extended in order to treat a mental disorder in a suitable institution, the punitive element of preventive detention, and its connection with the person’s criminal conviction, was eclipsed to such an extent that the measure was no longer a penalty within the meaning of Article 7 § 1.

In these circumstances, the Court concludes that the applicant’s preventive detention in the period at issue could no longer be classified as a “penalty”. There has accordingly been no violation of Article 7 § 1 of the Convention.

Alexopoulos and Others v. Greece (no. 41804/13)

The applicants (10 Greek people, 1 Serb and 1 Turk) complained about their conditions of detention in Komotini Prison (violation of Article 3; violation of Article 3 in violation with Article 13)

The applicants refer to their version of detention conditions in Komotini prison and produce in support of their claims the pictures taken inside the dormitories and cells.

Each of the nine dormitories of 30 m² each hosted 25 detainees and twenty cells of 6 m² hosting 4, their personal space did not exceed 1.2 m² to 1.7 m² and a number of prisoners slept on the floor. The overcrowding in the prison was also denounced by prison staff in their letter of February 7, 2013 to the Minister of Justice in which they demanded the immediate decongestion of the prison. Added to this, there is the lack of common refectory in the prison forcing prisoners to eat their meals on their beds, mold on the ceilings and walls, and the lack of door to some of the cells toilet.

It was also found by the CPT in its report of July 5, 2013 which described as "intolerable" the situation in some cells.

There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

Kalandia v. Greece (no. 48684/15)

Relying on Article 3, the applicant complained of his conditions of detention and transfer and alleged that the treatment provided to him in detention had been inadequate. He complained in that regard that the interim measure indicated by the Court had not been implemented.

Complaints under Article 3

The Court notes the following findings of the CPT (2015 report): the cell had no access to natural light, ventilation was inadequate and a light bulb was lit continuously; the toilets, which were in the cell, were not separated and used detainees in the day shower and toilet on the corridor; night, detainees could not be in contact with the guards and thus could not ask out of their cells. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 concerning the conditions of detention in Larissa and Alikarnassos prisons and the conditions of transfer.

Regarding the transfer conditions in the hospitals of Thessaloniki Korydallos and a prison to prison and detention conditions in Thessaloniki transfer centers and Athens, the Court recalls that handcuffs are normally not a problem in terms of Article 3 of the Convention when linked with a lawful detention and does not entail the use of force or public exposure, beyond what is reasonably considered necessary. As to medical treatment, the Court finds that the authorities have fulfilled their obligation to provide the applicant with adequate medical assistance. There has accordingly been no violation of Article 3 on these two issues.

Complaints under Article 13

A remedy intended to allow the conditional release of inmates with disabilities or severe and permanent disease should be subject to the authorities, a review in time to even take into account the dignity and needs of them and to, if necessary, as soon as possible an end to the suffering endured by them, especially as the detention of these prisoners are often held in conditions incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention. Given these considerations, the Court considers that, in this case, the effectiveness of the remedy provided for in Article 110A of the Penal code has been affected by the duration of the examination of this remedy, in this case ten months.  There has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention taken together with Article 3.

Pivovarnik v. Ukraine (no.29070/15)

Relying on Article 3, the applicant complained that he had not been provided with adequate medical care in detention (violation of Article 3). Relying on Article 34 he also alleged that the Ukrainian government had failed to comply with the ECtHR interim measure (violation of Article 34).

The case concerned the complaint of the applicant Yuriy Pivovarnik about inadequate medical care in detention. Already diagnosed with hepatitis C before his arrest, he consulted the prison doctor on a number of occasions between August and December 2014 complaining of pain below his lower ribs. In December 2014 the prison authorities informed Mr Pivovarnik’s lawyer that his client needed to be examined by an infectious diseases specialist. In March 2015 a blood test, which confirmed the hepatitis C diagnosis, also confirmed that Mr Pivovarnik required medical attention. In June 2015 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decided to apply interim measures under Rule 39, indicating to the Ukrainian Government that Mr Pivovarnik should urgently be examined by a specialist doctor. As a result of this interim measure, Mr Pivovarnik had a comprehensive medical examination in July 2015 and the doctors found that he was suffering from liver impairment. The doctors recommended a number of blood tests and prescribed him with hepatoprotectors. He subsequently complained to the ECtHR that these recommendations were not being followed through. His treatment started in September 2015 and he had certain blood tests, just before his release on probation. Relying on Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), Mr Pivovarnik complained that he had not been provided with adequate medical care in detention. Also relying on Article 34 (right of individual petition), he alleged that the Ukrainian Government had failed to comply with the ECtHR interim measure, in particular certain recommended blood tests had not been carried out and he had only started receiving the treatment prescribed to him by doctors with a two-month delay.

The Court concluded that “the prison authorities failed to ensure regular and systematic medical supervision of the applicant’s condition and to put in place a comprehensive treatment strategy in respect of his hepatitis” (§ 45). Therefore, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.

Regarding the alleged violation of Article 34, the Court noted that the purpose of the interim measure “was to ensure that the applicant received appropriate medical assistance in detention while his case was pending before the Court”. However, “this purpose could not be achieved since the prison authorities merely ensured the initial examination of the applicant and then (…) apparently neglected to follow up on any of the medical recommendations made following that examination without providing any justification for this omission” (§ 60). The Court concluded, therefore, that the respondent State has failed to fulfil its obligation under Article 34 of the Convention (§ 62).

 

13 October 2016

Konovalchuk v. Ukraine (no. 31928/15)

The applicant alleged in particular that she had not been provided with adequate medical assistance in detentation and that the conditions of her transportation had been inhuman and degrading. The applicant further complained that the Government failed to ensure her medical examination and treatment following indication of the interim measure by the Court.

Complaint under Article 3

The Court observed that while on October 2014 a cytology test gave indication that the applicant had cancer she was not examined in this connection until December 2014. In addition, her treatment programme was interrupted on March 2015 after a transfer to a facility with no oncology specialists, and the question of treatment was not re-examined until June 2015. Accordingly, the Court concluded that, give the very serious nature of the applicant’s condition, there had been a violation of Article 3.

As regards the conditions of transportation the Court noted that the Government submitted that the applicant had been subject to the standard rail travel conditions for detainees which “have been deplored in domestic and international reports” (§68, see Koktysh v. Ukraine, §§104-108). The Court saw no reason to deport from its previous similar judgments and declared there had been a violation of Article 3.

Complaint regarding the interim measure

The Court recalled that the interim measure indicated on July 2015 “required that the applicant be (i) urgently examined by a medical specialist and (ii) immediately receive appropriate treatment” (§81). As regards the first element, the Court declared itself satisfied with the Government’s reaction and noted that “the applicant’s argument that her examination [...] did not comply with the interim measure because it was conducted at the [prison facility] rather than at a specialist medical institution lacks any substantiation” (§85). As regards the treatment, the Court noted a delay of at least twenty days in pursuing the applicant’s treatment programme between August and September 2015. Therefore, the Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 34 of the Convention.

 

20 October 2016

[GC] Muršić v. Croatia (no.7334/13)

In this case, the Grand Chamber was called upon to clarify the principles and standards for the assessment of the minimum personal space per detainee in multi-occupancy accommodation in prisons under Article 3 of the Convention

The Grand Chamber in this judgment did not consider itself bound by the European and International standards, especially the CPT’s available space standards (§§109-115). It then clarified the methodology for the calculation of the minimum personal space: (1) the in-cell sanitary facility should not be counted in the overall surface area of the cell; (2) calculation of the available surface area in the cell should include space occupied by furniture: in this regard, “what is important in this assessment is whether detainees had a possibility to move around within the cell normally”.

That said, it established its own standards:

-          In cases where a detainee disposed of more than 4 sq. m of personal space in multi-occupancy accommodation in prison and where therefore no issue with regard to the question of personal space arises, the other aspects of physical conditions of detention remained relevant for the Court’s assessment of adequacy of an applicant’s conditions of detention (see Story and Others v. Malta, nos. 56854/13, 57005/13 and 57043/13, §§ 112-113, 29 October 2015)

-          In cases where a prison cell measuring in the range of 3-4 sq. m of personal space per inmate was at issue, space remained a weighty factor in the Court’s assessment of the adequacy of conditions of detention. In such instances a violation of Article 3 would be found if the space factor was coupled with other aspects of inappropriate physical conditions of detention related to, in particular, access to outdoor exercise, natural light or air, availability of ventilation, adequacy of room temperature, the possibility of using the toilet in private, and compliance with basic sanitary and hygienic requirements;

-          There is a strong presomption of violation where the personal space available to a detainee fell below 3 sq. m of floor surface in multi-occupancy accommodation in prisons. The burden of proof is on the respondent Government which could, however, rebut that presumption by demonstrating that there were factors capable of adequately compensating for the scarce allocation of personal space.It would normally be the case only if the following factors were cumulatively met: (1) the reductions in the required minimum personal space of 3 sq. m were short, occasional and minor; (2 such reductions were accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement outside the cell and adequate out-of-cell activities ; (3) the applicant is confined in what is, when viewed generally, an appropriate detention facility, and there are no other aggravating aspects of the conditions of his or her detention. With regard to the question of sufficient freedom of movement, the Court referred to the relevant CPT standards according to which all prisoners must be allowed at least one hour of exercise in the open air every day and preferably as part of a broader programme of out-of-cell activities, bearing in mind that outdoor exercise facilities should be reasonably spacious  and whenever possible offer shelter from inclement weather  The Court recall that, according to the relevant international standards prisoners should be able to spend a reasonable part of the day outside their cells, engaged in purposeful activity of a varied nature (work, recreation, education), and that regimes in establishments for sentenced prisoners should be even more favourable. In short, when considering whether measures of compensation invoked are capable of rebutting the strong presumption of a violation of Article 3, the Court will have regard to factors such as: the time and extent of restriction; freedom of movement and adequacy of out-of-cell activities; and general appropriateness of the detention facility.

In the present case, the Court concluded that there has been a violation of Article 3 as regards the period of 27 days in which the applicant disposed of less than 3 sq. m of personal space, without assessing the other aspects of the material conditions of detention.  As regards the remainder of the non-consecutive periods in which the applicant disposed of less than 3 sq. m of personal space (from 1 to 8 days), the Court considered that there as been no violation of Article 3 (ten votes to seven). The applicant had been detained in generally appropriate conditions, the non-consecutive periods could be regarded as short and minor reductions in personal space, during which sufficient freedom of movement and out-of-cell activities had been available to him (the inmates were allowed to move freely outside their cells in the morning and afternoon, and to use the indoor and outdoor facilities of Bjelovar Prison).

Three partly dissenting opinion were annexed to the judgement (a joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Sajó, López Guerra and Wojtyczek; a joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Lazarova Trajkovska, De Gaetano and Grozev; a partly dissenting opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque).

 

15 November 2016

Goryachkin v. Russia (no. 34636/09)

The applicant had been sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment in 2005. The applicant issued two sets of civil proceedings against the authorities, claiming that he was subjected to poor conditions of detention, and that he had not been given adequate medical care for his ailments. Both claims were dismissed, the last of the decisions being issued on 28 April 2011. In both sets of proceedings, Mr Goryachkin requested leave to appear before the courts; however, his requests were denied, and he was not allowed to attend the hearings due to “the lack of a legal provision regulating inmates’ transport to civil courts” according the to Town Court (§47).

The Court noted that the case is similar to the case Yevdokimov and Others v. Russia (no.27236/05, 16 February 2016) were it concluded there had been a violation of Article 6§1. The Court saw no reason to depart from that conclusion. Accordingly, there had been a violation of Article 6§1.

 Hamdemir and Others v. Turkey (no. 41896/08)

The applicants are twelve Turkish nationals, relatives of the victims of the police operation carried out in December 2000 in Bayrampaşa Prison. Relying in particular on Article 2 (right to life), they criticised the authorities for having used excessive and disproportionate force during the operation in Bayrampaşa Prison.

The Court recalled it had already examined a similar case about the Bayrampaşa Prison police operation. It found there had been a violation of Article 2 due to the unnecessarily excessive use of force by the authorities (see Ismail Altun v. Turkey, no. 22932/02, 21 September 2010). It saw no reason to depart from this conclusion. Accordingly, there had been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention.

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